Consequentialism

This chapter explains the consequentialist approach to ethical analysis. It distinguishes act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. It also considers different possibilities as to which outcomes should be considered relevant for consequentialists. It considers a number of challenges and objections to consequentialist ethics.

The Eligibility of Rule Utilitarianism

According to the eligibility theory of meaning, often attributed to David Lewis, the referent of a predicate is the property that best balances the twin constraints of charity (i.e. fit with our usage of the term) and eligibility, where eligibility is a function of metaphysical naturalness (i.e. how much of a natural kind the property is). This sort of metasemantics, which is motivated by its ability to resolve problems of indeterminacy and secure shared reference between disputing parties, can be somewhat friendly towards revisionary (i.e. counterintuitive) theories, since highly natural properties can act as “reference magnets,” securing our reference despite some mismatch with usage. In this paper, I apply these considerations to normative ethics and argue that the theory of rule utilitarianism achieves a high balance of charity and eligibility. I proceed by comparing rule utilitarianism to two of its well-known rivals, act utilitarianism and Rossian pluralism (a.k.a. “Commonsense Morality”). I show how the former achieves a high degree of eligibility but only at a significant cost of charity, while the latter does the opposite, fitting very nicely with our considered judgments but at the price of very low eligibility. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, strikes a good balance between these extremes; it assigns to our core moral term (‘moral permissibility’) a relatively natural property without doing too much damage to our moral convictions. Thus, rule utilitarianism should be regarded as a promising moral theory by any philosopher who takes seriously considerations of eligibility and naturalness.

Mill, rule-utilitarianism and „incoherence objection”

So-called ?incoherence objection? or ?rule-worship? objection is one of the most famous objections to ?rule-utilitarianism? approach to ethics. The author analyzes two indications present in current ethical literature: 1) that John Stuart Mill was aware of ?incoherence objection?; and 2) that some early critics of Mill?s Utilitarianism were founded on this objection. In the end, the author examines if John Rawls? distinction between ?summary? and ?practice? rules could resolve the issue posed by incoherence objection.

„What if everybody does the same?” (Mill and the utilitarian generalization)

The debate whether ethical thought of John Stuart Mill should be interpreted as a sort of rule-utilitarianism or in a manner of ?classical? act-utilitarianism was launched in early 1950?s. One of the ?proofs? that Mill, in fact, was a rule-utilitarian is based on the presence of the ?generalization test? in his work. This test in the form of asking and answering the question ?What if everybody does the same?? is the essence of socalled ?utilitarian generalization? - one of two main forms of rule-utilitarianism. The author discusses what the purpose of this test in Mill?s work has. It is usually assumed that ?generalization test? is normative in its nature, but there is strong evidence in Mill?s text that it has a fact-tracking role. The fact-tracking sense of the ?generalization test? cannot prove that Mill was rule-utilitarian.

How should utilitarians think about the future?

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.