scholarly journals The Prospect Analysis of Sino-US Manufacturing Trade Friction Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

CONVERTER ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 554-570
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhou, Jing Yang, Xiaocheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Trade Friction ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Import And Export ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

The Sino-US trade friction since 2018 is an important turning point in trade relations between these two countries. As the world's two major manufacturing powers, the friction will have a profound impact on the world. This articlesorts out the comparison of economic and trade strength between these two countries in the past ten years, the dependence of import and export, and the changes in trade structure. Then we construct a dynamic evolutionary model of the strategic choices of these two countries in trade friction from the perspective of evolutionary game. Finally, we analyze the stability of the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game by copying the dynamic equation. The results show that when at least one of these two countries has a cooperative benefit less than the speculative benefits brought about by competition, (competition,competition) is the only evolutionary stable strategy combination, andboth of them will adopt competitive measures. The prerequisite for the combination of (cooperation, cooperation) strategies adopted by these two countries are that the net benefits obtained by the two countries' cooperation strategies are greater than the speculative benefits obtained when one side chooses to cooperate and the other side adopts competitive strategy. The probability that two countries choose cooperation strategy is directly proportional to benefits brought about by cooperation and inversely proportional to the cost of cooperation, the loss of sticking to the cooperation strategy, and the speculative benefits of abandoning cooperation. The trade policies of these two countries cannot be achieved overnight, but can gradually tend to be stable and balanced through mutual imitation and learning.

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

scholarly journals Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Jingyi Yi ◽  
Yingmei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Boundary ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Value Range ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Multiple Variables

Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

scholarly journals Analysis of coordinated control of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei smog based on evolutionary game theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 248 ◽  
pp. 02030
Author(s):  
Yuan Qing-min ◽  
Tan Xin
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Cost Of Energy ◽  
Reduction Strategies ◽  
Compensation Standard ◽  
Emission Reduction Strategies ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

Based on the perspective of ecological compensation and ecological claims, this paper analyzes the stability of Beijing Tianjin Hebei haze governance alliance by using asymmetric evolutionary game model, and obtains the optimal strategy combination. The results show that: a reasonable ecological compensation standard is very important for enterprises to adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies. Only when the total value of ecological claims in the two places is higher than the cost of energy-saving and emission reduction, enterprises will adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies, and the implementation of energy-saving and emission reduction strategies will not be shaken by the amount of ecological compensation.

scholarly journals Research on Evolutionary Model and Dynamic Analysis for Internet Public Opinion Spreading

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Yong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
Internet Media ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control

Internet public opinion has developed rapidly in recent years, which has more influence on society. The relevant problems of Internet public opinion have become the hotspots of research. The complexity of Internet public opinion spreading brings difficulties to research and analysis. For the problems of Internet public opinion spreading, an evolutionary model of Internet public opinion spreading is built based on evolutionary game theory in this paper, considering three subjects including Internet media, Internet users, and government. Then, the evolutionary stable strategies of the Internet public opinion spreading system are studied. Finally, the influences of the stable strategy of the Internet public opinion spreading system are analyzed through simulation. Relevant conclusions are obtained. The results show that there are multiple possible stable strategies in the evolution of Internet public opinion. The different initial probabilities of the strategy lead to the different stable strategies of the evolutionary system. The stable strategy is influenced by some factors, such as the punished loss of Internet media, the gain of Internet users from government controlling, and the cost of government. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to Internet public opinion management and control.

scholarly journals Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jiangchao Li ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Market Sentiment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

Four-party evolutionary game analysis of supervision for vaccine quality in major epidemics

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rongjian Xie ◽  
Yucai Jia ◽  
Yuanmei Wu ◽  
Peiyun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
External Information ◽  
The Public ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

During major epidemics, monitoring vaccine quality can ensure the public health and social stability. Considering that social media has become an important way for the public to obtain external information during the epidemic. We developed a dual regulatory system of vaccine quality with the government in the leading role and the participation of We Media, and constructed a four-party evolutionary game model (government regulatory agency, We Media, vaccine industry groups, and the public) and analyzed the stability of each game player’s strategy choice. The system’s possible equilibrium points are identified using Lyapunov’s first law. Then the game trajectory between stakeholders is simulated by MATLAB, the effects of initial intention and parameters on the evolution process and results are analyzed. The results show that to ensure the quality and safety of vaccines and stabilize network public opinion during epidemics, the government should invest in an effective supervision mechanism. By strengthening responsibility, increasing penalties, and reducing supervision costs, the probability of vaccine industry groups providing high-quality vaccines is effectively enhanced. Restricting the behavior of We Media and supervising vaccine industry groups to reduce speculation reduces the cost of government supervision and improves its efficiency.

