scholarly journals The Last Will Be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies With Relative Payoff Concerns

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Riccardo Saulle ◽  
Christian Seel
Keyword(s):  
Relative Payoff

Influence of Different Preparatory Sets on Reaction Time and Arm-Movement Time

1980 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimihiro Inomata
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Canonical Correlation ◽  
Movement Time ◽  
Arm Movement ◽  
Motor Program ◽  
Simple Task ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Relative Payoff ◽  
Time Movement ◽  
Payoff Condition

The effect of three different preparatory sets on reaction time (RT), movement time (MT) and reaction time-movement time (RT-MT) relationship was examined. All 15 subjects were required to perform under the three conditions regarding the relative payoff of stimulus and speed of movement. No significant effect on RT was found, while the significant difference between MT under MT-payoff condition and MT under RT-payoff condition was found. The correlations between RT and MT under MT-payoff condition and RT-MT-payoff condition are significant ( p < .05). Also high canonical correlation between RTs and MTs was found. Results suggested that the motor program in the simple task may be executed more effectively under MT-payoff condition than RT-payoff conditions and also that a certain amount of generality between RT and MT under the payoff conditions might exist in multivariate domains.

scholarly journals Managing team coordination incentives: the effect of payoff differentials

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
Madjid Tavana ◽  
Debora Di Caprio ◽  
Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Team Coordination ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Team Cooperation ◽  
Cooperation Incentives ◽  
Relative Payoff

Purpose The current paper aims to present a formal model illustrating how payoff imbalances among the members of a team of decision makers (DMs) who must undertake a project condition the final outcome obtained. This result builds on the fact that payoffs imbalances would lead to different performance levels among the employees and managers who compose a team. The analysis is applied to a strategic environment, where a project requiring coordination among the DMs within the team must be developed. Design/methodology/approach The intuition behind the strategic framework on which the results are based is twofold. The authors build on the literature on social comparisons and assume that employees and managers acquire information on the payoffs received by other members of the team while being affected by the resulting comparisons, and they follow the economic literature on firm boundaries determined via incomplete contracts. In this case, employees and managers may underperform if they feel aggrieved by the outcome of the contract giving place to deadweight losses when developing the project. Findings The authors illustrate how a team-based performance reward structure may lead to a coordinated equilibrium even when team managers and employees receive different payoffs and exhibit shading incentives based on the payoff differentials between them. The authors will also illustrate how identical shading intensities by both groups of DMs imply that shading by the managers imposes a lower cost on the profit structure of the firm because it leads to a lower decrease in the cooperation incentives of the other members of the team. Finally, the authors show how differences in shading intensity between both types of DMs trigger a strategic defect mechanism within the team that determines the outcome of the project. Originality/value The novel environment of team cooperation and defection through shading introduced in this paper is designed to deal with the strategic decisions taken by DMs when undertaking a project within a group. In particular, the intensity of shading applied by the DMs will be endogenously determined by the relative payoffs received, which allows to account for different scenarios, where relative payoff differentials among DMs determine the outcome of the project.

Using Expectation-Maximization for Reinforcement Learning

1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dayan ◽  
Geoffrey E. Hinton
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Expectation Maximization ◽  
Learning Algorithm ◽  
Stochastic Gradient ◽  
Gradient Ascent ◽  
Relative Payoff ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Stochastic Gradient Ascent ◽  
Reinforcement Learning Algorithm

We discuss Hinton's (1989) relative payoff procedure (RPP), a static reinforcement learning algorithm whose foundation is not stochastic gradient ascent. We show circumstances under which applying the RPP is guaranteed to increase the mean return, even though it can make large changes in the values of the parameters. The proof is based on a mapping between the RPP and a form of the expectation-maximization procedure of Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977).

Learning in Large Worlds

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-110
Author(s):  
John M. McNamara ◽  
Olof Leimar
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Learning Rule ◽  
Bayesian Updating ◽  
Learning Approach ◽  
Learning Approaches ◽  
Small Worlds ◽  
Learning Rates ◽  
Relative Payoff

The chapter introduces reinforcement learning in game-theory models. A distinction is made between small-worlds models with Bayesian updating and large-worlds models that implement specific behavioural mechanisms. The actor–critic learning approach is introduced and illustrated with simple examples of learning in a coordination game and in the Hawk–Dove game. Simple versions of a game of investments with joint benefits and a social dominance game are presented, and these games are further developed in Chapter 8. The idea that parameters of the learning process, such as learning rates, can evolve is put forward. For the game examples it is shown that with slow learning over many rounds the outcome can approximate an ESS of a one-shot game, but for higher rates of learning and fewer rounds this need not be the case. The chapter ends with an overview of learning approaches in game theory, including the originally proposed relative-payoff-sum learning rule for games in biology.

scholarly journals The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff Concerns

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
P Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Riccardo D Saulle ◽  
Christian Seel
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Relative Payoff

Abstract This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split their surplus equally and individualistic societies in which coalitions split their surplus according to productivity. Preferences of coalition members depend on their material payoffs, but are also influenced by relative payoff concerns. The stable partitions in both egalitarian and individualistic societies are segregated, i.e., individuals with adjacent productivities form coalitions. If some individuals are not part of a productive coalition, then these are the least productive ones for egalitarian societies and the most productive ones for individualistic societies.

scholarly journals State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 1307-1335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
The State ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
The Social ◽  
Relative Payoff ◽  
Common Interests

This paper explores the role of civic culture in expanding fiscal capacity by developing a model based on reciprocal obligations: citizens pay their taxes and the state provides public goods. Civic culture evolves over time according to the relative payoff of civic‐minded and materialist citizens. A strong civic culture manifests itself as high tax revenues sustained by high levels of voluntary tax compliance and provision of public goods. This captures the idea of government as a reciprocal social contract between the state and its citizens. The paper highlights the role of political institutions and common interests in the emergence of civic culture.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document