scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

scholarly journals Metode Tutor Sebaya Berbantuan Whatsapp untuk Meningkatkan Hasil Uji Coba Ujian Nasional di SMK Negeri 1 Tanjungpandan

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 691-703
Author(s):  
Yuli Yulianti
Keyword(s):  
Peer Tutoring ◽  
Average Score ◽  
Learning Method ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Peer Tutors ◽  
National Examination ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
Academic Year

National Examination is one of the learning results assessment set by the Government, and is ruled at Minister of Education and Culture regulation Number 4 year 2018. The problem discussed in this study is the low percentage of students achieving Graduare Competence Standard/SKL 55 in the nationale examination tryout for mathematics. One of the alternatives to solve this problem is the Peer Tutoring learning method using Whatsapp Messenger application asisstance, in which the subject is grade 12 AP students of SMK Negeri 1 Tanjungpandan academic year of 2018/2019. The research method implemented is the classroom action research. The peer tutoring learning method using Whatsapp Messenger application asisstance was carried out both inside and outside the classroom by providing a smaller member whatsapp group and a  classroom whatsapp group. Each small group consists of 6 people in which there were 1-2 peer tutors. Based on the results of data analysis and discussion, there was an increase at the results of the tryout of mathematics national exam tryout for grade 12 AP students after peer tutoring learning method using whatsapp messenger application asisstance was applied, with the total increase up to 50%. This fact can be inferred from the difference of the test results percentage for the first tryout and the third tryout which is from 10% to 60%, while the average score is increased from 34.96 to 60.22 by 25.26 points.

scholarly journals An Evolution Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Network considering Government Subsidies and Supervision

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Networks ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Free Network ◽  
The Government

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.

Analysis of College Student Employment Option under the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

2014 ◽  
Vol 998-999 ◽  
pp. 1549-1552
Author(s):  
Li Li Sun ◽  
Guang Hong Li ◽  
Ming Yi Sun
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Economic Transformation ◽  
Student Employment ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Working Ability ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Social Concerns

With the economic transformation and the reform of higher education, the ‘dilemma’ in the talent market and the great changes in the college students’ employment market have become the focus points of social concerns. This paper made quantitative analysis of college students’ employment option, and constructed a game model of college students and employing units in order to make evolutionary game analysis. By deriving the evolutionary trend, we obtained the evolutionary stable strategies and locked the opportunity cost, degree of talent effort and working ability as the key factors that affecting the college students’ employment option.

Evolutionary game analysis between the government and the waste producer in the venous industry

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong-you Niu ◽  
Xiao-wen Shan ◽  
Tao Bai ◽  
Jin-ru Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824402199485
Author(s):  
Nina Su ◽  
Zhuqin Shi ◽  
Xianqi Zhu ◽  
Yunsheng Xin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Higher Learning ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Institutions Of Higher Learning ◽  
Innovation Cost ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive” and “non-incentive” chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.

scholarly journals Research on Behavior Incentives of Prefabricated Building Component Manufacturers

Information ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 284
Author(s):  
Pinbo Yao ◽  
Hongda Liu
Keyword(s):  
Incremental Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Development Stage ◽  
Mature Stage ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Material Component ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Based on the positive externalities of prefabricated buildings, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and material component vendors and analyzes the changes in the behavior of the government and component vendors in different stages of the advancement of prefabricated buildings. Based on data modeling and equation prediction analysis, it can be found that the expansion of the incremental cost of construction at the initial stage inhibits the enthusiasm of the government. Thus, the government’s incentive behavior effectively affects the behavior of component vendors, and fiscal taxation and punishment policies will promote component vendors to provide prefabricated components. In the development stage, the government’s fiscal policy influence that weakens and affects component vendors’ behavior mainly comes from the incremental costs and benefits of components. Additionally, the difference between the builder’s incremental cost and the sales revenue narrowed. At this time, the behavior prediction of both parties tends to be steady. In the mature stage, prefabricated buildings will mainly rely on market forces, and the government can gradually withdraw from the market. The cost variable tends to be lower, and it can be predicted that component vendors tend to supply components, while the government tends to restrict policies.

scholarly journals Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (17) ◽  
pp. 9729
Author(s):  
Na Yu ◽  
Chunfeng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Yangtze River ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Yangtze River Delta ◽  
River Delta ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
The Yangtze River ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Yangtze River Delta

It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the influencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate. In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.

scholarly journals Research on Green Collaborative Innovation Mechanism of Cloud Manufacturing Enterprises under Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Zhai ◽  
Xinliang Xu ◽  
Jianzhong Xu ◽  
Xichen Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Load Capacity ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cloud Manufacturing ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of information technology, the sharing economy based on “Internet plus” cloud platforms has become a new collaborative innovation mode and a hot topic in recent years. Considering that government regulation restricts green innovation cooperation among cloud manufacturing enterprises, an evolutionary game model involving the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B with potential differences in their technology knowledge is established using evolutionary game theory. A replication dynamic equation is established, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy of the three parties is analysed, and the key factors affecting the cooperative selection strategy of the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises are discussed through a MATLAB-based numerical simulation. This research shows that when governmental incentives and punishments, the platform load capacity, the trust between enterprises, the technology loss coefficient, and the informatization degree are increased, the government will tend to choose supervision, and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B will tend to choose the “collaborative innovation” strategy. These results provide a scientific basis suggesting that the government should not only formulate rules and regulations for cloud manufacturing enterprises but also promote green collaborative innovation among such enterprises and enhance their core competitiveness.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Sustainable Cooperation Relationship of Collaborative Innovation Network in Strategic Emerging Industries

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwei Liu ◽  
Jianing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Research Institutes ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Cooperation Relationship

Strategic emerging industries (SEIs) represent the future direction of industrial developments and are crucial in stimulating the overall and long-term development for economy and society. The government plays a key role in promoting the development of SEIs. This paper, for the first time, investigates the cooperation relationship among innovation members, such as enterprises, universities and research institutes in a collaborative innovation network of strategic emerging industries under government intervention. A three-population evolutionary game theory approach was employed under different scenarios for the government acting as the stakeholder, considering the non-profit, definite fit as well as uncertain profit when incentive and punishment policies are adopted. A novel evolutionary game model of the cooperation relationship among collaborative innovation network members under government’s intervention is established. The results of the simulation experiments show that government’s intervention significantly influences the cooperation relationship between enterprises, universities and research institutes. When the sum of financial incentives and punishments is greater than the total additional cost (TAC), enterprises, universities and research institutes should pay for collaborative innovation. Moreover, government’s financial intervention can effectively promote the cooperation between enterprises, universities and research institutes.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

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