ESG Management and the Role of Outside Directors in Korean Listed Companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 401-433
Author(s):  
Seungjae Oh
2016 ◽  
pp. 55-94
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Carlotta D'Este

The reporting of comprehensive income is becoming increasingly important. After the introduction of Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) reporting, as required by the 2007 IAS 1-revised, the IASB is currently seeking inputs from investors on the usefulness of unrealized gains and losses and on the role of comprehensive income. This circumstance is of particular relevance in code law countries, as local pre-IFRS accounting models influence financial statement preparers and users. This study aims at investigating the role played by unrealized gains and losses reporting on users' decision process, by examining the impact of OCI on the Italian listed companies RoE ratio and by surveying a sample of financial analysts, also content analysing their formal reports. The results show that the reporting of comprehensive income does not affect the financial statement users' decision process, although it statistically affects Italian listed entities' performance.


Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (6/7) ◽  
pp. 582-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar ◽  
Hafiz Majdi Abdul Rashid

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to ascertain the control role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), as prescribed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG).The MCCG (2000) requires substantive involvement of INEDs on the audit, nomination and remuneration board sub-committees. The study also examines the effectiveness of INEDs in discharging their monitoring roles in these sub-committees. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative research design consisting of a series of interviews with board members of Malaysian-owned PLCs on the board of Bursa Malaysia was used. Findings – Interviews with 27 company directors reveal that, due to their independence, INEDs are crucial in safeguarding the interests of smaller investors if situations arise in which shareholders’ interests may be threatened. The interviews also disclose that the audit committee possesses the most authority among the sub-committees, as it derives its power not only from the Listing Requirements but also from statute, as well as being involved in areas of the company not traditionally associated with the committee. The study also reveals the differences in opinion between executive directors and INEDs with regard to the extent of INEDs’ effectiveness. Research limitations/implications – This research utilises interviews. Generalisation may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. In addition, the sample is not random, as access to many directors is dependent on recommendations. In addition, the respondents have been consciously selected to cover various board positions, including independent and non-independent directors. Practical implications – The findings from this research suggest that INEDs are able to discharge their responsibilities in overseeing the conduct of executives and protecting the interests of investors. In addition, the interviews disclose that the effectiveness of INEDs depends on how non-executive directors view INEDs being on the board. Rather than focusing solely on their control role, INEDS are expected to have a more proactive and progressive role in ensuring sustainable growth and the expansion of the business entity. Originality/value – There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating the effectiveness of INEDs in the control role of the board in developing countries. Prior studies were predominantly based upon the experience of Western economies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenge Wang

Abstract This article explores the board independence of listed companies in the US and China – an ongoing and important issue of corporate governance concerning the true independence of independent directors from management in both countries. It aims to identify what elements have an impact on board independence and examine how these influence the independence of independent directors. Four elements, independence from management; dependence on shareholders; access to information; and incentive to monitor, may have a substantial influence on board independence and align with the in-fact independence of independent directors. This article examines how and why these four elements have an impact on the effectiveness of the role of independent directors in monitoring top management and lead to independent directors failing to be truly independent of management. To support this argument, this article also investigates the efficiency and effectiveness of independent directors serving as a governance mechanism in terms of board independence in Chinese listed companies. The aim was therefore to scrutinise whether independent directors in Chinese listed companies are truly independent from management. Based on statistics calculated on data collected from CSMAR, there appears to be little evidence that independent directors serve as a governance mechanism in monitoring top management in Chinese listed companies, which thus shows that independent directors are not independent in China. The implications arising from this article are that solutions addressing the four elements that have an impact on board independence will enable independent directors to become truly independent.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Chao Zhou

Since the establishment of the first free trade zone in Shanghai in 2013, as of 2018, China has successively established 13 free trade zones. This paper uses a multi-period difference method and uses the financial data of Chinese A-share listed companies to prove the construction of the FTZ help to improve the TFP of the enterprise. The annual patent data obtained by the company is used to empirically analyze the role of innovation as a mediating effect in the development of the FTZ. In the end, it is believed that the construction of the FTZ can improve the TFP of enterprises through intermediary effects and regulatory effects.


Author(s):  
Bilal Nayef Zureigat ◽  
Faudziah Hanim Fadzil ◽  
Syed Soffian Syed Ismail

This study discusses the association between foreign, family ownership and audit committee on the going concern evaluation among Jordanian listed companies for the years 2011 and 2012. The data reveal through using OLS regression that there is a negative and not significant relationship between foreign ownership and going concern evaluation, while a negative significant relationship with family ownership. In addition, this study also finds a positive and significant relationship of audit committee with the going concern evaluation.The results alsoshow that most of the Jordanian companies have violated some of Corporate Governance requirements. For instance, approximately 43% of Jordanian firms did not have an audit committee. This study shows valuable insights to the understanding of factors that may affect going concern evaluation among Jordanian firms. Therefore, the findings of this study provide important conclusions for investors, regulators and policymakers and academics to shed the light on the mechanisms that ensure the continuity of companies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shaique ◽  
Fei Guo ◽  
Ruqia Shaikh ◽  
Shahbaz Khan ◽  
Muhammad Usman

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