Board Structure and the Role of Outside Directors: Evidence from Private Firms

Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Zhongda He ◽  
Jun-Koo Kang
2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-907 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Zhongda He

2020 ◽  
Vol 138 (2) ◽  
pp. 483-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Syan Chen ◽  
Yan-Shing Chen ◽  
Jun-Koo Kang ◽  
Shu-Cing Peng

Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 649-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nkoko Blessy Sekome ◽  
Tesfaye Taddesse Lemma

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the nexus between firm-specific attributes and a company’s decision to setup a separate risk management committee (RMC) as a sub-committee of the board within the context of an emerging economy, South Africa. Design/methodology/approach – The authors analyse data extracted from audited annual financial reports of 181 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) by using logistic regression technique. Findings – The results show a strong positive relationship between the existence of a separate RMC and board independence, board size, firm size and industry type. However, the authors fail to find support for the hypotheses that independent board chairman, auditor reputation, reporting risk and financial leverage have an influence on a firm’s decision to establish RMC as a separately standing committee in the board structure. The findings signify the role of costs associated with information asymmetry, agency, upkeep of a standalone RMC, damage to the reputation of directors and industry-specific idiosyncrasies on a firm’s decision to form a separate RMC. Research limitations/implications – As in most empirical studies, this study focuses on listed firms. Nonetheless, future studies that focus on non-listed firms could add additional insights to the literature. Investigating the role of firm-specific governance attributes other than those considered in the present study (e.g. gender of directors, ownership structure, etc.) could further enhance the understanding of antecedents of risk-management practices. Practical implications – The findings have practical implications for the investment community in assessing the quality of risk management practices of companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, the results provide insights that are potentially useful to the King Committee and other corporate governance regulators in South Africa in their effort to improve corporate governance practices. Originality/value – The present study focuses on firms drawn from an emerging economy which has profound economic, institutional, political and cultural differences compared to advanced economies, which have received a disproportionately higher share of attention in prior studies. Thus, the study contributes additional insights to the literature on corporate risk management from the perspective of an emerging economy.


2018 ◽  
pp. 74-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Devesh Kapur ◽  
Milan Vaishnav

In many developing countries, politicians often turn to private firms for illicit election finance. In sectors where firms are highly regulated, politicians can exchange policy discretion or regulatory favours for financial support during elections. This chapter explores this dynamic by focusing on the role of the construction sector in India, a domain where regulatory intensity is high. Specifically, we argue that builders will experience a short-term liquidity crunch as elections approach because of their need to re-route funds to campaigns as a form of indirect election finance. We use variation in the demand for cement, the indispensable ingredient for construction, to investigate the presence of an electoral cycle in building activity consistent with this logic. Using a novel monthly-level dataset, we demonstrate that cement consumption does exhibit a political business cycle supportive of our hypothesis.


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