Some Critical Comments on Zimmerman’s Ignorance and Moral Obligation

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-400
Author(s):  
Krister Bykvist
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Objective View ◽  
The Right ◽  
Michael Zimmerman

In his recent book, Michael Zimmerman continues to defend the Prospective View, according to which moral obligation depends on evidence about both empirical and evaluative factors. In my commentary, I shall first focus on Zimmerman’s framework in which different moral theories are defined and distinguished. I argue that Zimmerman fails to formulate a clear and coherent distinction between The Prospective View and the Objective View, which he rejects. Then I turn to the so-called constraint #2, a crucial premise in Zimmerman’s master argument against the Objective View. Here I argue that it should be given up so that we can give the right verdict in cases of fundamental moral uncertainty. More specifically, I shall argue that a morally conscientious agent can rationally choose the option that is guaranteed to be morally wrong in a Jackson-case of fundamental moral uncertainty. Finally, I shall argue that the Prospective View, in its most recent guise – according to which moral obligation depends on empirical and evaluative evidence the agent has actually availed herself of – has very troubling substantive implications that go against all traditional moral theories, as well as an earlier version of Zimmerman’s Prospective View.

The Zimmerman-Graham Debate on Objectivism versus Prospectivism

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-414
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Objective View ◽  
Peter Graham ◽  
Michael Zimmerman

In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and with the agent’s choosing an act she believes to be Objectively wrong. In Ignorance and Moral Obligation Zimmerman argues that Graham’s “Objectivism” is only terminologically distinct from his Prospectivism. I argue that Graham faces a dilemma: if his theory delivers different prescriptions from Zimmerman’s, those prescriptions are implausible. On the other hand, if his theory avoids such implausible recommendations, it now generates exactly the same recommendations as Zimmerman’s theory, and so does not constitute a serious challenge to it.

Kajian pelu dan tidaknya penambahan term Budi Pekerti dalam konten buku Pendidikan Agama Islam dan Budi Pekerti untuk siswa SMU

1969 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Salim Ashar
Keyword(s):  
Religious Education ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Holistic Education ◽  
Islamic Education ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Split Personality ◽  
Objective View ◽  
The Right ◽  
Scientific Value

Character is a complicated issue, even considered an abstract problem. It is said to be abstract because the concept of manners is not yet operational. While good and bad standards for morals are in the objective view of God the Creator of man. If the character is ethics, it is very dangerous, because some of its value will be contrary to the moral lessons that exist in religious subjects. When both are taught (ethics and morals) then the threat is the students will later experience what is called a split personality, that is split personality. Students become confused because there are conflicting values, such as good values ​​in the sense of morals and good value in manners (call: ethics). There is no honest terminology of Arabic versions, honest English versions, false witnesses of Arabic and French versions, as there is no terminology about Arab or Turkish morality. This applies to humans when there is a pattern of intersection between ethical values ​​and customs: ethical values ​​derive from the "right" way (revelation), whereas customs are derived from the habits The purpose of this study are: 1) Describing whether or not the addition manners in the lessons of Islamic Religious Education. 2) Describe the material (content) in the lesson of Islamic Education and the intersection of Budi Pekerti based on traditional perspectives. This study uses "Library Research". The research data used is secondary data. Data collection techniques used are documentation. Data processing is done by conducting the activity of review, verification and reduction, grouping and systematization, and interpretation or interpretation so that a phenomenon has social, academic, and scientific value. From the results of the discussion concluded: 1) Based on the perspective of Islam, the lessons of Islamic Religious Education need not be added with the character, because in fact holistic education includes in the Islamic Religious Education. 2) The content of Islamic Religious Education should include aspects of Islam, ie Aqidah, Shari'ah and Akhlak which are taught in a balanced way, but the lesson of character can be combined as long as the adat is the custom of the Muslims.

The Changing Ethics of Climate Change

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Mittler
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Power Plant ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Environmental Movement ◽  
Health Problems ◽  
Renewable Energies ◽  
Car Use ◽  
The Face ◽  
Speed Up ◽  
The Right

Many in the environmental movement have argued in recent years that in order to speed up climate actions we should take the ethics out of the climate change debate. Focusing on the moral obligation to act or on the effects of climate change on the most vulnerable was often judged to render the discourse too “heavy,” “negative,” or “difficult.” Many also deemed it unnecessary. After all, renewable energies, better designed cities that allow for reduced car use, and power plant regulations that lead to cleaner local air—to take just three examples—all have real and substantial benefits unrelated to the fact that they are “the right thing to do” in the face of climate change. They create jobs, reduce health problems and costs, and make society fitter.

scholarly journals Social justice and the formal principle of freedom

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-284
Author(s):  
Olga Nikolic ◽  
Igor Cvejic
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Significant Degree ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Obligation ◽  
Free Society ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Formal Principle ◽  
The Right ◽  
Friedrich Hayek

The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek?s Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we will introduce the distincion between formal and factual freedom and argue that the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognize (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant?s argument on taxation, according to which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant?s justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.

Epilogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-242
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
African Country ◽  
Good Position ◽  
African Students ◽  
Intellectual Traditions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Do So

At the end of the first chapter (1.5), I noted that, since having moved to an African country, I have considered myself to have had a moral obligation to engage with its intellectual traditions when teaching and researching. I would have rightly felt guilt had I taught merely Western ethics to African students and contributed only Euro-American-Australasian perspectives to journals published in the sub-Saharan region. Having been principally trained as an analytic moral and political philosopher, I have been in a good position to articulate normative-theoretic interpretations of African morality, to evaluate these moral theories by appealing to intuitions, and to apply them to a range of practical controversies. Now, it would be welcome if the relational moral theory I have defended in this book could explain why I had a duty to make such a contribution to the field. And indeed it does. I have had an obligation of some weight to teach and research African philosophical ideas as I am particularly able to do so for a reason that is by now familiar to the reader. In the way that a newly trained doctor has an obligation of some weight to give something back to his country before emigrating (...

scholarly journals Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-273
Author(s):  
JP Messina ◽  
David Wiens
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Standard Conception ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Theoretic Argument ◽  
Game Theoretic

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

Brain Drain, Contracts, and Moral Obligation

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edward Callies
Keyword(s):  
Brain Drain ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Right

AbstractIn this paper I first argue that when answering the question of whether or not governments may restrict emigration, Brock and Blake are staking out positions not astronomically far from one another. Despite the ostensibly large philosophical gap between the two, both think that certain governments may restrict emigration when such restriction is agreed to in a morally binding contract. Secondly, both authors think that there are specific “circumstances” or “conditions” under which a contract that restricts emigration can be morally binding. This second part of the paper will pose some questions that explore these various circumstances or conditions. The ultimate aim of the paper is to help point the debate in the right direction so as to further develop an answer to the question of whether or not governments may restrict emigration.

The Bounds of Morality

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 217-234
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Helmreich ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Related Point ◽  
The Right ◽  
Paradigm Shifting ◽  
Promissory Obligation ◽  
Moral Requirements

Margaret Gilbert’s ‘Three Dogmas about Promising’ is a paradigm-shifting contribution to the literature, not only for its account of promissory obligation based on joint commitment, but for its equally important focus on two properties of such obligation, which her account uniquely and elegantly captures: first, that the duty to keep a promise is necessary—the obligation stands regardless of the content or morality of the promise—and, second, that it is directed, with the promisee having unique standing to demand performance. A related point, implied by Gilbert’s argument, is that moral requirements, alone, can never have those properties. Here I challenge that point, arguing that moral requirements, under the right circumstances, can give rise to necessary and directed obligations, after all, and I propose one such moral obligation of which the duty to keep a promise may well be an instance. Nevertheless, I conclude, it may not provide as plausible a basis of promissory obligation as joint commitment.

Is it the Right Revolution? On Tushnet's The Rights Revolution in The Twentieth Century

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rivka Weill
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Legal History ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Legal Studies ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Law Professors ◽  
Alon Harel

This is yet another manuscript by one of the most interesting and prolific American constitutional law professors that the Critical Legal Studies movement has produced. Mark Tushnet has written extensively and influentially in the fields of both American and comparative constitutional law. He is a known expert on twentieth century American legal history, bringing this expertise to bear in writing his ambitious and most recent book, The Rights Revolution in the Twentieth Century.This review of an early draft of the book will consist of three parts. The first portrays Tushnet's descriptive enterprise in a nutshell. The second discusses the historical dimensions of Tushnet's work. The last evaluates its contribution to legal theory along the lines suggested by Alon Harel.

Hegel's Idealism: Prospects

1989 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 28-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Pippin
Keyword(s):  
Category Theory ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Self ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Full Theory ◽  
Self Actualization ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Right ◽  
Conceptual Possibility

First of all, I am very grateful to both commentators for the attention they have devoted to Hegel's Idealism; I am heartened by the kind words and humbled by the magnitude of the problems introduced by their criticisms. These criticisms both rightly refer to what is the heart of my interpretation, the Kant-Hegel relation, and, interestingly enough, raise objections from roughly opposite directions. Professor Pinkard, in effect, charges that I have made too much of that relation and thereby confused transcendental and speculative concerns. He argues here, as he does at greater length in his recent book (Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility), that the philosophically valuable core of Hegel is a ‘category theory’ limited to an ‘explanation’ of the conceptual ‘possibility’ of various judgments, practices, institutions, etc. Professor Harris charges, on the other hand (and with some irony), that I have made too little of the Kant-Hegel relation, or have construed it too narrowly, that the interpretation of Hegel's idealism which I provide thus either unfairly neglects, or does not have the resources to deal with, Hegel's full theory of the ‘whole’, or of Absolute Spirit, his account of the modern community's reconciliation with itself in time. I am thus alleged to have provided an interpretation that is at once too ambitious, and not ambitious enough, and I hope that such responses, at least for the Aristotelians in the audience, count as prima facie evidence that I must have said just the right thing. My claim in Hegel's Idealism is that the well-known Hegel Renaissance, in post-war Western Europe especially, has still failed to produce a contemporary reconstruction of Hegel's fundamental position, his ‘identity theory’, his identifying the ‘self-actualization’ of the Notion with ‘actuality’, or his theory of the reality of the Absolute Idea.

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