scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

scholarly journals Public Opinion Communication Model under the Control of Official Information

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yuexia Zhang ◽  
Ziyang Chen ◽  
Lie Zou
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Communication Process ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Communication Model ◽  
Network Nodes ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Official Information

The rapid development of Internet technology has facilitated the dissemination of information that can threaten national security and public health, and effectively controlling the process of public opinion communication is an important topic in contemporary social network research. This paper establishes an official information-controlled public opinion propagation (OI-SEIR) model based on the delay, latency, and conversion of public opinion communication under the control of official information. According to the influence and importance of the network nodes, we theoretically derive the attitude conversion probability of the nodes, making the model more in line with the actual situation. Through actual cases, we analyzed the important influence of official information on the public opinion communication process and provided a theoretical basis for the government and relevant departments to supervise and correctly guide the public opinion network, which has certain practical significance.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hongsen Luo ◽  
Ying Gao ◽  
Fulei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Mass Communication ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Personalized Recommendation ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals E-LEARNING ACCESSIBILITY IN STATE-OWNED SCHOOLS IN NORTH BALI

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 8
Author(s):  
Wicaksana Gede Dharma Arya ◽  
Dewi Ni Putu Febriana
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Snowball Sampling ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Public ◽  
Interview Guide ◽  
E Learning ◽  
The Government ◽  
Descriptive Qualitative

This study aimed at investigating the implementation of e-learning in one of government non-favourite schools in Singaraja. This study was the result of the real implementationof e-learning in Bali in which the government expected e-learning to be applicable in every school in Bali since the launching of Balinese version of E-learning 2017. This research was a descriptive qualitative research. This study used snowball sampling in which the public opinion was counted. The data were collected by using observation and interview guide. The result of the study showed that the implementation of e-learning was not running well and became a serious problem. Some sollutions were offered in this study.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhiqi Xu ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Shuangliang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Health Emergency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negative Behaviors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Safety And Health

Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

scholarly journals Public Opinion and Public Policy in Advanced Democracies

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Wlezien
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Government

The representation of public opinion in public policy is of obvious importance in representative democracies. While public opinion is important in all political systems, it is especially true where voters elect politicians; after all, opinion representation is a primary justification for representative democracy. Not surprisingly, a lot of research addresses the connection between the public and the government. Much of the work considers “descriptive representation”—whether the partisan and demographic characteristics of elected politicians match the characteristics of the electorate itself. This descriptive representation is important but may not produce actual “substantive representation” of preferences in policy. Other work examines the positions of policymakers. Some of this research assesses the roll call voting behavior of politicians and institutions. The expressed positions and voting behavior of political actors do relate to policy but are not the same things. Fortunately, a good amount of research analyzes policy. With but a handful of exceptions noted below, this research focuses on expressed preferences of the public, not their “interests.” That is, virtually all scholars let people be the judges of their own interests, and they assess the representation of expressed opinion no matter how contrary to self-interest it may seem.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Jingyi Yi ◽  
Yingmei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Boundary ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Value Range ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Multiple Variables

Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

scholarly journals Modeling Public Opinion Reversal Process with the Considerations of External Intervention Information and Individual Internal Characteristics

Healthcare ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tinggui Chen ◽  
Yulong Wang ◽  
Jianjun Yang ◽  
Guodong Cong
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
External Information ◽  
Media Technology ◽  
The Public ◽  
Reversal Process ◽  
Information Intensity ◽  
The Impact ◽  
External Intervention

With the rapid development of “we media” technology, external information about the same sudden hot social event is often involved repetitiously, leading to frequent public opinion reversal. However, the phenomenon of public opinion reversal process usually has a long-lasting duration and spreads wide, making the event itself attract the widespread attention of ordinary people. Focusing on the public opinion reversal process of sudden social hot topic (a popular and widely discussed issue), this paper firstly identifies the internal and external factors that affect the reversal, namely individual internal characteristics and external intervention information. Secondly, information intensity and the amount of information perceived by individuals are introduced to describe the impact of external intervention information on the public opinion reversal. Thirdly, the parameters of individual attention and conservation are used to describe the process of individual’s selection of external information, so as to reveal the influence of the internal characteristics on public opinion reversal, and then build a public opinion reversal model. Fourthly, the effects of information intensity and individual attention, as well as individual conservation on the process of public opinion reversal are analyzed by simulation experiment. Simulation results show that: (1) the intensity of external intervention information affects the direction and degree of public opinion reversal; (2) when individual conservation is strong or individual attention is weak, even if external intervention information is strong, there will still be no obvious reversal of public opinion. Subsequently, the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model are verified by a real case. Finally, some recommendations and policy implications are also given.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document