scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Liwen Chen ◽  
Mengjia Zhang ◽  
Shiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Existing Building ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
The Government

Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

An Analysis of Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components Using Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Simulation Calculation ◽  
The Government

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.

Evolutionary game analysis of land income distribution in tourism development

2020 ◽  
pp. 135481661989807
Author(s):  
Pang Qingyun ◽  
Zhang Mu
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tourism Development ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Land Prices ◽  
Land Transfer ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Tourism Destinations ◽  
The Government

Social stability is the key to the sustainable development of tourism destinations. And reasonable distribution of land revenue during tourism development can effectively avoid social conflicts at these destinations. This study explores the dynamic nature and stabilization of land revenue distribution for tourism development. It does so by developing an evolutionary game model. In this model, the main stakeholders include the government, developers and local communities, and analysis of the model indicates that the process of distributing land revenue is profoundly influenced by land transfer methods. Specifically, a developer chooses land transfer methods by weighing the land cost (consisting of land prices and taxes) or the benefit under non-cooperation with different land transfer methods. Meanwhile, the local community chooses whether to cooperate by considering the land income (consisting of land prices) or non-cooperative benefits. With different game sequences, the stakeholders will consider different conditions. Moreover, government taxation and subsidization policies are found to have little influence on the land transfer market in the long run. Instead, to avoid potential conflicts and social instability, the government should provide a good political environment for community participation. This study offers important implications for policymaking involving land income distribution for tourism destinations.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Dongdong Li ◽  
Chunfa Li ◽  
Runde Gu
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Network Externality ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Customer Churn ◽  
Evolutionary Equilibrium ◽  
Industrial Internet ◽  
Value Cocreation

A good partnership is conducive to promoting the empowerment of manufacturing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) via industrial Internet platforms. By analyzing the factors influencing the cooperation motives of both parties and individual behavior, this paper puts forward the design of a cost-sharing and scale revenue-sharing mechanism and establishes an evolutionary game model. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of individuals and the evolutionary equilibrium state of the system are analyzed. The results show that the key factors affecting the strategic choices of industrial Internet platforms and manufacturing SMEs are different and will change with the number of platform customers and the level of digitalization of enterprises. By sharing the access cost of SMEs and the scale revenue of the platform, mutual trust between the two parties can be enhanced, and SMEs will be more motivated to access the platform. Moreover, the platform network externality, customer churn risk, and cost-sharing ratio have different influences on the process of reaching evolutionary equilibrium in the system. Collaborative revenue expectations are critical to the behavioral strategies of both parties. In comprehensive consideration of the results of this study, it is recommended that industrial Internet platforms be subsidized in the initial stage of cooperation.

Tax risks control and sustainable development: evidence from China

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wanyi Chen
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Perspective

Purpose Tax risks are common in China but often ignored by enterprises. Determining how to measure tax risks and effectively identify and control influencing factors is the key to the sustainable development of enterprises. This study aims to explore the key factors affecting corporate tax risks and analyze influencing factors from external and internal perspectives. Design/methodology/approach After selecting a data set comprising 11,503 firm-year observations of Chinese firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008–2017, this study applied a panel regression model to identify the factors’ impact. Findings The results indicate that the more standardized the institutional environment and stronger the tax supervision, the lower the tax risks. Taking into account the internal factors of a firm, private companies with political connections have lower tax risks than those without. Originality/value This study enriches the literature on the factors affecting tax risks. The conclusion provides significant insights for enterprises to effectively control tax risks and maintain sustainability. The research findings also provide a new perspective for the government to guard against corporate risks and maintain the stable development of the economy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Enterprise Resource Integration Under Government Regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Weixing Zhu ◽  
Lin Ma ◽  
Yuting Dong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Coal Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coal Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

scholarly journals Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (17) ◽  
pp. 9729
Author(s):  
Na Yu ◽  
Chunfeng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Yangtze River ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Yangtze River Delta ◽  
River Delta ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
The Yangtze River ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Yangtze River Delta

