Constitutional Law. The Practice of Communicating with Departed Spirits, Though a Part of an Established Religion, Is Not within the Protection of Federal and State Constitutions Relating to Religious Liberty

1922 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
State Constitutions

State Constitutional Law in 1929–1930

1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 666-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Constitutional Law

State courts determine, in the absence of constitutional provision to the contrary, whether amendments to state constitutions have been proposed and adopted in the manner provided for these constitutions. Not every minor deviation from the course of action marked out in the constitution for its amendment is deemed sufficient to justify the court in declaring that the amendment has been “unconstitutionally adopted,” but whether these deviations are serious enough to warrant such a declaration is a question to be determined by the courts themselves. Statutes supplementing constitutional provisions on the subject of amendment are valid if not in conflict with the constitutional provisions themselves, and substantial compliance with these rules is also required by the courts. Sometimes the provisions regulating the subject of publication of proposed amendments are constitutional; at other times they are statutory. In either case, publication in the manner provided for, and for the period of time provided for, is necessary to the validity of the amendment. Publication for two weeks, when the period should have been four weeks, was deemed sufficient by the Nebraska court to invalidate the amendment involved.

Who Decides?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Home Rule ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
Federal Constitutional

The earlier book, 51 Imperfect Solutions, told stories about specific state and federal individual constitutional rights, and explained two benefits of American federalism: how two sources of constitutional protection for liberty and property rights could be valuable to individual freedom and how the state courts could be useful laboratories of innovation when it comes to the development of national constitutional rights. This book tells the other half of the story. Instead of focusing on state constitutional individual rights, it focuses on state constitutional structure. Everything in law and politics, including individual rights, eventually comes back to divisions of power and the evergreen question: Who decides? The goal of this book is to tell the structure side of the story and to identify the shifting balances of power revealed when one accounts for American constitutional law as opposed to just federal constitutional law. Who Decides? contains three main parts—one each on the judicial, executive, and legislative branches—as well as stand-alone chapters on home-rule issues raised by local governments and the benefits and burdens raised by the ease of amending state constitutions. A theme in the book is the increasingly stark divide between the ever-more-democratic nature of state governments and the ever-less-democratic nature of the federal government over time.

State Constitutional Law in 1932–33

1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-596
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
State Constitutional Law ◽  
Unusual Stress ◽  
Emergency Measures

One of the best known members of the bench in the United States raised the query whether constitutional law was not becoming so textual and so formal in its applications that it was losing touch with the realities of life. For the operations of government to be “cabined and confined” under ordinary circumstances raises difficulties not readily surmounted; but in times of unusual stress, either constitutional limitations unduly restrict urgent and necessary action or they must be ignored to permit emergency measures. A resumé of the decisions of state and federal courts affecting state constitutions for the year 1932–33 indicates the tendency both toward undue formality in interpretation and toward the warping of the constitutional mold to sanction ways and means of dealing with extraordinary conditions. Law, like life, is a matter of growth, and, as Lord Bryce long since observed, under written constitutions ways of growth must be found either within or without the provisions of fundamental laws.

The First State Constitutional Conventions, 1776-1783

1908 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-561
Author(s):  
W. F. Dodd
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
Historical Origins ◽  
The Revolution

The distinction between constitutions and statutes is a fundamental one in American constitutional law, but it is a matter of surprise that no one has yet attempted to discuss this distinction in its historical origins. Brinton Coxe in his Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation has traced the development of the doctrine that statutes in conflict with the constitution may be declared invalid by the courts. Judge J. A. Jameson in his Treatise on Constitutional Conventions has given a brief account of the adoption of the first State constitutions; but no one has yet studied the adoption of these constitutions in order to find what were the theories of their framers as to the distinction between constitutions and statutes.By the term constitution, as used both in England and America before the Revolution, was understood the general and more permanent principles upon which government is based. The term was used on both sides of the Atlantic to signify something superior to legislative enactments, and the principles of the constitution were appealed to as beyond the control of the British parliament.

Fundamental Law and the Processes of Constitutional Change in Australia

1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. D. Lumb
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Special Place ◽  
Fundamental Law

This article explores the concept of “fundamental law” as it relates to the Australian legal system. Concentrating in particular on constitutional law and the special place in that body of law of the doctrines relating to amendment of the Federal and State constitutions, Dr Lumb examines the source of the power to amend the constitution, the limitations on that power and the aspects of our legal system which may be beyond the power to amend. It attempts to discover those elements of our constitutional systems which are so fundamental that they may not be materially altered by any form or process of constitutional alteration.

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