scholarly journals The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff Concerns

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
P Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Riccardo D Saulle ◽  
Christian Seel

Abstract This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split their surplus equally and individualistic societies in which coalitions split their surplus according to productivity. Preferences of coalition members depend on their material payoffs, but are also influenced by relative payoff concerns. The stable partitions in both egalitarian and individualistic societies are segregated, i.e., individuals with adjacent productivities form coalitions. If some individuals are not part of a productive coalition, then these are the least productive ones for egalitarian societies and the most productive ones for individualistic societies.

Author(s):  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
James P. Kahan ◽  
Sandra G. Funk ◽  
Abraham D. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Paul Chaisty ◽  
Nic Cheeseman ◽  
Timothy J. Power

This chapter summarizes the main parameters of coalitional presidentialism and the key concepts, definitions, explanatory frameworks, indicators, and propositions. It summarizes our understanding of coalitional presidentialism; the distinction between coalition formation and maintenance; the definition of coalitions; the multidimensional understanding of coalition management (the ‘presidential toolbox’); and an analytical framework that emphasizes the motivation of presidents to achieve cost minimization under constraints determined by system-level, coalition-level, and conjunctural factors. It also summarizes our main empirical findings: (1) the characteristics of presidential tools, (2) the substantive patterns of their deployment, (3) the factors that shape the costs of using these tools, (4) the actual (observed) costs of using them, and (5) the potential for imperfect substitutability of these tools. Finally, it concludes with some reflections on the current state of the research on comparative presidentialism.


Author(s):  
Jer Shyuan Ng ◽  
Wei Yang Bryan Lim ◽  
Hong-Ning Dai ◽  
Zehui Xiong ◽  
Jianqiang Huang ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Moshe Mash ◽  
Roy Fairstein ◽  
Yoram Bachrach ◽  
Kobi Gal ◽  
Yair Zick

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Budge ◽  
Valentine Herman

Traditional theories of government coalition formation concentrate on formal criteria inspired by – if not directly drawn from – game theory. One such criterion is that the coalition which forms must be winning; another is that it should have no surplus members without whom it would still be winning, i.e. it should be minimal; and a third is that the number of parties should be as few as possible. The closest that such theories come to considering the substantive issues affecting the formation of coalitions in the real world is their focus on reducing the ideological diversity of parties within the government. On many occasions, however, such ideological considerations receive negligible attention from politicians, who often ignore size factors altogether.


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