scholarly journals Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Montero
Keyword(s):  
Noncooperative Bargaining

The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining

2002 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 490-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Manzini ◽  
Marco Mariotti
Keyword(s):  
Noncooperative Bargaining

Introduction: Symposium on Noncooperative Bargaining

1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Linhart ◽  
Roy Radner ◽  
Mark Satterthwaite
Keyword(s):  
Noncooperative Bargaining

scholarly journals Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Austen-Smith ◽  
Jeffrey Banks
Keyword(s):  
Party Competition ◽  
Electoral Behavior ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining ◽  
Party Behavior

Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Randolph T. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Duration Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Critical Events ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Stochastic Version ◽  
Empirical Assessment ◽  
Strategic Model ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining

We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strøm's noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches: (1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet's risks of being replaced without an intermediate election may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametric duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strøm model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternative, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability.

Voting and Vetoing

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-823 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Winter
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Quantitative Results ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown

2020 ◽  
Vol 105 ◽  
pp. 34-40
Author(s):  
Guangjing Yang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Dongshuang Hou ◽  
Genjiu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining ◽  
Endogenous Protocol
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