Three Models of Territory

The chapter argues that regardless of whether a legal order has been established over a territory, possession of land itself already imposes obligations on persons outside the territory to respect it. She points out that possession of land also imposes duties on the holders of territory that are global in scope. It is therefore not possible to reduce territorial rights to claims of juridical independence in virtue of a state’s internal civil condition, although the existence of a legal order over a territory is an additional argument to the duty to respect a group’s occupation of land. This is because the internal legal order is only binding to its members, while occupation of land is binding to individuals and states already in the state of nature.

Publicly Committed to the Good: The State of Nature and the Civil Condition in Right and in Ethics

In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant speaks of an ethical state of nature and of an ethico-civil condition, with explicit reference to the juridical state of nature and the juridico-civil condition he discusses at length in his legal-political writings. Given that the Religion is the only work where Kant introduces a parallel between these concepts, one might think that this is only a loose analogy, serving a merely illustrative function. The paper provides a first outline of the similarities and the differences between the state of nature and the civil condition in Right and in ethics. The comparison points to a deeper, structural relation between the two pairs of concepts. By doing so, it makes room for developing a unitary conception of the state of nature and of the civil condition, which would underlie both the ethical and the juridical version.

The Legislative Authority

This article develops an account of the nature and limits of the state’s legislative authority that closely attends to the challenge of harmonizing Kant’s ethical and juridical theories. It clarifies some key Kantian concepts and terms, then explains the way in which the state’s three interlocking authorities – legislative, executive, and judicial – are metaphysically distinct and mutually dependent. It describes the emergence of the Kantian state and identifies the preconditions of its authority. Then it offers a metaphysical model of the Kantian state and uses it to argue that the activity of juridical lawgiving is an act of the omnilateral will itself. Legislative authority is limited in the sense that it does not include the capacity to create juridical laws that are conceptually incompatible with the idea of universal external freedom. I argue that my proposed account of the legislative authority is wholly consistent with that authority’s exclusive lawgiving capacity and does not threaten the possibility of ‘distributive justice’ – the legal finality that is the sine qua non of a civil condition.

Kant’s Provisionality Thesis

I argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property, sovereignty and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textual arguments against it. I conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated.

A Juridical Right to Lie

Kant’s essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’ claims that everyone has an unconditional duty of right not to lie under any circumstances. This claim creates a conflict within the doctrine of right because Kant also claims that each of us is under an unconditional duty of right to obey the positive law in force in the civil condition in all circumstances. In Kant’s specific example, truthfulness would violate the positive law because it would make the speaker an accomplice to a crime. Since both duties flow from the requirement that we not act inconsistently with the possibility of rightful relations among humans, a juridical solution to the conflict must be possible. That solution is to recognize that lying in appropriate circumstances is akin to the use of force in self-defence or defence of a third party.

Hobbes among International Relations Thinkers

Among philosophers and historians of political thought Hobbes has little or nothing to say about relations among states. For modern realists and representatives of the English School in contemporary international relations theory, however, caricatures of Hobbes abound. There is a tendency to take him too literally, referring to what is called the unmodified philosophical state of nature, ignoring what he has to say about both the modified state of nature and the historical pre-civil condition. They extrapolate from the predicament of the individual conclusions claimed to be pertinent to international relations, and on the whole find his conclusions unconvincing. It is demonstrated that there is a much more restrained and cautious Hobbes, consistent with his timid nature, in which he gives carefully weighed views on a variety of international issues, recommending moderation consistent with the duties of sovereignty.

Civil association across borders: Law, morality and responsibility in the post-Brexit Era

Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between ‘civil association’ and ‘enterprise association’ has inspired international society theorists to conceive of international society as not just a ‘purposive association’ constructed by states to satisfy their interests but also as a ‘practical association’ providing formal and pragmatic rules that are not instrumental to particular goals of state policy. While this article is supportive of the Oakeshottian turn in international society theory, it suggests that somewhat different conclusions can be drawn from it. The article sketches out an alternative conception of international ‘civil association’, one that transcends the boundaries of communities. It is argued that such a notion of civil association is both possible and at the same time anchored in the experiences of the modern state. It is suggested that this notion of international civil association, when sustained by an adequate legal conception, promotes the enforcement of moral and political responsibility across borders. Finally, it is argued that European governments post-Brexit should strive to retain, as much as possible, the element of civil association present in European relations in order to preserve the civil condition, the rule of law, and in order to enhance political responsibility across borders.

A Kantian argument against world poverty

Immanuel Kant is recognised as one of the first philosophers who wrote systematically about global justice and world peace. In the current debate on global justice, he is mostly appealed to by critics of extensive duties of global justice. However, I show in this paper that an analysis of Kant's late work on rights and justice provides ample resources for disagreeing with those who take Kant to call for only modest changes in global politics. Kant's comments in the Doctrine of Right clarify that he thinks we need a coercively enforced global civil condition. But his work also contains ideas that imply that within such a global legal order there must be no extreme forms of poverty and inequality, and that the current holdings of states are by no means conclusive possessions without confirmation by the global legal order we have a duty to establish. Thus, this paper challenges the prevailing interpretation of Kant as a conservative thinker about global justice that is held, for instance, by the leading contemporary liberal thinkers such as John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Ronald Dworkin.

Droit civil, condition ouvrière et transition au capitalisme industriel au Québec

Résumé Cet article propose une reconstitution du régime juridique avec lequel devait composer la classe ouvrière au Québec, de l’adoption du Code civil du Bas-Canada en 1866 à la mise en place d’une législation provinciale sur les accidents de travail, en 1909. L’examen des règles de droit relatives au salariat contredit de manière assez franche l’idéal libéral d’égalité juridique formelle des citoyens : à bien des égards, la marginalisation des travailleurs est inscrite au cœur même du droit civil québécois du temps. Cependant, la province de Québec revoit assez fréquemment, durant cette période, le contenu du code civil et du code de procédure civile applicable aux ouvriers. Le caractère limité de ces réformes, pour certaines complexes et difficiles à concrétiser, traduirait une espèce d’épuisement du recours à la juridicisation du social en tant que réponse à l’ébranlement de la société sous les coups du salariat, de ses risques et de ses fragilités.

Enactable and Enforceable: Kant’s Criteria for Right and Virtue

Kant’s distinction between duties of right and of virtue remains controversial, for a number of reasons. A close look at the distinctions he draws and the claims that he makes suggests that a distinction between the requirements of enforceable duties of right and of unenforceable duties of virtue is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is not exclusive because it is possible to fulfil duties of right as a matter of principle, in which case what is done is both right and virtuous. It is not exhaustive because certain duties, among them the duty to enter a civil condition and duties of equity, are not in principle enforceable, yet are duties of right.