Socio-Economic Origins of Constitutional Review in Central Asia: Political Economy and Politico-Historical Context as Defining Factors

This article pursues two main objectives. First, to identify the main factors behind the establishment of constitutional review in Central Asia. Second, to define how those factors have shaped the institutional design of constitutional courts. In doing so, this article revisits standard theories of comparative constitutional law in terms of the origin of judicial review. While the insurance theory dominates the present global discourse on judicial review, it cannot completely and accurately account for the origin of constitutional review in Central Asia. Rather, this article conveys that the main impetus and motivation behind the establishment of constitutional courts and their institutional designs has been the economic interests of Central Asian states, determined by the region’s political and historical context.

Ukrainian Constitutional Court: Attacks and Backlash

This article intends to analyze Ukraine’s Constitutional Court in the light of the tolerance interval theory and the backlash thesis, through a case study, which is, the decision issued on October 27, 2020, that held unconstitutional part of the powers of the National Agency for the Corruption Prevention (NAPC). Three comorbidities — particular conditions that weaken the court and render it vulnerable to attacks — in the Ukrainian system are presented: Ukrainian democracy, autocracies tendencies in the presidency, and lack of public confidence in the judicial system. Through the adoption of a Comparative Constitutional Law approach, an index measuring the impact of the ruling is developed and calculated, allowing a comparison of the consequences to other notable controversial rulings in the world. After discussing the findings, the article concludes with some reflections and predictions on the longevity of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court.

Constitutional Democracy and Electoral Commissions: A Reflection from Asia

This symposium explores the role of “fourth branch” institutions, and specifically the role of independent electoral commissions (IECs) in protecting and promoting constitutional democracy. It does so by focusing on the global South, and Asia in particular. It aims to go beyond the “usual suspects” in comparative constitutional law, and put the constitutional experiences of countries such as Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka at the centre of a decolonized constitutional project and understanding, supplementing them with an examination of more-often-studied systems such as Australia and India.

The judicial review of legality

In comparative constitutional law, the various models of judicial review require courts to examine either the substantive content of legislation or the procedure through which legislation was passed. This article offers a new model of judicial review – ‘the judicial review of legality’ – in which courts review instead the forms of law. The forms of law are the ways in which law communicates its norms to the persons who are meant to comply with them, and they include generality, clarity, avoidance of contradiction, and non-retroactivity. Drawing on recent writing on the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, this article argues that Fuller’s linking of the forms of law to a relationship of reciprocity between government and governed can ground judicial review and that such review provides a missing language to address important legislative pathologies. Moreover, through an analysis of recent developments in Israel, the article demonstrates that the judicial review of legality targets some of the key legal techniques of contemporary processes of democratic erosion which other models of judicial review struggle to address, all the while re-centring judicial review on the lawyer’s craftsmanship and thus reducing problems of court legitimacy. This article therefore offers a distinctive and normatively appealing way for courts to act in troubling times.

Judicial Dictatorship: Potential Institutionalisations of the Constitutional Review Process

<p>This paper concerns constitutional review of legislation, a widely discussed issue within comparative constitutional law. Specifically, this paper addresses the issue of the lack of democratic legitimacy that U.S. style judicial review has and the potential lack of stability that other weak form constitutional review mechanisms have. Three constitutional review procedures are proposed in this paper, with the commonly overlooked executive branch playing a central role in each review mechanism. These proposed procedures aim to solve democratic legitimacy and stability issues. While all three arguably accomplish the mentioned goal, the paper addresses the issues each proposed mechanism has before defending the leading mechanism. The paper offers a possible solution to the seemingly unresolvable tension within constitutional review of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy. The described mechanisms and the outcomes they produce seems to show that democratically based constitutional review is possible and it is not necessary to rely on unelected judges to ensure that constitutional rights are maintained. Ultimately, this paper aims to show that a redistribution of constitutional review power among all state organs is the best way to ensure that legislation conforms to constitutional norms.</p>

Judicial Dictatorship: Potential Institutionalisations of the Constitutional Review Process

<p>This paper concerns constitutional review of legislation, a widely discussed issue within comparative constitutional law. Specifically, this paper addresses the issue of the lack of democratic legitimacy that U.S. style judicial review has and the potential lack of stability that other weak form constitutional review mechanisms have. Three constitutional review procedures are proposed in this paper, with the commonly overlooked executive branch playing a central role in each review mechanism. These proposed procedures aim to solve democratic legitimacy and stability issues. While all three arguably accomplish the mentioned goal, the paper addresses the issues each proposed mechanism has before defending the leading mechanism. The paper offers a possible solution to the seemingly unresolvable tension within constitutional review of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy. The described mechanisms and the outcomes they produce seems to show that democratically based constitutional review is possible and it is not necessary to rely on unelected judges to ensure that constitutional rights are maintained. Ultimately, this paper aims to show that a redistribution of constitutional review power among all state organs is the best way to ensure that legislation conforms to constitutional norms.</p>

How (Not) to Compare?: Not Being Inside, Nor Outside

Despite the clear clue given by Kim L. Scheppele as to the shortcomings of governance checklists, it is surprising that comparative constitutional lawyers have not yet followed it up. In fact, what Scheppele hinted at is that the methodologies we have used so far fall short of detecting the interaction effect of the particular components; this is why we need new methodologies and new ways of seeing. To address this, this article will incorporate some tools, having already taken hold in legal philosophy, into the methods discussions in comparative constitutional law in particular and comparative law in general. Upon benefiting from the distinction between internal and external points of view and showing how hermeneutical one differs from the others, the article will make a discursive analysis of the 2010 constitutional amendment in Turkey through the lenses of these three points of view.

Taming the Incumbency Advantage: Innovative Constitutional Designs from the "South"

This Discussion Paper was drafted for an International IDEA webinar on Taming the Incumbency Advantage (25 May 2021), the first of a series on innovative constitutional design options. It has been revised and updated to reflect contributions from webinar participants: Professor Juvence F. Ramasy (Madagascar), Professor Ridwanul Hoque (Bangladesh) and Professor Gabriel Negretto (Latin America), among others. The webinar series seeks to identify, discuss, profile and showcase the ‘hidden treasures’ of innovative constitutional/institutional design options—including from the Global ‘South’—with potential to help tackle emerging and recurrent challenges facing societies around the world. The goal is not to promote any specific institutional design, but rather to enrich conversations about constitutional reform processes and share comparative constitutional law and practice insights among academic and practitioners’ communities.

The Case for Religious Constitutions: Comparative Constitutional Law among Buddhists and Other Religious Groups

This article argues that there is body of governing laws appearing widely throughout the global history of religions that warrants classification as constitutions. Like national constitutions, these religious constitutions present themselves as a form of “higher law” that declare the identity of a given a community, organize its structures of governing power, define its foundational norms, and authorize further acts of rulemaking. In this article, I offer an overview of these texts across several traditions and a defense of their importance in the study of comparative constitutional law. I then draw on fieldwork from Sri Lanka to provide a firsthand account of what a modern religious constitution looks like and how it works to govern one of the country’s largest communities of Buddhist monks. I conclude by urging scholars to view religion and constitutional law not as opposing legal domains but, rather, as homologous forms of social ordering that draw upon similar concepts and logics to address common human dilemmas.