The Political Conception of Human Rights and Its Rule(s) of Recognition

The political conception makes sense of human rights strictly in light of their role in international human rights practice, more specifically by describing how they justify interventions against states that engage in or fail to prevent human rights violations. This conception is, therefore, normative and fact-dependent. Beyond this, it does not seem to have much to say about the actual nature of international human rights practice. The argument sustained here reinterprets the political conception by resorting to a heuristic device that explains how normativity can be fact-dependent: the Hartian model. The characteristics of H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition are useful to determine the characteristics of human rights practice from the viewpoint of the political conception. Also, they help to overcome some of the problems typically faced by the political conception, such as whether there is only one practice or many, whether the notion of human rights becomes too contingent on the way the world is currently organised, how agents can violate content-changing practices, or how reliance on current states of affairs leaves room for criticism of those states of affairs.

Induction, Experimentation and Causation in the Social Sciences

Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult to make reliable inferences in the social sciences. In particular, we want knowledge about general causal relations in order to be able to determine what to do in order to achieve a certain state of affairs. Knowledge about causal relations that are also valid in the future requires experiments or so called ‘natural experiments’. Only knowledge derived from such experiences enable us to draw reasonably reliable inferences about how to act in order to achieve our goals.

Will and Volition: Personal Conditions of Possibility of Being an Agent

Will is a very old important philosophical concept, an analysis of which is very specific, if not odd, comparatively with the others (when it fruitfully proceeds in terms of criteria). This concept (‘will’) is going to be used to provide and clarify conditions of possibility for person of being an agent. In doing that I refer to the correspondent pieces of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations; and to their interpretations by M. Alvarez in “Wittgenstein on Action and Will” (2009) and D. K. Levy in “Morality without Agency” (2017). Person is essentially constituted by ‘powerless’ will in terms of ‘understanding’ that is experienced during her life. Action depends on and manifests understanding by will of a personal attitude to some states of affairs. Will does not incline a person to particular desires about preferable states of affairs or actions. Will is not about states of affairs. By willing I value the world, its portions, they appear significant, important to me. Volition is treated as related to will. Both are personal conditions of being an agent with priority of agency as capacity realized by rational actions.

Bayes factors for mixed-effects models

In psychology, we often want to know whether or not an effect exists. The traditional way of answering this question is to use frequentist statistics. However, a significance test against a null hypothesis of no effect cannot distinguish between two states of affairs: evidence of absence of an effect, and absence of evidence for or against an effect. Bayes factors can make this distinction; however, uptake of Bayes factors in psychology has so far been low for two reasons. Firstly, they require researchers to specify the range of effect sizes their theory predicts. Researchers are often unsure about how to do this, leading to the use of inappropriate default values which may give misleading results. Secondly, many implementations of Bayes factors have a substantial technical learning curve. We present a case study and simulations demonstrating a simple method for generating a range of plausible effect sizes based on the output from frequentist mixed-effects models. Bayes factors calculated using these estimates provide intuitively reasonable results across a range of real effect sizes. The approach provides a solution to the problem of how to come up with principled estimates of effect size, and produces comparable results to a state-of-the-art method without requiring researchers to learn novel statistical software.

Applied Linguists

This paper seeks out future directions for the field of study that has by now fully consolidated itself as an independent discipline under the name of Applied Linguistics. Special attention is drawn to the ‘loosening up’ of the very notion of language as a hermetically sealed entity, impervious to outside influences, as well as the groundbreaking critical turn it has taken in recent years, along with the impulse to intervene in the states of affairs that it unveils through painstaking studies. It is shown that this last development is by no means an optional follow-through from the analytic work customarily done. Rather, it is an inevitable sequel to the new stance adopted by researchers in the field – a development whose roots can, oddly enough, be traced back to Saussure’s thoughts at the very dawn of Linguistics, its ‘mother discipline’. But it is also emphasized that, side by side with these exciting prospects, there also appear on the horizon some serious challenges to reckon with in the years ahead.

Dismantling the Chinese Room with linguistic tools: a framework for elucidating concept-application disputes

Imagine advanced computers that could, by virtue merely of being programmed in the right ways, act, react, communicate, and otherwise behave like humans. Might such computers be capable of understanding, thinking, believing, and the like? The framework developed in this paper for tackling challenging questions of concept application (in any realm of discourse) answers in the affirmative, contrary to Searle’s famous ‘Chinese Room’ thought experiment, which purports to prove that ascribing such mental processes to computers like these would be necessarily incorrect. The paper begins by arguing that the core issue concerns language, specifically the discourse-community-guided mapping of phenomena onto linguistic categories. It then offers a model of how people adapt language to deal with novel states of affairs and thereby lend generality to their words, employing processes of assimilation, lexemic creation, and accommodation (in intersense and intrasense varieties). Attributions of understanding to some computers lie in the middle range on a spectrum of acceptability and are thus reasonable. Possible objections deriving from Searle’s writings require supplementing the model with distinctions between present and future acceptability, and between contemplated and uncontemplated word uses, as well as a literal-figurative distinction that is more sensitive than Searle’s to actual linguistic practice and the multiplicity of subsenses possible within a single literal sense. The paper then critiques two misleading rhetorical features of Searle’s Chinese Room presentation, and addresses a contemporary defense of Searle that seems to confront the sociolinguistic issue, but fails to allow for intrasense accommodation. It concludes with a brief consideration of the proper course for productive future discussion.

Representing Polar Questions

Although the linguistic properties of polar questions have been extensively studied, comparatively little is known about how polar questions are processed in real time. In this paper, we report on three eye-tracking experiments on the processing of positive and negative polar questions in English and French. Our results show that in the early stages, participants pay attention to both positive and negative states of affairs for both positive and negative questions. In the late stages, positive and certain negative polar questions were associated with a bias for the positive state, and this bias appears to be pragmatic in nature. We suggest that different biases in mental representations reflect the hearer’s reasoning about the speaker’s purposes of enquiry.

Qualitative properties and relations

This paper is concerned with two concepts of qualitativeness that apply to intensional entities (i.e., properties, relations, and states of affairs). I propose an account of pure qualitativeness that largely follows the traditional understanding established by Carnap, and try to shed light on its ontological presuppositions. On this account, an intensional entity is purely qualitative iff it does not ‘involve’ any particular (i.e., anything that is not an intensional entity). An alternative notion of qualitativeness—which I propose to refer to as a concept of strict qualitativeness—has recently been introduced by Chad Carmichael. However, Carmichael’s definition presupposes a highly fine-grained conception of properties and relations. To eliminate this presupposition, I tentatively suggest a different definition that rests on a concept of perspicuous denotation. In the penultimate section, both concepts of qualitativeness are put to work in distinguishing between different ‘grades’ of qualitative discriminability.

How (not) to construct worlds with responsibility

In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be (at least partly) morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false.