It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the influencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate. In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.

scholarly journals A simple model to assess Wuhan lock-down effect and region efforts during COVID-19 epidemic in China Mainland

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheming Yuan ◽  
Yi Xiao ◽  
Zhijun Dai ◽  
Jianjun Huang ◽  
Yuan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Human Mobility ◽  
Transmission Risk ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
The Government ◽  
Lower Transmission ◽  
China Mainland ◽  
Transmission Ability ◽  
At Home

AbstractSince COVID-19 emerged in early December, 2019 in Wuhan and swept across China Mainland, a series of large-scale public health interventions, especially Wuhan lock-down combined with nationwide traffic restrictions and Stay At Home Movement, have been taken by the government to control the epidemic. Based on Baidu Migration data and the confirmed cases data, we identified two key factors affecting the later (e.g February 27, 2020) cumulative confirmed cases in non-Wuhan region (y). One is the sum travelers from Wuhan during January 20 to January 26 (x1), which had higher infected probability but lower transmission ability because the human-to-human transmission risk of COVID-19 was confirmed and announced on January 20. The other is the “seed cases” from Wuhan before January 19, which had higher transmission ability and could be represented with the confirmed cases before January 29 (x2) due to a mean 10-day delay between infection and detection. A simple yet effective regression model then was established as follow: y= 70.0916+0.0054×x1+2.3455×x2 (n = 44, R2 = 0.9330, P<10−7). Even the lock-down date only delay or in advance 3 days, the estimated confirmed cases by February 27 in non-Wuhan region will increase 35.21% or reduce 30.74% - 48.59%. Although the above interventions greatly reduced the human mobility, Wuhan lock-down combined with nationwide traffic restrictions and Stay At Home Movement do have a determining effect on the ongoing spread of COVID-19 across China Mainland. The strategy adopted by China has changed the fast-rising curve of newly diagnosed cases, the international community should learn from lessons of Wuhan and experience from China. Efforts of 29 Provinces and 44 prefecture-level cities against COVID-19 were also assessed preliminarily according to the interpretive model. Big data has played and will continue playing an important role in public health.

scholarly journals Application of the Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) Method in Analyzing Poverty in Indonesia and the Self Organizing Map (SOM) Method in Grouping Provinces Based on Factors Affecting Poverty

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-83
Author(s):  
Ulimazzada Islamy ◽  
Afdelia Novianti ◽  
Freditasari Purwa Hidayat ◽  
Muhammad Hasan Sidiq Kurniawan
Keyword(s):  
Social Protection ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Organizing Map ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Development Goals ◽  
Spatial Autoregressive ◽  
The Government ◽  
Som Clustering ◽  
Self Organizing

The economy is a benchmark to determine the extent of the development of a country. Indonesia, which is now a developing country, is ranked 5th as the poorest country in Southeast Asia. Of course, the government must pay attention because until now, poverty has become one of Indonesia's main problems. Ending poverty everywhere and in all its forms is goal 01 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) program. One of the efforts that can be done is by planning as part of the implementation of the target, namely eliminating poverty and appropriate social protection for all levels of society so that the SDGs are achieved. Therefore, it is important to do a spatial analysis by making a model of poverty estimation in Indonesia and grouping to identify areas in Indonesia that have the highest poverty mission. The clustering method used in this grouping is Self Organizing Map (SOM). In this study, Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) analysis was used to create a predictive model. This is because poverty is very likely to have a spatial influence or be influenced by location to other areas in the vicinity. The results of the SAR model that can be formed are . Furthermore, the region with the highest mission is grouped using the Self Organizing Map (SOM) clustering based on variables that significantly affect the amount of poverty in Indonesia. From the results of the analysis obtained four clusters, each of which has its characteristics to classify 34 provinces in Indonesia. The clusters formed include cluster 1 consisting of 17 provinces, cluster 2 consisting of 9 provinces, cluster 3 consisting of 1 province, and cluster 4 consisting of 7 provinces.

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