Constitutional Law. Constitutional Amendment Similar to Provision in Other State Constitutions

1904 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 359
1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 666-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field

State courts determine, in the absence of constitutional provision to the contrary, whether amendments to state constitutions have been proposed and adopted in the manner provided for these constitutions. Not every minor deviation from the course of action marked out in the constitution for its amendment is deemed sufficient to justify the court in declaring that the amendment has been “unconstitutionally adopted,” but whether these deviations are serious enough to warrant such a declaration is a question to be determined by the courts themselves. Statutes supplementing constitutional provisions on the subject of amendment are valid if not in conflict with the constitutional provisions themselves, and substantial compliance with these rules is also required by the courts. Sometimes the provisions regulating the subject of publication of proposed amendments are constitutional; at other times they are statutory. In either case, publication in the manner provided for, and for the period of time provided for, is necessary to the validity of the amendment. Publication for two weeks, when the period should have been four weeks, was deemed sufficient by the Nebraska court to invalidate the amendment involved.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (101) ◽  
pp. 819
Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

Resumen:La presente contribución adopta como hipótesis de partida la relativa influencia de los estándares internacionales en la redacción de la Constitución de 1978 y la absoluta necesidad de adaptación a la realidad del Estado supranacional e internacionalmente integrado. En este sentido, un primer enfoque permite comprobar que, a pesar del juego potencial de las disposiciones constitucionales de apertura internacional, y tras cuatro décadas de vigencia de la Carta Magna Española de 1978, la justicia constitucional y la doctrina constitucionalista no han mostrado una actitud clara y abierta hacia las exigencias jurídicas internacionales, con la excepción de un relativo entusiasmo hacia los parámetros europeos. En efecto, en la parte central del artículo, el análisis de los cuarenta años constitucionalismo democrático bajo la Constitución de 1978 revela, primeramente, un déficit de interpretación basado en soluciones internacionales más favorables, así como una incorrecta e inexplorada concepción del impacto de los tratados internacionales en el sistema constitucional de fuentes.En segundo término, se examina la proyección positiva de los estándares internacionales tanto en la «parte dogmática» (valores, principios y derechos constitucionales) como en la «parte orgánica» de la Constitución (separación de poderes y organización territorial del poder), sin olvidar el peso de los instrumentos internacionales en la defensa del orden constitucional (mecanismos ordinario —tribunal constitucional— y extraordinario —reforma constitucional—). En tercer lugar, se somete a escrutinio la responsabilidad social de la Universidad en sus tareas de enseñanza y de investigación (especialmente en situaciones domésticas conflictivas), con objeto de transferir un conocimiento avanzado a la sociedad sin banalizar o trivializar la importancia del Derecho internacional y del Derecho constitucional en la defensa democrática del orden constitucional. Por último, se completa el análisis propuesto a través de la toma en consideración del lugar que también ocupan las normas constitucionales en los tratados internacionales y el impacto de nociones como margen de apreciación nacional, identidad constitucional y otras.La conclusión principal del trabajo consiste en sostener la necesaria retroalimentación de los estándares internacionales y constitucionales, puesto que esas sinergias positivas (incluido un diálogo judicial global) seguirán propiciando el fortalecimiento del sentimiento constitucional bajo una Carta Magna Española de 1978 inserta en un contexto cada vez más globalizado.Abstract:This papers adopts as a starting hypothesis the relative degree of influence of international standards in the drafting of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the absolute need to accommodate to the reality of an integrated State at supranational and international levels. In this sense, a first approach shows that, despite the potential role of constitutional clauses opening to international standards, and after four decades since the entry into force of the Spanish Magna Carta of 1978, constitutional justice and constitutional doctrine have not shown clear nor open behaviour towards international legal requirements, with the exception of its relative enthusiasm towards European parameters.Indeed, in the main part of this paper, the analysis of the past forty yearsof democratic constitutionalism under the 1978 Constitution reveals, first and foremost, an interpretative deficit based on more favourable international solutions, as well as an incorrect and unexplored view of the impact of international treaties within the constitutional system of sources of law.Secondly, the positive impact of international standards is examined in  connection with both the «dogmatic part» (constitutional values, principlesand rights) and the «organic part» of the Constitution (separation of powers and territorial organization of the State), without forgetting the weight of international instruments in defending the constitutional order (ordinary —constitutional court— and extraordinary —constitutional amendment— mechanisms). Thirdly, the social responsibility of Universities in their teaching and research (especially in conflicting domestic situations) is submitted to scrutiny, in order to show its key role in transferring advanced knowledge to society without trivializing the importance of both international law and constitutional law in the democratic defense of the constitutional order. Finally, the place that constitutional norms occupy in international treaties, as well as the impact of notions such as (national) margin of appreciation, constitutional identity and others, are proposed so as to complete the analysis.The main conclusion of this paper holds the necessary feedback of internationaland constitutional standards, since these positive synergies (including a global judicial dialogue) will continue to promote the strengthening of a «constitutional feeling» under the 1978 Spanish Magna Carta, which is inserted in an increasingly globalized context.Summary:1. Preliminary issues: the influence of international standards in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution and the need for consistency with the reality of an integrated State at supranational and international levels. 2. Subsequent issues: the weight of constitutional jurisdiction confinement in light of international parameters. 3. Further questions: the presence of a self-absorbed constitutionalism with respect to international sources in general and relatively enthusiastic about European sources in particular. 4. Constitutional clauses on the open acceptance of international standards: particular focus on human rights instruments. 5. The constitutional approach international treaties and the so-called control of conventionality. 6. The favourable impact of international standards on the set of constitutional values, principles and rights. 7. The impact of international standards on the organization of powers. 8. The positive role of international instruments in defending the constitutional order: 8.1. Internationalization of the constituent function and the weighting of constitutional amendments. 8.2. International standards and constitutional jurisdiction. 8.3. The inadmissible trivialization of both International and Constitutional Law. 9. International instruments’s regard for constitutional norms: the margin of (national) appreciation, the counter-limits and related notions doctrine. 10. Final remarks: the feedback between international andconstitutional standards  


Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton

The earlier book, 51 Imperfect Solutions, told stories about specific state and federal individual constitutional rights, and explained two benefits of American federalism: how two sources of constitutional protection for liberty and property rights could be valuable to individual freedom and how the state courts could be useful laboratories of innovation when it comes to the development of national constitutional rights. This book tells the other half of the story. Instead of focusing on state constitutional individual rights, it focuses on state constitutional structure. Everything in law and politics, including individual rights, eventually comes back to divisions of power and the evergreen question: Who decides? The goal of this book is to tell the structure side of the story and to identify the shifting balances of power revealed when one accounts for American constitutional law as opposed to just federal constitutional law. Who Decides? contains three main parts—one each on the judicial, executive, and legislative branches—as well as stand-alone chapters on home-rule issues raised by local governments and the benefits and burdens raised by the ease of amending state constitutions. A theme in the book is the increasingly stark divide between the ever-more-democratic nature of state governments and the ever-less-democratic nature of the federal government over time.


Global Jurist ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gürkan Çapar

Abstract Despite the clear clue given by Kim L. Scheppele as to the shortcomings of governance checklists, it is surprising that comparative constitutional lawyers have not yet followed it up. In fact, what Scheppele hinted at is that the methodologies we have used so far fall short of detecting the interaction effect of the particular components; this is why we need new methodologies and new ways of seeing. To address this, this article will incorporate some tools, having already taken hold in legal philosophy, into the methods discussions in comparative constitutional law in particular and comparative law in general. Upon benefiting from the distinction between internal and external points of view and showing how hermeneutical one differs from the others, the article will make a discursive analysis of the 2010 constitutional amendment in Turkey through the lenses of these three points of view.


1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-596
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines

One of the best known members of the bench in the United States raised the query whether constitutional law was not becoming so textual and so formal in its applications that it was losing touch with the realities of life. For the operations of government to be “cabined and confined” under ordinary circumstances raises difficulties not readily surmounted; but in times of unusual stress, either constitutional limitations unduly restrict urgent and necessary action or they must be ignored to permit emergency measures. A resumé of the decisions of state and federal courts affecting state constitutions for the year 1932–33 indicates the tendency both toward undue formality in interpretation and toward the warping of the constitutional mold to sanction ways and means of dealing with extraordinary conditions. Law, like life, is a matter of growth, and, as Lord Bryce long since observed, under written constitutions ways of growth must be found either within or without the provisions of fundamental laws.


1908 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-561
Author(s):  
W. F. Dodd

The distinction between constitutions and statutes is a fundamental one in American constitutional law, but it is a matter of surprise that no one has yet attempted to discuss this distinction in its historical origins. Brinton Coxe in his Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation has traced the development of the doctrine that statutes in conflict with the constitution may be declared invalid by the courts. Judge J. A. Jameson in his Treatise on Constitutional Conventions has given a brief account of the adoption of the first State constitutions; but no one has yet studied the adoption of these constitutions in order to find what were the theories of their framers as to the distinction between constitutions and statutes.By the term constitution, as used both in England and America before the Revolution, was understood the general and more permanent principles upon which government is based. The term was used on both sides of the Atlantic to signify something superior to legislative enactments, and the principles of the constitution were appealed to as beyond the control of the British parliament.


Author(s):  
Williams Robert F

This chapter discusses the extensive judicial involvement in litigation considering the substance and procedure of state constitutional amendment and revision. Some processes of state constitutional change can only be utilized, for example, to amend the state constitution but not to revise it. This is generally true for the initiative. Litigation therefore arises over whether an initiated change is a valid amendment or an invalid revision. Also, state constitutions contain a number of procedural requirements and limitations on the processes for their change, such as single-subject and separate-vote requirements. These procedural restrictions are enforced by the courts through litigation. This level of judicial involvement in the processes of state constitutional change is unlike that at the federal level, for change does not occur very often and challenges to the federal processes of change are generally viewed as non-justiciable political questions.


1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. D. Lumb

This article explores the concept of “fundamental law” as it relates to the Australian legal system. Concentrating in particular on constitutional law and the special place in that body of law of the doctrines relating to amendment of the Federal and State constitutions, Dr Lumb examines the source of the power to amend the constitution, the limitations on that power and the aspects of our legal system which may be beyond the power to amend. It attempts to discover those elements of our constitutional systems which are so fundamental that they may not be materially altered by any form or process of constitutional alteration.


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