Emotion and Reason in Political Language

This paper studies the use of emotion and reason in political discourse. Adopting computational-linguistics techniques to construct a validated text-based scale, we measure emotionality in 6 million speeches given in U.S. Congress over the years 1858-2014. Intuitively, emotionality spikes during times of war and is highest in speeches about patriotism. In the time series, emotionality was relatively low and stable in earlier years but increased significantly starting in the late 1970s. Across Congress Members, emotionality is higher for Democrats, for women, for ethnic/religious minorities, for the opposition party, and for members with ideologically extreme roll-call voting records.

Legislators’ roll-call voting behavior increasingly corresponds to intervals in the political spectrum

Scaling techniques such as the well known NOMINATE position political actors in a low dimensional space to represent the similarity or dissimilarity of their political orientation based on roll-call voting patterns. Starting from the same kind of data we propose an alternative, discrete, representation that replaces positions (points and distances) with niches (boxes and overlap). In the one-dimensional case, this corresponds to replacing the left-to-right ordering of points on the real line with an interval order. As it turns out, this seemingly simplistic one-dimensional model is sufficient to represent the similarity of roll-call votes by U.S. senators in recent years. In a historic context, however, low dimensionality represents the exception which stands in contrast to what is suggested by scaling techniques.

Legislator Adoption of the Fake News Label: Ideological Differences in Republican Representative Use on Twitter

We examine the extent to which Republican members of the House of Representatives have attempted to delegitimize established media by adopting the fake news label on Twitter since Donald Trump’s election. We find that a significant minority of Republican representatives used the fake news label on Twitter. Ideology, measured through roll-call voting behavior (DW-NOMINATE), was the strongest indicator of likely adoption, with conservative representatives using the label at significantly higher rates than comparative moderates. Quantity of tweets sent was a further significant predictor of use, with active Twitter users more disposed to use the label on the platform. District partisanship (PVI) provided no explanatory value beyond ideology, suggesting limited ‘tactical’ use of the label for electoral gain. We discuss potential reasons for these findings and consider consequences for various actors, including Trump. We respond to a call in the literature for more empirical data concerning the use of the fake news label by actors other than President Trump by assessing the extent to which House Republicans have adopted this behavior.

Roll-call Voting Behaviour in Legislatures

Roll call votes offer rich behavioural information on individual members of parliament (MPs) and have been used to study many important research questions, also dealing with issues of representation. With the help of such votes MPs (and/or their parties) can be held to account. Thus, scholars have assessed broadly whether political parties act in a disciplined fashion and what affects the voting behavior of individual MPs, thus covering both processes of collective and individual accountability. The literature finds that evidence for such accountability relationships, is, however, also hampered by different uses of roll call votes across time and space.

Vote Secrecy With Diverse Voters

Why would incumbent politicians adopt the secret ballot when doing so weakens the advantages of incumbency? Why is the secret ballot considered a democratizing reform in some settings, whereas in others it is associated with democratic backsliding? We provide theory and empirics to address these questions. Our starting point is the observation that the secret ballot had two consequences. It reduced the capacity to monitor the vote, thereby dampening the efficacy of clientelism. Yet, depending on literacy and electoral rules, it could also narrow political participation. Recognizing this, we endogenize politicians’ preferences over the secret ballot, concentrating on the role of their personal and constituency characteristics. Legislative roll call voting data from Brazil’s Second Republic (1945-1964) is used to test our framework. Consistent with expectations, the level of literacy of legislators’ supporters and the strength of their local ties strongly influenced the choice to adopt the secret ballot.