scholarly journals Overconsumption, Procreation, and Morality

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
John Mariana

Thomas Young (2001) argues that overconsumption and procreation are morally equivalent, and thus that anyone who disapproves of overconsumption must arrive at the same normative judgment concerning procreation (or procreation beyond a certain threshold). Young presents an analogical argument in support of his claim, and defends it against four varieties of objections intended to show that the analogy is weak or faulty. I argue that Young’s defense of his argument fails, and that though a stronger case can be made for his claim of moral equivalence between procreation and overconsumption, a full defense of the claim would unfortunately require a moral theory that we presently do not have (namely, Derek Parfit’s Theory X, the theory of beneficence that would tell us how many people there should be). This is unfortunate because in the absence of successful rational grounds for such a claim concerning the moral value (or disvalue) of procreation relative to resource consumption, we are likely to overlook or misjudge the moral and other costs of population growth.

2021 ◽  
pp. 228-230
Author(s):  
Barbara Herman

This chapter reflects on how the book’s method of using the Kantian apparatus to build out the moral habitat idea has been an occasion to fundamentally rethink Kantian theory and to show it capable of engaging creatively with contemporary moral concerns. It has also expanded the very idea of a deontology by drawing out the implications of taking imperfect duties seriously and showing the merits of regarding the practical side of moral theory as a kind of participatory moral science. It offers reflections on the local and global implications of the moral habitat idea, the importance to it of innate right, and emphasizes the place of motive and its connection to moral value in the Kantian scheme.


Catalysts ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 1043
Author(s):  
Carmen M. Dominguez ◽  
Aurora Santos

Water and soil pollution are among the most critical global problems due to population growth, industrial development, and associated resource consumption [...]


Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilea Bramer

Care ethicists have long insisted that Kantian moral theory fails to capture the partiality that ought to be present in our personal relationships. In her most recent book, Virginia Held claims that, unlike impartial moral theories, care ethics guides us in how we should act toward friends and family. Because these actions are performed out of care, they have moral value for a care ethicist. The same actions, Held claims, would not have moral worth for a Kantian because of the requirement of impartiality. Although Kantian moral theory is an impartial theory, I argue that the categorical imperative in the Formulation of Humanity as an End and the duty of respect require that we give special treatment to friends and family because of their relationships with us. Therefore, this treatment does have moral value for a Kantian.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 283
Author(s):  
Zulfardi D

This research  is classified  as a qualitative descriptive approach to literary  sociology that aims to describe the manifestation of moral values in novel Amira: Cinta dari Tanah Surga. Data sourced from novel texts that were amalyzed using moral theory. The results of the study show that the from of moral values consists of three types, namely moral values in human relations with variants of  have faith,  pray to God, prayer and read the Quran. Moral values in relation  to humans and themselves with variants of patience, sincerity, and responsibility. Moral value of human relations with other people  with variants, of  advice from fellow friends, parents love children, and the love of fellow friends


2020 ◽  
pp. 37-52
Author(s):  
F Stuart Chapin

This chapter describes how to shape the linkages between people and nature so that both may flourish. People shape nature through exploitation, impacts, and stewardship; and nature shapes people through ecosystem services—nature’s benefits to society. These benefits include provisioning services such as food, water, and fiber; regulating services that shape climate, clean our drinking water, and influence disturbance risk; and cultural services such as cultural identity, spiritual connections, and recreation. Two-thirds of Earth’s ecosystem services are being degraded or used unsustainably in the global aggregate, primarily because of land conversion to agriculture and climate change. More thoughtful resource consumption choices by society, slower population growth, and greater respect for nature would reduce these impacts. Building respect for nature often requires collaboration among groups with different views of nature.


Conatus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Filimon Peonidis

Although appeals to human dignity became quite popular after the end of War World II in various moral and legal settings, the term retained an air of semantic indeterminacy, and scholars are of opposing minds concerning its usefulness and significance. In this essay I intend to offer a sketch of a “deflationary” account of human dignity – viewed as one moral value among many others – according to which it is conceived as the minimal respect we prima facie owe to our own personality, as well as to the personality of everyone else without any restriction or exception. This account is accompanied by a justification, which does not presuppose the endorsement of a particular moral theory, and envisages dignity as a bulwark to counter the morally abhorrent consequences of many categorical and normatively tainted dichotomies western societies have created.


Author(s):  
Graham Floyd

The principle of organic unities is a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of moral value.  It states that the value of the whole is not equal to the summation of its parts.  Even though this principle has a major impact on moral theory, it has been neglected in the consideration of the problem of God and evil.  I claim that the theist can utilize the principle of organic unities to undermine the problem of evil.  First, I explain the principle of organic unities and how it affects one’s understanding of moral value.  Next, I explicate the two major historical versions of the problem of evil: the logical argument from evil and the evidential argument from evil.  Lastly, I argue that the principle of organic unities demonstrates that God may logically co-exist with evil and that the atheologian lacks rational warrant appealing to gratuitous evil against God’s existence.  As a result, both problems fail.


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