How Important Are Dismissals in CEO Incentives?: Evidence From a Dynamic Agency Model

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvaro Remesal
Keyword(s):  
Agency Model ◽  
Ceo Incentives ◽  
Dynamic Agency

Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (9) ◽  
pp. 3329-3345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Hoffmann ◽  
Sebastian Pfeil
Keyword(s):  
Agency Model ◽  
Dynamic Agency

Alternatives to Traditional Repricing of Executive Stock Options

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 35-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry T. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Subjective Value ◽  
Dynamic Agency ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Incentive Measure ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Associated Variable

The main purpose of this paper is to examine two commonly used alternatives to traditional repricing (TR) of executive stock options (ESOs) in a dynamic agency model. TR practices have become obsolete since new accounting rules took effect in July 2000. To avoid associated variable accounting charges that cause uncertainty in future reported earnings, companies have tried several TR alternatives as solutions to rescuing underwater options. We justify the occurrence of TR alternatives and quantify the impact of the marking-to-market feature imbedded in the new accounting rules. We also propose an incentive measure which is comparable to the subjective value of ESOs claimed by Ingersoll, J (2006) to rank TR alternatives in terms of agent's incentive.

The Governance of CEO Incentives in English NHS Hospital Trusts

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan Amanda Ballantine ◽  
John Forker ◽  
Margaret J. Greenwood
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Incentives
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