A Defense of Rule Utilitarianism against David Lyons who Insists on Tieing it to Act Utilitarianism, Plus a Brand New Way of Checking out General Utilitarian Properties

1968 ◽  
Vol 65 (18) ◽  
pp. 533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gertrude Ezorsky
Keyword(s):  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Act Utilitarianism

Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice

1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Harsanyi
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Expectation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Social Utility ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Act Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism and the Concept of Social UtilityIn this paper I propose to discuss the concepts of equality and justice from a rule utilitarian point of view, after some comments on the rule utilitarian point of view itself.Let me start with the standard definitions. Act utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is one that in the existing situation will produce the highest expected social utility. (I am using the adjective “expected” in the sense of mathematical expectation.) In contrast, rule utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is simply an action conforming to the correct moral rule applicable to the existing situation. The correct moral rule itself is that particular behavioral rule that would yield the highest expected social utility if it were followed by all morally motivated people in all similar situations.

scholarly journals The Eligibility of Rule Utilitarianism

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Mokriski
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Natural Property ◽  
Significant Cost ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Moral Permissibility ◽  
Act Utilitarianism ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Commonsense Morality

According to the eligibility theory of meaning, often attributed to David Lewis, the referent of a predicate is the property that best balances the twin constraints of charity (i.e. fit with our usage of the term) and eligibility, where eligibility is a function of metaphysical naturalness (i.e. how much of a natural kind the property is). This sort of metasemantics, which is motivated by its ability to resolve problems of indeterminacy and secure shared reference between disputing parties, can be somewhat friendly towards revisionary (i.e. counterintuitive) theories, since highly natural properties can act as “reference magnets,” securing our reference despite some mismatch with usage. In this paper, I apply these considerations to normative ethics and argue that the theory of rule utilitarianism achieves a high balance of charity and eligibility. I proceed by comparing rule utilitarianism to two of its well-known rivals, act utilitarianism and Rossian pluralism (a.k.a. “Commonsense Morality”). I show how the former achieves a high degree of eligibility but only at a significant cost of charity, while the latter does the opposite, fitting very nicely with our considered judgments but at the price of very low eligibility. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, strikes a good balance between these extremes; it assigns to our core moral term (‘moral permissibility’) a relatively natural property without doing too much damage to our moral convictions. Thus, rule utilitarianism should be regarded as a promising moral theory by any philosopher who takes seriously considerations of eligibility and naturalness.

Consequentialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Anna Smajdor ◽  
Jonathan Herring ◽  
Robert Wheeler
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Act Utilitarianism

This chapter explains the consequentialist approach to ethical analysis. It distinguishes act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. It also considers different possibilities as to which outcomes should be considered relevant for consequentialists. It considers a number of challenges and objections to consequentialist ethics.

The Iterated-Utilitarianism of J.S. Mill

1979 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Act Utilitarianism ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The interpretation of the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill has been a matter of controversy at least since J.O. Urmson published his well known paper over twenty-five years ago. Urmson attributed to Mill a form of “rule-utilitarianism”, contrasting his reading with the “received view” on which Mill held a form of “act-utilitarianism”. Since then, the interpretive problem has typically been seen to be that of determining which of these two types of theory should be attributed to Mill, or, at least of determining whether Mill was a “rule-utilitarian”. However, as the distinction is typically made, it is possible to have a utilitarian theory which is neither an act- nor a rule-utilitarian theory (nor a form of “utilitarian generalization“). 1n particular, as I will attemptto show, Mill's theory is of neither type but is an example of a sophisticated type of utilitarianism which we might call “iterated-utilitarianism”, for reasons which will become clear in what follows.

scholarly journals „What if everybody does the same?” (Mill and the utilitarian generalization)

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-130
Author(s):  
Nenad Cekic
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Generalization Test ◽  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Act Utilitarianism

The debate whether ethical thought of John Stuart Mill should be interpreted as a sort of rule-utilitarianism or in a manner of ?classical? act-utilitarianism was launched in early 1950?s. One of the ?proofs? that Mill, in fact, was a rule-utilitarian is based on the presence of the ?generalization test? in his work. This test in the form of asking and answering the question ?What if everybody does the same?? is the essence of socalled ?utilitarian generalization? - one of two main forms of rule-utilitarianism. The author discusses what the purpose of this test in Mill?s work has. It is usually assumed that ?generalization test? is normative in its nature, but there is strong evidence in Mill?s text that it has a fact-tracking role. The fact-tracking sense of the ?generalization test? cannot prove that Mill was rule-utilitarian.

scholarly journals Czego należy oczekiwać od utylitaryzmu czynów?

Etyka ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 87-109
Author(s):  
R. Bales
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Act Utilitarianism

In recent years, act-utilitarianism has been distinguished from rule-utilitarianism. We may say (roughly) that act-utilitarianism is the thesis that a particular act (as opposed to a type of act or class of acts) is right if and only if its utility – that is contribution towards intrinsically good states of affairs – is no less than that of some alternative act. Rule-utilitarianism is (roughly) the thesis that an act is right if and only if it conforms to a rule somehow grounded in utility. The present paper concerns one type of argument sometimes used as an attempt to show that act-utilitarianism cannot be an adequate ethical theory. Arguments of this type are characterized by an emphasis on practical difficulties involved in, or paradoxes arising out of, the attempt to apply act-utilitarianism theory to concrete moral situations.

Brink, Kagan, Utilitarianism and Self-Sacrifice

Utilitas ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Method ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Rule Utilitarianism ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Act Utilitarianism ◽  
David Brink

Act-utilitarianism claims that one is required to do nothing less than what makes (or can reasonably be expected to make) the largest contribution to overall utility. Critics of this moral theory commonly charge that it is unreasonably demanding. Shelly Kagan and David Brink, however, have recently defended act-utilitarianism against this charge. Kagan argues that act-utilitarianism is right, and its critics wrong, about how demanding morality is. In contrast, Brink argues that, once we have the correct objective account of welfare and once we accept that act-utilitarianism is a criterion of moral rightness, not necessarily a good method for everyday moral thought, act-utilitarianism is not as demanding as its critics claim. I shall argue that Brink's arguments for thinking act-utilitarianism is not so demanding fail. I shall then argue against Kagan that, in comparison with act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism is considerably less demanding and more plausible.

The Disutility of Act-Utilitarianism

1973 ◽  
Vol 23 (93) ◽  
pp. 289 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Mackie
Keyword(s):  
Act Utilitarianism
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document