Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game

A novel approach to sustainable cooperation called subgameperfect core (S-P Core) was introduced by P. Chander and M. Wooders in 2020 for n-person extensive-form games with terminal payoffs. This solution concept incorporates both subgame perfection and cooperation incentives and implies certain distribution of the total players' payoff at the terminal node of the cooperative history. We use in the paper an extension of the S-P Core to the class of extensive games with payoffs defined at all nodes of the game tree that is based on designing an appropriate payoff distribution procedure β and its implementation when a game unfolds along the cooperative history. The difference is that in accordance with this so-called β-subgameperfect core the players can redistribute total current payoff at each node in the cooperative path. Moreover, a payoff distribution procedure from the β-S-P Core satisfies a number of good properties such as subgame efficiency, non-negativity and strict balance condition. In the paper, we examine different properties of the β-S-P Core, introduce several refinements of this cooperative solution and provide examples of its implementation in extensive-form games. Finally, we consider an application of the β-S-P Core to the symmetric discrete-time alternating-move model of fishery management.

Exploring the antecedents of organizational resilience practices – A transactive memory systems approach

PurposeThe purpose of this paper was to explore individual- and firm-level antecedents of the ability of a manufacturing firm's personnel to collaborate and integrate knowledge for organizational resilience practices.Design/methodology/approachThe authors apply hierarchical regression analysis to study a sample of 192 European industrial equipment manufacturers. Data for each firm are collected from surveys of two key informants in each firm, as well as from public sources.FindingsFirms' personnel’s ability to integrate information and knowledge for organizational resilience practices was positively related with the extent of the head of manufacturing's network of personal contacts inside the firm. This effect was stronger in firms with more formalized job descriptions and clearly defined roles. The head of manufacturing's orientation to teamwork and cooperation impacted this ability only in firms that did not financially incentivize cooperation. The authors also found that cooperation incentives and role formalization directly relate to firms' personnel’s ability to integrate information and knowledge for organizational resilience practices.Originality/valueThe study proposes to study organizational resilience practices through a transactive memory systems lens. The study is also the first to link characteristics of individual managers to firm-level resilience practices by examining the antecedents of firms' ability to integrate information and knowledge to recover from operational disruptions. Furthermore, the study serves to enhance the knowledge of resilience practices by examining the role of firm-level antecedents and their interplay with characteristics of individual managers.

A Holistic Performance Management Approach in Business Networks

Companies want to achieve a sustainable financial success through process and performance improvements. Increasing the company’s performance is a good way for sustainable success. Typically, the success is measured by process output metrics. This output mirrors the performance of a company’s processes in the end. It is obvious that for being able to cope with complex business network structures in a derivative supply-demand-structure as well as collaboration cooperation incentives, performance needs to be managed across the whole network to strengthen the own network centrality. The present paper contributes to the development of a new holistic Performance Management in business networks. Thus, a Network Performance Wheel - for a more network oriented approach, and a Process Management Balanced Scorecard - to close the gap between internal and external impacts, are introduced. Also, a PM-VICTORY model is launched for implementing the whole network directed Performance Management.

Managing team coordination incentives: the effect of payoff differentials

Purpose The current paper aims to present a formal model illustrating how payoff imbalances among the members of a team of decision makers (DMs) who must undertake a project condition the final outcome obtained. This result builds on the fact that payoffs imbalances would lead to different performance levels among the employees and managers who compose a team. The analysis is applied to a strategic environment, where a project requiring coordination among the DMs within the team must be developed. Design/methodology/approach The intuition behind the strategic framework on which the results are based is twofold. The authors build on the literature on social comparisons and assume that employees and managers acquire information on the payoffs received by other members of the team while being affected by the resulting comparisons, and they follow the economic literature on firm boundaries determined via incomplete contracts. In this case, employees and managers may underperform if they feel aggrieved by the outcome of the contract giving place to deadweight losses when developing the project. Findings The authors illustrate how a team-based performance reward structure may lead to a coordinated equilibrium even when team managers and employees receive different payoffs and exhibit shading incentives based on the payoff differentials between them. The authors will also illustrate how identical shading intensities by both groups of DMs imply that shading by the managers imposes a lower cost on the profit structure of the firm because it leads to a lower decrease in the cooperation incentives of the other members of the team. Finally, the authors show how differences in shading intensity between both types of DMs trigger a strategic defect mechanism within the team that determines the outcome of the project. Originality/value The novel environment of team cooperation and defection through shading introduced in this paper is designed to deal with the strategic decisions taken by DMs when undertaking a project within a group. In particular, the intensity of shading applied by the DMs will be endogenously determined by the relative payoffs received, which allows to account for different scenarios, where relative payoff differentials among DMs determine the outcome of the project.

Modeling and Verification of Cooperation Incentive Mechanisms in User-Centric Wireless Communications

User-centric wireless networks are characterized by a community-scale objective aiming at the shared provision of user-generated services and contents. This may be contrasted by the reticence of individuals to share the limited resources of mobile devices. Hence, cooperation incentives play a key role to promote prosocial decisions and to isolate selfish nodes and cheating behaviors. In particular, trust-based incentives and remuneration are used to induce collaborative behaviors in Wi-Fi communities. Typically, these mechanisms are based on reputation infrastructures and virtual currency systems, the application of which should not hinder the normal operation of the network. In this chapter, the authors present an approach to the combined use of indirect rewards deriving from trust-based incentives and direct rewards deriving from remuneration. The effectiveness and efficiency of such an approach in the setting of user-centric wireless networks is verified by conducting a formal study of the benefits of the joint application of these rewards and of the related impact upon performance.