The essence of democracy

1915 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Hasbach
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Social Democracy ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Active Citizenship ◽  
Political Democracy ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
The People ◽  
European Science

Mr. W. J. Shepard, in a review of my work, Die moderne Demokratie, remarks that I have forgotten its spirit in the study of its forms. “It is not the vitalizing spirit,” he writes, “the impelling motive force, the broadly based popular sentiment of democracy that is of interest, but only the forms and mechanism ‥‥ of democratic-republican states.” Now I have in the fifth chapter of the second book presented the theory of political democracy, in the sixth that of social democracy, and in the seventh that of democratic socialism; and in the first of these three chapters I have discussed popular sovereignty and active citizenship, the supremacy of the majority in a democracy, the unlimited constituent power of the people (pouvoir constituant), in which European science has conceived the essence of this form of the state to reside in contradistinction to other forms. But Mr. Shepard has a different conception of its nature. He has raised an interesting question in this connection which I should like to discuss in the following pages.Brief though his statement on this point is, no one can doubt that he considers the supremacy of public opinion as the essence of democracy, since he writes: “No discussion of the nature, elements and effects of public opinion, no appreciation of the spirit of democracy is to be found in the covers of this volume.” As a matter of fact I have treated of this subject in the above-mentioned first division of the fifth chapter, which is devoted to the discussion of popular sovereignty, though certainly in the brief compass which appeared to me sufficient for the understanding of the nature of democracy.

Constituent power and people-as-the-governed: About the ‘invisible’ people of political and legal theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
GENEVIÈVE NOOTENS
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Modern Concept ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The Core ◽  
The People ◽  
The Status ◽  
State Relations ◽  
Relations Of Power

AbstractThe core promise of the modern concept of constituent power is to make the people-as-the-governed active participants in the shaping and ruling of political regimes. Its development was related to the consolidation of the modern state. Current circumstances, though, raise the issue of the possibility of a non-state based concept of constituent power, and of appropriate constituencies. The article argues that dominant views have made the people-as-the-governed capacity to act dependent upon state sovereignty, whereas the latter actually was informed by theses antithetical to popular sovereignty. In order to show how a non-state based concept of constituent power may be articulated, the article builds on a critique of Martin Loughlin’s attempt to capture the structure of beliefs that frames the idea of the state and the function of constituent power within that structure. The first part of the article focuses on the main elements of such a theory in order to situate its basic assumptions about constituent power. The second discusses the issues raised by such a conception, amongst other things as to the status granted to the structure of beliefs that frames the idea of the modern polity in Loughlin’s perspective; this discussion opens the way to an alternative conception of constituent power, one that stresses that the core fact of the political is that people are always already embedded in relations of power that are not restricted to the state, relations in the course of which they strive to achieve their civic freedom. Political power is not necessarily made public until the people-as-the-governed, in challenging the boundaries of the polity, claim it.

The Power of the People

2020 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Ari Hirvonen ◽  
Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Contemporary Theory ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Theoretical Idea ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Alain Badiou ◽  
Jacques Ranciere ◽  
The People ◽  
Jacques Rancière

In this chapter Hirvonen and Lindroos-Hovinheimo argue that the revolutionary power of constituent power and popular sovereignty are relevant conditions of radical emancipatory and egalitarian politics. How the people become the people – and what makes the people in its becoming – are relevant questions in modern democracy. The article considers the power of the people as a theoretical idea and political possibility. It brings together the older tradition of political philosophy with contemporary theory by discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas together with those of Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Alain Badiou.

scholarly journals The Strange Fruit of the Tree of Liberty: Lynch Law and Popular Sovereignty in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834
Author(s):  
Michael Gorup
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
African Americans ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
The Right

Lynch mobs regularly called on the language of popular sovereignty in their efforts to authorize lynchings, arguing that, as representatives of the people, they retained the right to wield public violence against persons they deemed beyond the protections of due process. Despite political theorists’ renewed interest in popular sovereignty, scholars have not accounted for this sordid history in their genealogies of modern democracy and popular constituent power. I remedy this omission, arguing that spectacle lynchings—ones that occurred in front of large crowds, sometimes numbering in the thousands—operated as public rituals of racialized people-making. In the wake of Reconstruction, when the boundaries of the polity were deeply contested, spectacle lynchings played a constitutive role in affirming and circulating the notion that the sovereign people were white, and that African Americans were their social subordinates.

The Theory of the State as a Sovereign Juristic Person

1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth C. Cole
Keyword(s):  
Political History ◽  
Public Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
General Conception ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Constitutional Morality

The casual student of Western political history encounters sovereignty in a number of guises. In the stage of absolute monarchy, it was a personal endowment of princes; in the stage of democracy, it seems to be a collective endowment of the “nation” or the “people.” In the latter period, moreover, a definition of law as the command of a sovereign becomes increasingly popular.These various contexts for sovereignty will already have suggested the protean possibilities of the general conception, but the student will have had little difficulty in sensing its generally anti-constitutional influence. Even popular sovereignty, which sounds the least dangerous, has had to be offset by opposing institutions in accounting for the relatively high constitutional morality of the democratic system.While, therefore, it is not surprising to find sovereignty again (and in a still different guise) when we examine the leading conceptions of American public law, one well may marvel to find it accorded a key position among them. For, strange to say, the sovereignty of the state is widely accepted as the cornerstone of a legal edifice which the lawyers themselves appear to have laid.

scholarly journals Rousseau, theorist of constituent power

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Careful Exploration ◽  
The One

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.

