A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations

1991 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas G. Baird ◽  
Randal C. Picker
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining ◽  
Corporate Reorganizations

Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Randolph T. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Duration Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Critical Events ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Stochastic Version ◽  
Empirical Assessment ◽  
Strategic Model ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining

We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strøm's noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches: (1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet's risks of being replaced without an intermediate election may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametric duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strøm model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternative, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability.

Do Relative Status of Women and Marriage Characteristics Matter for the Intimate Partner Violence?

2021 ◽  
pp. 0192513X2110300
Author(s):  
Aysegul Kayaoglu
Keyword(s):  
Intimate Partner Violence ◽  
Partner Violence ◽  
Emotional Abuse ◽  
Intimate Partner ◽  
Resource Theory ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Relative Status ◽  
Turkish Case ◽  
Status Of Women

This article analyzes intimate partner violence (IPV) in a developing country context, namely, Turkey, which faces an enormous increase in femicide cases over the last decade. Analyzing a very rich nationwide representative survey on IPV, we show that it is not only the absolute status of women but also their relative status in terms of income and education that affects different types of domestic violence, ranging from emotional abuse to physical and sexual violence. Besides, factors related to marriage setting are found to have a significant role in the effect of women’s superior status on IPV. Overall, we provide evidence to support the relative resource theory and invalidate the intra-household bargaining model in the Turkish case.

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

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