scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperation between Microgrid and Conventional Grid

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengrong Pan ◽  
Yong Long
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable Point ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Indirect Benefits ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Direct Benefits ◽  
Policy Suggestions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Selection Of

This paper employs the evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid, with the discussion focusing on the factors that influence the game players’ selection of strategies, and additionally makes a numerical simulation analysis. The results of analysis based on the evolutionary game model suggest that the two parties’ undertaking of cooperative strategies and uncooperative strategies during the game is the stable point of their evolution and that the probability of their unanimous choice of cooperative strategies positively correlates with the direct benefits and indirect benefits of their cooperation as well as the government subsidies but negatively correlates with the cooperation costs and spending on cooperation risks. Based on the findings, the paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions aiming to deepen the cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hongsen Luo ◽  
Ying Gao ◽  
Fulei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Mass Communication ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Personalized Recommendation ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.

Collaborative knowledge management for corporate ecological responsibility

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 304-317
Author(s):  
Weiwei Guo
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ecological Responsibility ◽  
Collaborative Knowledge Management ◽  
Collaborative Knowledge ◽  
Selection Of

Purpose Knowledge has become the basis of enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises in this era of knowledge-driven economies. Collaborative knowledge management not only realizes the real-time exchange and communication of knowledge among different enterprises, but also facilitates the collaboration and integration of knowledge. Collaborative knowledge management has been successfully applied to different fields. To address the poor ecological responsibility of enterprises, the purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of collaborative knowledge management in this research to determine if the evolution of the decision-making process in collaborative knowledge management is involved in corporate ecological responsibility (CER). Design/methodology/approach This research established an evolutionary game model of collaborative knowledge management for CER. The behavioral, evolutionary law and stable behavioral, evolutionary strategy of the participants was identified according to the replicator dynamics equation. Simulation analysis was conducted using MATLAB software. Findings Research results demonstrated that, first, the strategic selection of firms is influenced by cost and interest coefficients. Second, the strategy, selection of enterprises, is related to the common benefits of enterprise cooperation. Third, during the systematic evolution and stabilization of strategies, enterprises adopt the same knowledge strategies. Originality/value On the basis of the research findings, policy suggestions were proposed to encourage enterprises to implement collaborative knowledge management strategies in ecological responsibility.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Liwen Chen ◽  
Mengjia Zhang ◽  
Shiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Existing Building ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
The Government

Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

Evolutionary game analysis between the government and the waste producer in the venous industry

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong-you Niu ◽  
Xiao-wen Shan ◽  
Tao Bai ◽  
Jin-ru Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Analysis of Building Information Modeling (BIM) Technology Diffusion

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Qian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Technology Diffusion ◽  
Impact Analysis ◽  
Building Information Modeling ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Benefit ◽  
Information Modeling ◽  
Building Information ◽  
High Investment ◽  
The Government

Building Information Modeling (BIM) technology plays a pivotal role in the process of building process informatization. In the context of extensive promotion by all parties, how to effectively evaluate the promotion value of countries and enterprises is particularly important. In order to better analyze the promotion trend of the BIM technology diffusion system in China, a noncooperative evolutionary game model of BIM technology diffusion between the government and enterprises is constructed, and Vensim PLE software is used for simulation analysis in this paper. The model includes government subsidy cost and penalty, social benefit and loss, and income payment matrix of BIM technology input income and cost. The results show that enterprises need not only direct cost subsidy from the government but also indirect cost subsidy in the process of BIM technology diffusion. Appropriate government penalties can effectively promote the initiative of enterprises to adopt BIM technology; BIM has a great impact on the input income and cost of enterprises. In view of this, it is suggested that the first task for enterprises to promote the diffusion of BIM technology is to clarify the definition of BIM's high investment cost and do a good financial impact analysis.

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