scholarly journals Rousseau, theorist of constituent power

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
JI Colón-Ríos

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-113
Author(s):  
Hanna Lukkari

This chapter presents a reading of Hannah Arendt’s constitutional thinking from the perspective of the paradox of constituent power. The paradox at issue here is that, on the one hand, in order to exercise its constituent power, ‘the people’ needs some kind of representation, but on the other hand, all forms of representation are determinations of collective existence and held, in a constitutional democracy, to derive their power from ‘the people’. At stake in constitutional democracy is the contingency of representations of ‘the people’ and the possibility of their modification in response to claims that exclusion from or inclusion within ‘the people’ is violent and alienating. This chapter argues that the paradox ‘glimmers’ in Arendt’s work: it almost crystallizes into an account of the tensions present in ‘the act of founding’, but the ambiguities are again obscured by her republican ideal of constitutio libertatis. The chapter also traces an implication of this ‘glimmering’ in Arendt’s work that is problematic from the perspective of political pluralism: her ‘civilisationalism’. 


Author(s):  
Zoran Oklopcic

Who is ‘the people’? How does it exercise its power? When is the people entitled to exercise its rights? From where does that people derive its authority? What is the meaning of its self-government in a democratic constitutional order? For the most part, scholars approach these questions from their disciplinary perspectives, with the help of canonical texts, and in the context of ongoing theoretical debates. Beyond the People is a systematic and comprehensive, yet less disciplinarily disciplined study that confronts the same questions, texts, and debates in a new way. Its point of departure is simple and intuitive. A sovereign people is the work of a theoretical imagination, always shaped by the assumptions, aspirations, and anticipations of a particular theorist-imaginer. To look beyond the people is to confront them directly, by exploring the ways in which theorists script, stage, choreograph, record, and otherwise evoke the scenes, actors, actions, and events that permit us to speak intelligibly—and often enthusiastically—about the ideals of popular sovereignty, self-determination, constituent power, ultimate authority, sovereign equality, and collective self-government. What awaits beyond these ideals is a new set of images, and a different way to understand the perennial Who? What? Where? When? and How? questions—not as the suggestions about how best to understand these concepts, but rather as the oblique and increasingly costly ways of not asking the one we probably should: What, more specifically, do we need them for?


Author(s):  
Benjamin Ask Popp-Madsen

The article investigates Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt’s theory of the constituent power. By comparing Schmitt and Arendt’s notions of democracy, the people and the public sphere, the article seeks to establish an alternative to deliberative democracy’s conceptualisation of the relation between democracy and the public sphere. By pointing to the differences between the debating and legitimating public sphere inherent in deliberative democracy on the one hand and the lawgiving and constituting public sphere in the works of Schmitt and Arendt on the other, the article investigates Schmitt’s notion of plebiscitary democracy and Arendt’s idea of a federal republic of councils. These political modes of organizations attempt to overcome the hierarchical relation between representatives and represented and seek to envision the people as able, when gathered together in public, to give laws themselves, and not only play the role as electors or debaters.


Trictrac ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petru Adrian Danciu

Starting from the cry of the seraphim in Isaiahʹ s prophecy, this article aims to follow the rhythm of the sacred harmony, transcending the symbols of the angelic world and of the divine names, to get to the face to face meeting between man and God, just as the seraphim, reflecting their existence, stand face to face. The finality of the sacred harmony is that, during the search for God inside the human being, He reveals Himself, which is the reason for the affirmation of “I Am that I Am.” Through its hypnotic cyclicality, the profane temporality has its own musicality. Its purpose is to incubate the unsuspected potencies of the beings “caught” in the material world. Due to the fact that it belongs to the aeonic time, the divine music will exceed in harmony the mechanical musicality of profane time, dilating and temporarily cancelling it. Isaiah is witness to such revelation offering access to the heavenly concert. He is witness to divine harmonies produced by two divine singers, whose musical history is presented in our article. The seraphim accompanied the chosen people after their exodus from Egypt. The cultic use of the trumpet is related to the characteristics and behaviour of the seraphim. The seraphic music does not belong to the Creator, but its lyrics speak about the presence of the Creator in two realities, a spiritual and a material one. Only the transcendence of the divine names that are sung/cried affirms a unique reality: God. The chant-cry is a divine invocation with a double aim. On the one hand, the angels and the people affirm God’s presence and call His name and, on the other, the Creator affirms His presence through the angels or in man, the one who is His image and His likeness. The divine music does not only create, it is also a means of communion, implementing the relation of man to God and, thus, God’s connection with man. It is a relation in which both filiation and paternity disappear inside the harmony of the mutual recognition produced by music, a reality much older than Adam’s language.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-57
Author(s):  
See Seng Tan

