Co-op Advertising Analysis within a Supply Chain Based on the Three-Stage Non-cooperate Dynamic Game Model

Author(s):  
Hong Zhang
Author(s):  
Tiaojun Xiao ◽  
Jia Luo ◽  
Jiao Jin

This chapter develops a dynamic game model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effect of demand disruption on the coordination mechanism, where the market demand is sensitive to retail price and service. We assume that the supplier and the retailer only know the distribution of the disrupted amount after the demand disruption and they share the quantity deviation costs. We find that an all-unit wholesale quantity discount-subsidy mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. We give the coordination mechanism of the supply chain after the demand disruption and find that the demand disruption remarkably influences the price-service level decisions of the centralized supply chain and the coordination mechanism of the decentralized supply chain. In particular, the expected quantity differs from the planned quantity although the penalty costs prevent from this deviation.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Na ◽  
Wang Fusheng

This paper studied the political connections on product safety in supply chain. In market economy, information asymmetry exists throughout the entirety of supply chains that ought to ensure product safety. Due to the existence of game relations between the government and manufacturers in the aspects of product safety and regulation, the formation of market equilibrium depends on political connections between the government and manufacturers. Based on study and analyses of a static game model and a dynamic game model, this paper reveals that governments and manufacturers must use positive political connections to achieve product protection and supervision of safety throughout the supply chain. On the other hand, negative political connections lead to losses of both governmental credibility and social profits. This study indicates that inherent mechanism of political connections exists in the supply chain; it will help to enrich the theory of supply chain.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 768-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rabih Salhab ◽  
Roland P. Malhame ◽  
Jerome Le Ny

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandr A. Tarasyev ◽  
Gavriil A. Agarkov ◽  
Tatyana V. Tarasyeva ◽  
Jeenat B. Jabbar

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