Board Structure and Advisory Role of Outside Directors: Evidence From U.S. Legislation Granting China Permanent Normal Trade Status in 2000

Author(s):  
ShenggSyan Chen ◽  
Yan-Shing Chen ◽  
Jun-Koo Kang ◽  
Shu-Cing Peng
2020 ◽  
Vol 138 (2) ◽  
pp. 483-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Syan Chen ◽  
Yan-Shing Chen ◽  
Jun-Koo Kang ◽  
Shu-Cing Peng

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-907 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Zhongda He

Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.


1998 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 665
Author(s):  
Robert J. Steamer ◽  
Stewart Jay
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 649-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nkoko Blessy Sekome ◽  
Tesfaye Taddesse Lemma

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the nexus between firm-specific attributes and a company’s decision to setup a separate risk management committee (RMC) as a sub-committee of the board within the context of an emerging economy, South Africa. Design/methodology/approach – The authors analyse data extracted from audited annual financial reports of 181 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) by using logistic regression technique. Findings – The results show a strong positive relationship between the existence of a separate RMC and board independence, board size, firm size and industry type. However, the authors fail to find support for the hypotheses that independent board chairman, auditor reputation, reporting risk and financial leverage have an influence on a firm’s decision to establish RMC as a separately standing committee in the board structure. The findings signify the role of costs associated with information asymmetry, agency, upkeep of a standalone RMC, damage to the reputation of directors and industry-specific idiosyncrasies on a firm’s decision to form a separate RMC. Research limitations/implications – As in most empirical studies, this study focuses on listed firms. Nonetheless, future studies that focus on non-listed firms could add additional insights to the literature. Investigating the role of firm-specific governance attributes other than those considered in the present study (e.g. gender of directors, ownership structure, etc.) could further enhance the understanding of antecedents of risk-management practices. Practical implications – The findings have practical implications for the investment community in assessing the quality of risk management practices of companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, the results provide insights that are potentially useful to the King Committee and other corporate governance regulators in South Africa in their effort to improve corporate governance practices. Originality/value – The present study focuses on firms drawn from an emerging economy which has profound economic, institutional, political and cultural differences compared to advanced economies, which have received a disproportionately higher share of attention in prior studies. Thus, the study contributes additional insights to the literature on corporate risk management from the perspective of an emerging economy.


Author(s):  
Helen Fenwick

This chapter considers proposals for changes that might be made by a British Bill of Rights, as compared with the Human Rights Act, under the Coalition government, or a future Conservative government. It considers views expressed by Conservative spokespersons prior to and after the 2010 general election, and answers given by members of the Bill of Rights Commission to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in 2011. This chapter also touches on the second aspect of the Commission's remit — its advisory role on reform of the European Court of Human Rights. It questions whether adopting a Bill of Rights on the lines favoured by the Conservative leadership, combined with the Strasbourg reforms recently determined on, would be likely to realise Conservative aims of creating divergence from Strasbourg and enhancing parliamentary autonomy.


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