Abstract: The longstanding effort to develop a people-based regionalism in Southeast Asia has been shaped by an inherent tension between the liberal inclination to privilege the individual and the community under formation, on the one hand, and the realist insistence on the primacy of the state, on the other. This article explores the conditions and constraints affecting ASEAN’s progress in remaking Southeast Asia into a people-focused and caring community in three areas: disaster management, development, and democratization (understood here as human rights). Arguably, the persistent gap in Southeast Asia between aspiration and expectation is determined less by political ideology than by the pragmatic responses of ASEAN member states to the forces of nationalism and protectionism, as well as their respective sense of local and regional responsibility.Resumen: El esfuerzo histórico para desarrollar un regionalismo basado en las personas del sudeste de Asia ha estado marcado por una tensión fundamental entre la inclinación liberal de privilegiar el individuo y la comunidad y la insistencia realista sobre la primacía del estado. Este artículo explora las condiciones y limitaciones que afectan el progreso de la ASEAN en la reestructuración de Asia sudoriental en una comunidad centrada en el cuidado de las personas en: gestión de desastres, desarrollo y democratización (i.e., derechos humanos). La brecha persistente en el sudeste asiático entre la aspiración y la expectativa está determinada por las respuestas pragmáticas de los miembros de la ASEAN sometidos a las fuerzas del nacionalismo y proteccionismo, así como su respectivo sentido de responsabilidad local y regional.Résumé: L’effort historique pour développer un régionalisme fondé sur les peuples en Asie du Sud-Est a été marqué par une tension fondamentale entre l’inclination libérale qui privilégie, d’une part, l’individu et la communauté et, d’autre part, l’insistance réaliste sur la primauté de l’État. Cet article explore les conditions et les contraintes qui nuisent aux progrès de l’ANASE dans le cadre d’une refonte de l’Asie du Sud-Est en une communauté centrée et attentive aux peuples dans trois domaines : la gestion des désastres, le développement et la démocratisation (en référence aux droits humains). Le fossé persistant en Asie du Sud-Est entre les aspirations et les attentes est vraisemblablement moins déterminé par l’idéologie politique que par les réponses pragmatiques des États membres de l’ANASE soumis aux forces du nationalisme et du protectionnisme ainsi que par leur sens respectif de la responsabilité locale et régionale.


Author(s):  
David Rondel

This chapter distinguishes between “vertical” and “horizontal” egalitarianism. The vertical and horizontal metaphors differentiate primarily between two types of relationship in which equality is said to play an important role—the “vertical” relationship between state and citizen, on the one hand, and the “horizontal” relationship between or among the people of a society, on the other. But the distinction may be used in a wider way to track several issues around which egalitarian theories tend to diverge: about what a commitment to equality ultimately means; about to whom or what egalitarian principles are meant to apply; about how equality is achieved and what its achievement looks like, and about how theorizing on equality is properly or most promisingly undertaken.


Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer
Keyword(s):  

Most critiques of edificatory perfectionism concentrate on the detrimental effects that will be undergone by the people whose lives the edificatory perfectionists are seeking to improve. Chapter 6 shifts the focus to the officials who formulate and implement the policies that produce such effects. On the one hand, Rawlsians and other contractualists quite rightly demur at the disrespect that is shown by edificatory perfectionists toward the putative beneficiaries of the measures which the perfectionists advocate. On the other hand, the contractualists largely neglect to take account of the ways in which the edificatory-perfectionist measures degrade the whole system of governance wherein they occur. Chapter 6 highlights that degradingness as it draws attention to the quidnunc mentality that is evinced by the officials who adopt and administer the laws for which the edificatory perfectionists have called.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-338
Author(s):  
Victor Lieberman

AbstractInsisting on a radical divide between post-1750 ideologies in Europe and earlier political thought in both Europe and Asia, modernist scholars of nationalism have called attention, quite justifiably, to European nationalisms’ unique focus on popular sovereignty, legal equality, territorial fixity, and the primacy of secular over universal religious loyalties. Yet this essay argues that nationalism also shared basic developmental and expressive features with political thought in pre-1750 Europe as well as in rimland—that is to say outlying—sectors of Asia. Polities in Western Europe and rimland Asia were all protected against Inner Asian occupation, all enjoyed relatively cohesive local geographies, and all experienced economic and social pressures to integration that were not only sustained but surprisingly synchronized throughout the second millennium. In Western Europe and rimland Asia each major state came to identify with a named ethnicity, specific artifacts became badges of inclusion, and central ethnicity expanded and grew more standardized. Using Myanmar and pre-1750 England/Britain as case studies, this essay reconstructs these centuries-long similarities in process and form between “political ethnicity,” on the one hand, and modern nationalism, on the other. Finally, however, this essay explores cultural and material answers to the obvious question: if political ethnicities in Myanmar and pre-1750 England/Britain were indeed comparable, why did the latter realm alone generate recognizable expressions of nationalism? As such, this essay both strengthens and weakens claims for European exceptionalism.


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