scholarly journals The Game Analysis of Manufacturers’ Political Connections on Product Safety in Supply Chain: Evidence from China

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Na ◽  
Wang Fusheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
The Political ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Product Protection ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This paper studied the political connections on product safety in supply chain. In market economy, information asymmetry exists throughout the entirety of supply chains that ought to ensure product safety. Due to the existence of game relations between the government and manufacturers in the aspects of product safety and regulation, the formation of market equilibrium depends on political connections between the government and manufacturers. Based on study and analyses of a static game model and a dynamic game model, this paper reveals that governments and manufacturers must use positive political connections to achieve product protection and supervision of safety throughout the supply chain. On the other hand, negative political connections lead to losses of both governmental credibility and social profits. This study indicates that inherent mechanism of political connections exists in the supply chain; it will help to enrich the theory of supply chain.

Coordination of a Supply Chain with Demand Stimulation and Random Demand Disruption

2011 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiaojun Xiao ◽  
Jia Luo ◽  
Jiao Jin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Penalty Costs ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This chapter develops a dynamic game model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effect of demand disruption on the coordination mechanism, where the market demand is sensitive to retail price and service. We assume that the supplier and the retailer only know the distribution of the disrupted amount after the demand disruption and they share the quantity deviation costs. We find that an all-unit wholesale quantity discount-subsidy mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. We give the coordination mechanism of the supply chain after the demand disruption and find that the demand disruption remarkably influences the price-service level decisions of the centralized supply chain and the coordination mechanism of the decentralized supply chain. In particular, the expected quantity differs from the planned quantity although the penalty costs prevent from this deviation.

scholarly journals Game Analysis on Urban Rail Transit Project Under Governmental Investment Regulation

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 369-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangliang Yuan ◽  
Yousong Wang ◽  
Honghui Huang
Keyword(s):  
Research Result ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Governmental Regulation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Urban Rail ◽  
Regulatory Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Urban rail transit is the construction project under the planning and huge investment of the government. How to effectively conduct investment regulation and control becomes the core question that the government departments are concerned about. In this paper, the relations among government, owner and contractor are studied and the static and dynamic game model is built for behaviors among each subject from the perspective of governmental investment regulation through game theory. Game analysis result shows: (1) the lower the governmental regulation cost the heavier the government's punishment for the owner due to its fail in due diligence and the more the owner's possibility of strict scrutiny; (2) the higher the owner's examination the less willing the owner to conduct narrow examination and the more contractor’s possibility to choose fraudulent conducts; (3) In case of higher income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and lower cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor can adopt collusion strategy while the government can adopt regulatory strategy. In case of lower income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and higher cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor should not adopt collusion strategy while the government should adopt regulatory strategy. The research result provides theoretical basis for the government to formulate relevant policies for investment regulation of urban rail transit project.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Game Model of Collective Choice in Multiagent Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 768-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rabih Salhab ◽  
Roland P. Malhame ◽  
Jerome Le Ny
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Game Analysis on Product Safety Input of Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain Upstream

LISS 2014 ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 1613-1619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haoxiong Yang ◽  
Dan Wang ◽  
Jingrui Zhang ◽  
Jindan Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Agricultural Supply
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