A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown

2020 ◽  
Vol 105 ◽  
pp. 34-40
Author(s):  
Guangjing Yang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Dongshuang Hou ◽  
Genjiu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining ◽  
Endogenous Protocol

Voting and Vetoing

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-823 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Winter
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Quantitative Results ◽  
Noncooperative Bargaining

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

scholarly journals A Distributed and Resilient Bargaining Game for Weather-Predictive Microgrid Energy Cooperation

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 4721-4730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu An ◽  
Jie Duan ◽  
Mo-Yuen Chow ◽  
Alexandra Duel-Hallen
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Energy Cooperation

Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bård Harstad
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Political Cooperation ◽  
Political Centralization ◽  
Decentralized Cooperation

For two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities, I analyze a bargaining game under private information. I derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions—with and without side payments—and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations. While policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions, they create conflicts between the regions and, thus, delay. The results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation, and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial “uniformity assumption” traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature. (JEL C78, D72, D82, H77)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document