The Zimmerman-Graham Debate on Objectivism versus Prospectivism

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-414
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Objective View ◽  
Peter Graham ◽  
Michael Zimmerman

In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and with the agent’s choosing an act she believes to be Objectively wrong. In Ignorance and Moral Obligation Zimmerman argues that Graham’s “Objectivism” is only terminologically distinct from his Prospectivism. I argue that Graham faces a dilemma: if his theory delivers different prescriptions from Zimmerman’s, those prescriptions are implausible. On the other hand, if his theory avoids such implausible recommendations, it now generates exactly the same recommendations as Zimmerman’s theory, and so does not constitute a serious challenge to it.

Belief in others’ trustworthiness and trusting behaviour

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Macko ◽  
Marcin Malawski ◽  
Tadeusz Tyszka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Actual Rate ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Trust Games

Abstract Data from surveys indicate that people, in general, do not trust others. On the other hand, in one-shot trust games, where the player decides whether to send money to an anonymous partner, the actual rate of trust is relatively high. In two experiments, we showed that although reciprocity expectations and profit maximization matter, they are not decisive for trusting behaviour. Crucial factors that motivate behaviour in trust games seem to be altruism and a type of moral obligation related to a social norm encouraging cooperative behaviour. Finally, we were able to divide participants into specific profiles based on amount of money transferred to the partner, altruistic motivation, and belief in partners’ trustworthiness. This shows that the trust game is differently perceived and interpreted by different participants

The Moral Situation

Philosophy ◽  
1949 ◽  
Vol 24 (91) ◽  
pp. 335-341
Author(s):  
N. H. G. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Face

Modern ethics has been chiefly concerned with the analysis of the conditions and principles of morality; and, in particular, one of its most important achievements has been the further elucidation of the Kantian dictum that “I ought” implies that I can. On the face of it Kant's contention seems perfectly straightforward, but, on examination, it becomes apparent that the simple word “can” covers a somewhat complicated ambiguity. When it is said that I ought to do act A, it may rightly be taken that I can do act A; but the question arises whether or not this in turn involves that I am aware that I can do act A. There is clearly some significance in the assertion that I can do many acts which, however, never occur to me, either because I am ignorant of certain facts or because I have a mistaken opinion about the facts. On the other hand, it may quite properly be said that I cannot perform any act of the possibility of which I am unaware. The problem then is to determine and examine the sense of the word “can” which is a pre-condition of moral obligation.

Some Critical Comments on Zimmerman’s Ignorance and Moral Obligation

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-400
Author(s):  
Krister Bykvist
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Objective View ◽  
The Right ◽  
Michael Zimmerman

In his recent book, Michael Zimmerman continues to defend the Prospective View, according to which moral obligation depends on evidence about both empirical and evaluative factors. In my commentary, I shall first focus on Zimmerman’s framework in which different moral theories are defined and distinguished. I argue that Zimmerman fails to formulate a clear and coherent distinction between The Prospective View and the Objective View, which he rejects. Then I turn to the so-called constraint #2, a crucial premise in Zimmerman’s master argument against the Objective View. Here I argue that it should be given up so that we can give the right verdict in cases of fundamental moral uncertainty. More specifically, I shall argue that a morally conscientious agent can rationally choose the option that is guaranteed to be morally wrong in a Jackson-case of fundamental moral uncertainty. Finally, I shall argue that the Prospective View, in its most recent guise – according to which moral obligation depends on empirical and evaluative evidence the agent has actually availed herself of – has very troubling substantive implications that go against all traditional moral theories, as well as an earlier version of Zimmerman’s Prospective View.

Do Good Citizens Need Good Laws? Economics and the Expressive Function

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-174
Author(s):  
Michael D. Gilbert ◽  
Andrew T. Hayashi
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Commitment ◽  
Expressive Function ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
As If

Abstract We explore how adding prosocial preferences to the canonical precaution model of accidents changes either the efficient damages rule or the harm from accidents. For a utilitarian lawmaker, making the potential injurer sympathetic to the victim of harm has no effect on either outcome. On the other hand, making injurers averse to harming others reduces the harm from accidents but has no effect on efficient damages. For an atomistic lawmaker — one who excludes prosocial preferences from social welfare — cultivating a taste for either harm aversion or perfect sympathy can reduce efficient damages, though neither has any effect on the amount of harm from accidents. On the other hand, causing people to act as if they are averse to harm creation, such as out of habit or moral obligation, reduces both the efficient amount of damages and total harm. In general, encouraging either a distaste for, or moral commitment against, harm creation is useful while inculcating sympathy for victims of harm is not.

