scholarly journals Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jiangchao Li ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Market Sentiment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

scholarly journals Coregulation Supervision Strategy of Drug Enterprises under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Information Platform ◽  
Drug Quality ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Considering the government reward and punishment mechanism and the collusion behavior between third-party testing agencies and drug enterprises, based on the coregulation information platform, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of coregulation supervision, which involves the participation of local government, drug enterprises, and third-party testing agencies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov’s first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players’ strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, the government-increased awards and penalties will promote the integrity of drug enterprises and noncollusion of third-party testing agencies, but it is not conducive to strict performance of regulatory responsibilities by the local government. Secondly, the provision of real drug test reports by third-party testing agencies to the coregulation information platform can supervise drug enterprises and restrict local government to perform its duty. Thirdly, the central government’s punishment to the local government’s dereliction of duty is significant to enhancing the robustness of drug enterprises’ integrity operation. Furthermore, reasonably setting rewards and punishments and perfecting the coregulation information platform will help form a coregulation pattern of government supervision, self-discipline of drug enterprises, and social supervision. Finally, drug quality is highly related to whether drug enterprises operate with integrity. Standardizing coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation is the key to ensuring the safety of the source of drug quality. Therefore, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.

Four-party evolutionary game analysis of supervision for vaccine quality in major epidemics

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rongjian Xie ◽  
Yucai Jia ◽  
Yuanmei Wu ◽  
Peiyun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
External Information ◽  
The Public ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

During major epidemics, monitoring vaccine quality can ensure the public health and social stability. Considering that social media has become an important way for the public to obtain external information during the epidemic. We developed a dual regulatory system of vaccine quality with the government in the leading role and the participation of We Media, and constructed a four-party evolutionary game model (government regulatory agency, We Media, vaccine industry groups, and the public) and analyzed the stability of each game player’s strategy choice. The system’s possible equilibrium points are identified using Lyapunov’s first law. Then the game trajectory between stakeholders is simulated by MATLAB, the effects of initial intention and parameters on the evolution process and results are analyzed. The results show that to ensure the quality and safety of vaccines and stabilize network public opinion during epidemics, the government should invest in an effective supervision mechanism. By strengthening responsibility, increasing penalties, and reducing supervision costs, the probability of vaccine industry groups providing high-quality vaccines is effectively enhanced. Restricting the behavior of We Media and supervising vaccine industry groups to reduce speculation reduces the cost of government supervision and improves its efficiency.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Liwen Chen ◽  
Mengjia Zhang ◽  
Shiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Existing Building ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
The Government

Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

scholarly journals Evolution Dynamics of Agricultural Internet of Things Technology Promotion and Adoption in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Fang Wu ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Technology Selection ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Internet Of Things Technology

Internet of Things is the core technology of smart agriculture and can reform and upgrade traditional agriculture for reducing cost, reducing pollution, and increasing productivity and quality in China. From government-led and market economy perspectives, promotion mechanisms and sustainable adoption of agricultural Internet of Things technology are analyzed. In the initial application phase, the promotion of Internet of Things requires government support. For investigating the relationship between the government and farmers, this study builds an evolutionary game model and finds that increases of cost subsidy, farmers’ negative feedback, government’s positive feedback, and chemical agriculture cost can make the model evolve toward the strategy set: farmer adoption and government support. For long-term development, a sustainable model in competitive market is built by competition game and exponential replication equation. This paper analyzes the equilibrium of adoption ratio, long-run profit, and the conversion between equilibrium points under capacity sharing strategy in competitive market. It is also found that the market will eventually evolve to the technology selection strategy whose long-run average profit dominates the market. The innovations are that evolutionary game is used for analyzing the initial stage and competitive game and asynchronous update mechanism are used for analyzing the sustainable development adoption. At last, references are provided for agricultural Internet of Things development policy from the perspectives of initial promotion and long-run sustainability.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Enterprise Resource Integration Under Government Regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Weixing Zhu ◽  
Lin Ma ◽  
Yuting Dong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Coal Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coal Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Solution for Virtual Routers with Padding Misbehavior in Cloud Computing

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xia-an Bi ◽  
Xiaohui Wang ◽  
Hong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Computing ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interactive Applications ◽  
Network Applications ◽  
Normal Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Virtual Routers ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Theoretic Solution

With the development of cloud computing and virtualization, a physical router can be multiplexed as a large number of virtual routers. TCP-based interactive applications have an incentive to improve their performance by padding “junk packets” into the network among real communication packets. This padding misbehavior will upgrade short TCP flows from “mice” to “elephants” and consequently lead to network congestion and breakdown. This paper presents a detailed solution and analysis for describing the normal behavior and padding misbehavior of virtual routers. In particular, a system model for analyzing behavior of virtual routers is based on evolutionary game model, and, through analyzing the stability of the equilibrium points, the stable point is the solution to the problem. The clear evolutionary path of network applications with the normal behavior and padding misbehavior is analyzed by the corresponding graph. Then this paper gives the behavior control suggestions to effectively restrain the padding misbehavior and maintain stable high-throughputs of the router. The simulation results demonstrate that our solution can effectively restrain the padding misbehavior and maintain stable high-throughputs of the router simultaneously compared with the classical queue management.

scholarly journals Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (17) ◽  
pp. 9729
Author(s):  
Na Yu ◽  
Chunfeng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Yangtze River ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Yangtze River Delta ◽  
River Delta ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
The Yangtze River ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Yangtze River Delta

It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the influencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate. In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.

scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

scholarly journals The Prospect Analysis of Sino-US Manufacturing Trade Friction Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

CONVERTER ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 554-570
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhou, Jing Yang, Xiaocheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Trade Friction ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Import And Export ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

The Sino-US trade friction since 2018 is an important turning point in trade relations between these two countries. As the world's two major manufacturing powers, the friction will have a profound impact on the world. This articlesorts out the comparison of economic and trade strength between these two countries in the past ten years, the dependence of import and export, and the changes in trade structure. Then we construct a dynamic evolutionary model of the strategic choices of these two countries in trade friction from the perspective of evolutionary game. Finally, we analyze the stability of the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game by copying the dynamic equation. The results show that when at least one of these two countries has a cooperative benefit less than the speculative benefits brought about by competition, (competition,competition) is the only evolutionary stable strategy combination, andboth of them will adopt competitive measures. The prerequisite for the combination of (cooperation, cooperation) strategies adopted by these two countries are that the net benefits obtained by the two countries' cooperation strategies are greater than the speculative benefits obtained when one side chooses to cooperate and the other side adopts competitive strategy. The probability that two countries choose cooperation strategy is directly proportional to benefits brought about by cooperation and inversely proportional to the cost of cooperation, the loss of sticking to the cooperation strategy, and the speculative benefits of abandoning cooperation. The trade policies of these two countries cannot be achieved overnight, but can gradually tend to be stable and balanced through mutual imitation and learning.

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