The People Shall Be Judge

2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 749-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Vatter
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Political Judgment ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The People ◽  
Civil Condition

This essay offers an interpretation of Kant’s republicanism in light of the problem of political judgment. Kant is sometimes thought to base his conception of law on an idea of sovereignty drawn from Hobbes and Rousseau, which would leave little room for popular contestation of the state. In this essay, I reconstruct Kant’s account of the rule of law by bringing out the importance of his theory of judgment. I argue that for Kant the civil condition is ultimately characterized by a contest between the judgment of the sovereign and the judgment of the people, which corresponds to the determinative and reflective employments of political judgment, respectively. On this view, popular sovereignty is ultimately located in the people’s power to judge politically and contest publicly the state.

Hegel's Politics: Liberal or Democratic?

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Drydyk
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
French Revolution ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Press Freedom ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
The French Revolution

It probably comes as a surprise to no one that Hegel's political philosophy is difficult to interpret. But his political thought clearly poses problems which the rest of his work does not (especially), and these problems arise from apparent political ambivalence on his part towards the French Revolution, towards monarchy, towards the doctrine of popular sovereignty, towards public opinion and press freedom - well, there is scarcely a reader of Hegel who could not add some additional topic to this already lengthy list. For instance, Hegel sometimes noted how crucial it is for a state to be decisive; every state needs a reservoir of decisiveness, supplied preferably by a monarch, who ‘has become the personality of the state,’ who ‘cuts short the weighing of the pros and cons between which it lets itself oscillate perpetually now this way and now that, and by saying “I will” make its decision and so inaugurates all activity and actuality.’

The institutionalisation of public opinion: Bentham’s proposed constitutional role for jury and judges

Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-235
Author(s):  
Oren Ben-Dor
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Radical Reform ◽  
The People ◽  
Good Government ◽  
Free Interaction

Jeremy Bentham’s constitutional writings are innovative and radical. Unlike constitutional arrangements that sought to attain virtue though the institutional complexity entailed by the doctrine of Separation of Powers, Bentham’s constitution was socially dynamic and designed to facilitate constant and efficient interaction between amorphous public opinion and officials. Furthermore, it was in constant and free interaction between public opinion and officials that Bentham envisioned the determination and effectuation of constitutional limits, namely both the justification and limitation of coercion. The paper begins by outlining Bentham’s principles for a good constitution. It then discusses in detail Bentham’s proposals for incorporating public opinion into legal proceedings through radical reform to the jury. Such incorporation, he believed, would intensify and help to focus public gaze by which officials’ aptitude, and as a result a good government, would be attained with the minimal expense. The proposed institutionalisation of public opinion enabled Bentham to entrust the judiciary with a constitutional role. Judges were conceived as the interface between officialdom and focused manifestations of popular sovereignty. So entrusted, judges could determine constitutional limits, thus protecting against abuse of power. The reforms discussed in this paper are a testimony of the extent to which Bentham saw virtue both in the people and in free public debate.

scholarly journals Rousseau, theorist of constituent power

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Careful Exploration ◽  
The One

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.

Beyond the People

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoran Oklopcic
Keyword(s):  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The People ◽  
Sovereign Equality ◽  
Collective Self ◽  
The One ◽  
Canonical Texts ◽  
Point Of Departure

Who is ‘the people’? How does it exercise its power? When is the people entitled to exercise its rights? From where does that people derive its authority? What is the meaning of its self-government in a democratic constitutional order? For the most part, scholars approach these questions from their disciplinary perspectives, with the help of canonical texts, and in the context of ongoing theoretical debates. Beyond the People is a systematic and comprehensive, yet less disciplinarily disciplined study that confronts the same questions, texts, and debates in a new way. Its point of departure is simple and intuitive. A sovereign people is the work of a theoretical imagination, always shaped by the assumptions, aspirations, and anticipations of a particular theorist-imaginer. To look beyond the people is to confront them directly, by exploring the ways in which theorists script, stage, choreograph, record, and otherwise evoke the scenes, actors, actions, and events that permit us to speak intelligibly—and often enthusiastically—about the ideals of popular sovereignty, self-determination, constituent power, ultimate authority, sovereign equality, and collective self-government. What awaits beyond these ideals is a new set of images, and a different way to understand the perennial Who? What? Where? When? and How? questions—not as the suggestions about how best to understand these concepts, but rather as the oblique and increasingly costly ways of not asking the one we probably should: What, more specifically, do we need them for?

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