Law's Halo

1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald H. Regan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pure Error ◽  
The Law ◽  
Just Society

Like many people these days, I believe there is no general moral obligation to obey the law. I shall explain why there is no such moral obligation – and I shall clarify what I mean when I say there is no moral obligation to obey the law – as we proceed. But also like many people, I am unhappy with a position that would say there was no moral obligation to obey the law and then say no more about the law's moral significance. In our thinking about law in a resonably just society, we have a strong inclination to invest law with a sort of moral halo. It does not feel right to suggest that law is a morally neutral social fact, nor to suggest that law is merely a useful social technique.In this essay, I shall try to account in part for law's moral halo. (Let me emphasize “in part”; I do not purport to say everything that could be said.) Because I share the widespread inclination to invest law with this halo, I shall not be interested in a merely historical account of how we come to see law with a halo – a pure “error theory” of law's halo, if you will. I want to justify the halo. On the other hand, the main way to justify the halo is to get clear just what law's moral significance is. It is unlikely that at the end of the process of clarification the halo will have exactly the shape or luminance that it had at the beginning.

Obligation and Rightness

Philosophy ◽  
1945 ◽  
Vol 20 (76) ◽  
pp. 129-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. D. Falk
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject

Butler observes in the Preface to the Sermons that the subject of morals can be approached in two different ways: “One begins from enquiring into the abstract relations of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to his whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things: in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature. Thus they both lead us to the same thing, our obligations to the practice of virtue; and thus they exceedingly strengthen and enforce each other.” In making this observation Butler raises the problem of the nature of moral obligation, and of the criteria by which the existence of a moral obligation can be known. He does so by calling attention to the divisions of opinion which existed on this issue in his own days. Samuel Clarke, the fashionable moralist of the period, sought the roots of moral obligation in the “nature and reason of things”: for an agent to know that an act is his duty is to know that it is fitting or suitable to the circumstances in which it occurs. Shaftesbury, on the other hand, and many of the adherents to the doctrine of Natural Law, like Grotius and Pufendorf, sought the roots of moral obligation in the nature of agents: for an agent, to know that an act is his duty is for him to experience a special motive to do it. Butler recognized the fundamental difference between these two approaches.

scholarly journals Literary symbols and religious belief

1979 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 117-125
Author(s):  
Sven Linnér
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Christian Faith ◽  
Wide Area ◽  
Essential Difference ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So

Characteristic of the modern situation is the lack of any distinction between the languages of belief and non-belief. Thus, over a wide area, a believer on the one hand may use symbols which are in no way recognisable as specifically Christian, and may do so even when he wishes to portray experiences of a profoundly religious character; as reader, he can also recognise such experiences in the symbolism of the non-believer. A non-believer, on the other hand, may use Christian symbols without enabling us to attribute to him any conversion to faith. How then is one to describe the difference between believing and expressing a belief one does not share? The essential difference should be seen as resting in the attitude towards the truth of the symbol or statement of belief. In addition, at least as far as the Christian faith is concerned, there is also a moral obligation which is a consequence of faith. Furthermore, there is the sense of communion with those who embrace the same faith.

The Bearing of Ethics on Psychology

Philosophy ◽  
1927 ◽  
Vol 2 (7) ◽  
pp. 365-376
Author(s):  
Olaf Stapledon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Ethics And Psychology ◽  
Good And Evil

Ethics and psychology are apt to look askance at one another. The ethicist warns the psychologist that he cannot “ explain away ” the objective distinction between good and evil merely by describing the process by which we come to apprehend that distinction. Nor can he in any such manner show that moral obligation is illusory. On the other hand, some psychologists do claim that in exposing the psychological sources of moral experience they show that no objective distinction is involved in it.

A study of cometary eruptions through OH radio-lines

1999 ◽  
Vol 173 ◽  
pp. 249-254
Author(s):  
A.M. Silva ◽  
R.D. Miró
Keyword(s):  
Short Duration ◽  
Growth Curves ◽  
The Other ◽  
Initial Mass ◽  
Radio Lines ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Sudden Rise

AbstractWe have developed a model for theH2OandOHevolution in a comet outburst, assuming that together with the gas, a distribution of icy grains is ejected. With an initial mass of icy grains of 108kg released, theH2OandOHproductions are increased up to a factor two, and the growth curves change drastically in the first two days. The model is applied to eruptions detected in theOHradio monitorings and fits well with the slow variations in the flux. On the other hand, several events of short duration appear, consisting of a sudden rise ofOHflux, followed by a sudden decay on the second day. These apparent short bursts are frequently found as precursors of a more durable eruption. We suggest that both of them are part of a unique eruption, and that the sudden decay is due to collisions that de-excite theOHmaser, when it reaches the Cometopause region located at 1.35 × 105kmfrom the nucleus.

Closing the GAP—A 5Å Scanning Microscope

1969 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 6-7
Author(s):  
A. V. Crewe
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Resolving Power ◽  
Scanning Microscope ◽  
Conventional Microscope ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Closing The Gap ◽  
Thermal Sources ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Transmission Microscope

We have become accustomed to differentiating between the scanning microscope and the conventional transmission microscope according to the resolving power which the two instruments offer. The conventional microscope is capable of a point resolution of a few angstroms and line resolutions of periodic objects of about 1Å. On the other hand, the scanning microscope, in its normal form, is not ordinarily capable of a point resolution better than 100Å. Upon examining reasons for the 100Å limitation, it becomes clear that this is based more on tradition than reason, and in particular, it is a condition imposed upon the microscope by adherence to thermal sources of electrons.

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