scholarly journals Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Stratmann ◽  
Martin Baur
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
German Bundestag

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

scholarly journals Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik S. Herron
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
East European ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Spatial Coverage ◽  
As If

Scholarship on the classification, origins, incentives, and consequences of mixed-member electoral systems has matured, especially over the last two decades. While mixed-member electoral systems (also known as mixed electoral systems) have been in constant use since Germany adopted a mixed-member proportional system for assembly elections following World War II, researchers did not begin to fully probe the implications of this electoral system until its expansion across the globe beginning in the 1990s. Mixed-member electoral systems share an important characteristic: voter preferences are translated into outcomes by at least two allocation formulas applied in the same election. While voters typically receive a ballot to select a representative in a constituency (often using first-past-the-post) and a ballot to select a party list (often using a form of proportional representation (PR)), the institutional features of mixed-member systems vary substantially. A crucial distinction among mixed-member systems is whether or not seat allocation in the constituency and proportional representation tiers is linked (mixed-member proportional, or MMP) or unlinked (mixed-member majoritarian, or MMM). Across the universe of mixed-member systems, one finds additional differences in the number of ballots voters receive; the electoral formulas and thresholds used to determine winners; the proportion of seats allocated to each component; the ability of candidates to contest seats in both components during the same election; and other critical aspects of the rules. Scholarship classifying mixed-member systems has highlighted different aspects of the rules to sort them into categories. A substantial amount of scholarship on mixed-member systems has emphasized the debate about the incentives that the systems generate. The “controlled comparison” approach treats the components as if they are independent from one another and the “contamination effects” approach treats the components as if they are interdependent. These competing schools of thought generate different expectations, with the former generally anticipating compliance with Duverger’s propositions and the latter anticipating divergence. Subsequent scholarship has been split about which approach better explains observed behavior. However, many of the perceived differences between the approaches may be artificial, generated by extreme interpretations of the theoretical expectations that lack appropriate nuance. In other words, it may be inappropriate to treat this scholarship as strictly dichotomous. The extant literature on mixed-member systems evaluates data from surveys, interviews, personnel files, roll-call voting, and election returns to understand the behavior of voters, candidates, parties, and legislators. It assesses how the incentives of mixed-member systems contribute to outcomes such as the party system, descriptive representation, and policy decisions. It also explores the presence or absence of a “mandate divide”: the expectation that members of parliament (MPs) selected in the constituency component might behave differently than their counterparts in the party list component. The research is often cross-national, but studies of certain countries with mixed-member systems predominate: Germany, Japan, and New Zealand among established democracies, and central or east European countries among transitional societies. The literature presents many opportunities to generate more nuanced theory, explore different research methodologies (e.g., experimental work), and extend spatial coverage to under-studied countries.

Electoral Systems and the Substantive Representation of Marginalized Groups: Evidence from Women’s Issue Bills in South Korea

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110282
Author(s):  
Yesola Kweon ◽  
Josh M. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Substantive Representation ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
The Relationship

How do electoral rules shape the substantive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups? Using an original dataset of introduced and passed bills in the Korean National Assembly, which has both single-member districts and proportional representation, we examine the extent to which institutions condition the relationship between lawmaker gender and the substantive representation of women. While women lawmakers engage in higher levels of substantive representation of women, proportional representation allows both women and men to introduce more women’s issue bills than their counterparts elected through single-member districts. Furthermore, legislators elected through proportional representation are more effective at achieving passage of women’s issue legislation when compared with those elected in single-member districts, and this effect is especially pronounced for men. Our findings show that electoral systems matter for the representation of marginalized groups and that proportional representation systems allow both female and male politicians to increase their substantive representation of women.

Party Linkage, Public Justification and Mixed Electoral Systems

2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172097833
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
Democratic Life ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

In recent years, a number of political theorists have aimed to restore the central role of parties in democratic life. These theorists have especially highlighted two key normative functions of parties: linkage and public justification. In this article, I argue that these two functions are often in tension. First, I illustrate how this tension manifests itself in liberal democracies. Second, I explain that parties’ ability to fulfil each of the two functions is strongly affected by the electoral system under which they operate: while first-past-the-post encourages party linkage but hinders public justification, the opposite is true of proportional representation. Third, I argue that a mixed electoral system can best guarantee the balance between parties’ linkage and justificatory functions. Fourth, I suggest a number of proposals for party reforms that could help mixed electoral systems to balance party linkage and public justification while preventing the re-emergence of the tension between them within parties.

Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 589-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey André ◽  
Sam Depauw ◽  
Matthew S Shugart ◽  
Roman Chytilek
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Literature ◽  
Czech Republic ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Representation Systems

A paradox in the comparative literature on electoral systems is that one of the most common systems in Europe – flexible-list proportional representation systems – may be the least understood. Any study of flexible-list systems must start by acknowledging a puzzle: why candidates spend time and effort striving to win preference votes when typically these votes make no difference between election and defeat. Offering the first comprehensive multi-country test of this key puzzle, we provide evidence from Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia that parties will promote to better list ranks in the next election those candidates who are successful at winning preference votes, thereby improving their prospects of election in the longer term and incentivizing them to cultivate personal reputations. Our findings have important implications for party scholars and practitioners when designing, or reforming, political institutions.

A House Divided

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Representation Election ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Empirical Results

Mixed-member electoral systems embrace two views of representation by electing some legislators in single-member district elections and others in a proportional representation election. This can potentially create a “mandate divide” in legislatures, because single-member district legislators have an incentive to embrace parochial issues and proportional representation legislators have an incentive to center on national issues. Previous studies of this question have only found limited evidence of its existence. The author argues that the level of party system institutionalization will fundamentally determine whether a mandate divide will exist in a mixed-member legislature. Using roll-call voting data from the Hungarian National Assembly, the Russian Duma, and the Ukrainian Rada, the author analyzes patterns of party discipline in each legislature. The empirical results show that a mandate divide only existed in the legislature with the most weakly institutionalized party system, the Russian Duma.

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