Research on the Low-Carbon Evolutionary Model of Chinese Traditional Industrial Clusters Based on Evolutionary Games Theory under Low-Carbon Constraints

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 4461-4464
Author(s):  
Ru Guo Fan ◽  
Hong Juan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Industry Cluster ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Games Theory ◽  
Traditional Industry

The low-carbon evolution of traditional industry cluster is the key to a low-carbon economy, and also a frontier of industry cluster theory research. The paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct a low-carbon evolutionary model of Chinese traditional industrial clusters, which considers uncertain factors such as political, economic, cultural, etc. Through the analysis of the cluster low-carbon evolutionary paths and stable equilibrium strategies, the model reflects the inherent law of clusters low-carbon evolution. Finally, the paper gives advices to promote industrial cluster agents to adopt the low-carbon cooperation strategy.

scholarly journals Black Hole Algorithm for Sustainable Design of Counterfort Retaining Walls

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 2767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Víctor Yepes ◽  
José V. Martí ◽  
José García
Keyword(s):  
Black Hole ◽  
Sustainable Design ◽  
Retaining Walls ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Construction Company ◽  
Geometric Variables ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Black Hole Algorithm

The optimization of the cost and CO 2 emissions in earth-retaining walls is of relevance, since these structures are often used in civil engineering. The optimization of costs is essential for the competitiveness of the construction company, and the optimization of emissions is relevant in the environmental impact of construction. To address the optimization, black hole metaheuristics were used, along with a discretization mechanism based on min–max normalization. The stability of the algorithm was evaluated with respect to the solutions obtained; the steel and concrete values obtained in both optimizations were analyzed. Additionally, the geometric variables of the structure were compared. Finally, the results obtained were compared with another algorithm that solved the problem. The results show that there is a trade-off between the use of steel and concrete. The solutions that minimize CO 2 emissions prefer the use of concrete instead of those that optimize the cost. On the other hand, when comparing the geometric variables, it is seen that most remain similar in both optimizations except for the distance between buttresses. When comparing with another algorithm, the results show a good performance in optimization using the black hole algorithm.

scholarly journals Longevity of Raw and Lyophilized Crude Urease Extracts

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-334
Author(s):  
Neda Javadi ◽  
Hamed Khodadadi Tirkolaei ◽  
Nasser Hamdan ◽  
Edward Kavazanjian
Keyword(s):  
Crude Extract ◽  
Room Temperature ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Extraction Process ◽  
Crude Extracts ◽  
Simple Extraction ◽  
Commercial Applications ◽  
Stable Source ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

The stability (longevity of activity) of three crude urease extracts was evaluated in a laboratory study as part of an effort to reduce the cost of urease for applications that do not require high purity enzyme. A low-cost, stable source of urease will greatly facilitate engineering applications of urease such as biocementation of soil. Inexpensive crude extracts of urease have been shown to be effective at hydrolyzing urea for carbonate precipitation. However, some studies have suggested that the activity of a crude extract may decrease with time, limiting the potential for its mass production for commercial applications. The stability of crude urease extracts shown to be effective for biocementation was studied. The crude extracts were obtained from jack beans via a simple extraction process, stored at room temperature and at 4 ℃, and periodically tested to evaluate their stability. To facilitate storage and transportation of the extracted enzyme, the longevity of the enzyme following freeze drying (lyophilization) to reduce the crude extract to a powder and subsequent re-hydration into an aqueous solution was evaluated. In an attempt to improve the shelf life of the lyophilized extract, dextran and sucrose were added during lyophilization. The stability of purified commercial urease following rehydration was also investigated. Results of the laboratory tests showed that the lyophilized crude extract maintained its activity during storage more effectively than either the crude extract solution or the rehydrated commercial urease. While incorporating 2% dextran (w/v) prior to lyophilization of the crude extract increased the overall enzymatic activity, it did not enhance the stability of the urease during storage.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

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