scholarly journals Thermal Analysis of a 9975 Package in a Facility Fire Accident

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Multiple Sources ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site

Surplus plutonium bearing materials in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex are stored in the 3013 containers that are designed to meet the requirements of the DOE standard DOE-STD-3013. The 3013 containers are in turn packaged inside 9975 packages that are designed to meet the NRC 10 CFR Part 71 regulatory requirements for transporting the Type B fissile materials across the DOE complex. The design requirements for the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) involving a fire are given in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9975 packages are stored at the DOE Savannah River Site in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility for long term of up to 50 years. The design requirements for safe storage in KAMS facility containing multiple sources of combustible materials are far more challenging than the HAC requirements in 10 CFR 71.73. While the 10 CFR 71.73 postulates an HAC fire of 1475°F and 30 minutes duration, the facility fire calls for a fire of 1500°F and 86 minutes duration. This paper describes a methodology and the analysis results that meet the design limits of the 9975 components and demonstrate the robustness of the 9975 package.

Thermal Analysis of the 9975 Package Used for Long Term Nuclear Material Storage

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Tamburello ◽  
Matthew Kesterson ◽  
Steven Hensel
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Air Gap ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
The Us ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Impact Events ◽  
River Site

Abstract The 9975 is a double containment shipping package used to transport plutonium bearing materials for the US Department of Energy. The 9975 is also used for long term storage of plutonium bearing materials at the Savannah River Site. The package utilizes a fiberboard overpack to protect against fire and impact events. The 9975 has been shown to maintain containment during a hypothetical facility accident fire even though the facility fire is hotter and longer than the regulatory transportation fire. Fiberboard aging and degradation has been investigated using both laboratory and field surveillance data. This information is used to evaluate an aged 9975 used for nuclear material storage. Variations in fiberboard thermal properties due to aging were shown to have modest effects on the maximum component temperatures, while the package geometry variations due to aging and degradation have a larger effect on the maximum component temperatures. Specifically, the air gap between the upper fiberboard assembly and the drum lid increases during storage due to the deterioration of the lower fiberboard assembly and slumping of the package containment vessel. A limiting air gap distance has been determined via thermal fire analysis, which may be used to estimate a storage life.

scholarly journals Welding Plutonium Storage Containers

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie L. Hudlow
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Welding Parameters ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Gas Tungsten Arc ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
And Storage ◽  
River Site ◽  
Plutonium Metal

The outer can welder (OCW) in the FB-Line Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Gas Tungsten Arc Weld (GTAW) system used to create outer canisters compliant with the Department of Energy 3013 Standard, DOE-STD-3013-2000, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials. The key welding parameters controlled and monitored on the outer can welder Data Acquisition System (DAS) are weld amperage, weld voltage, and weld rotational speed. Inner 3013 canisters from the Bagless Transfer System that contain plutonium metal or plutonium oxide are placed inside an outer 3013 canister. The canister is back-filled with helium and welded using the outer can welder. The completed weld is screened to determine if it is satisfactory by reviewing the OCW DAS key welding parameters, performing a helium leak check, performing a visual examination by a qualified weld inspector, and performing digital radiography of the completed weld. Canisters with unsatisfactory welds are cut open and repackaged. Canisters with satisfactory welds are deemed compliant with the 3013 standard for long-term storage.

Pressure Protection Evaluation Program at Savannah River Site

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
James K. Chan ◽  
John W. Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Material Handling ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Savannah River Site ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
River Site

This paper describes the current pressure protection program at Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy chemical processing and nuclear material handling facility in Aiken, South Carolina. It gives a brief description of the design requirements based on ASME, API, CGA, and ASHRAE Codes. Equipment and systems requiring pressure protection at SRS are primarily pressure vessels, steam stations, process chemical systems, refrigerant and cryogenic systems and other air or gas systems. It is understood that any pressure protection program is built on five fundamental areas of responsibility: procurement, verification, registration, inspection, and repair. This paper focuses on the existing process of facility pressure protection evaluation for code compliance followed by identification of failure scenarios and system design requirements, valve selection and sizing, and verification record generation. Improvements to this process are recognized and discussed. They include the development of a computer program to perform pressure protection evaluation and generate verification records. The software would process all applicable pressure protection calculations using improved methodologies. All relevant data required would be accessible within the program. Pressure safety relief device attributes and system parameters would be displayed. The computer program would enhance design consistency, improve quality and plant safety, and make the pressure protection verification process more efficient and cost effective.

scholarly journals Interim Safe Storage of Radioactive Materials at the Savannah River Site

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas L. Kyriazidis ◽  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Jeff M. Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Savannah River Site ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Surveillance Program ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Safe Storage ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
High Level ◽  
Interim Storage ◽  
River Site

Storage of plutonium bearing materials at the US Department of Energy Savannah River Site (SRS) typically are packaged in DOE-STD-3013 welded containers which are stored in 9975 shipping packages. However, some materials are packaged in non-welded metal containers which consist of a can-bag-can configuration. These non-welded containers and the 9975 package provide safe containment of the plutonium bearing materials. Additionally, the materials must be stabilized such that adverse reactions do not occur during storage. Lastly, a surveillance program of these containers provides field and laboratory data with respect to package aging and potential degradation. The packaging, material stabilization, and surveillance requirements are identified in an Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC) Program at SRS. This paper provides a high level overview of the ISSC program. Interim storage is defined as the storage prior to long term plutonium disposition.

scholarly journals Life Extension of the 9975 Package As a Storage Container: Thermal Analysis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bereket Kiflu ◽  
Steve J. Hensel
Keyword(s):  
Ambient Temperature ◽  
Temperature Limit ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Life Extension ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Storage Container ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Years Of Service ◽  
River Site

The 9975 shipping package is used to store plutonium bearing material with a heat release of up to 19 Watts at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). Individual 9975 packages have been used to store these materials for nearly 15 years. The 9975 package contains non-metallic components such as the elastomeric dual O-ring seals, used to ensure containment at the vessel closures, and a fiberboard over pack which provides impact and fire resistance to the containment vessels. These non-metallic components degrade during long term storage, particularly when higher heat generating contents are packaged. Degraded fiberboard properties result in higher peak internal 9975 package material temperatures during a fire accident event. The thermal performance of the 9975 shipping package was evaluated for a sequential accident consisting of a fire and drop which locally ruptures the outer drum. The package is exposed to an off-normal 58.3°C (137°F) ambient temperature prior to being fully engulfed in a fire for 1.5 hours at 815.6°C (1500°F). Subsequently the fiberboard smolders for 1.0 hour at 760°C (1400°F) at the location of drum rupture, followed by cool down to the ambient temperature. The thermal evaluation considered both the beginning-of-life (as-designed) condition and after 20 years of service as a plutonium material storage container. The results of the evaluation demonstrate that the 9975 shipping package maintains containment during initial and after 20 years of service. The maximum Primary Containment Vessel dual O-ring temperatures during the facility fire-drop-smoldering accident are 163.9°C (327°F) and 186.1°C (367°F) for beginning of life and after 20 years of service, respectively, which are within the allowable accident temperature limit of 204.4°C (400°F). Thus, the 9975 shipping package meets its intended function to provide containment.

scholarly journals Proposal for Qualification of Gas-Generating Radioactive Payloads for Transportation Within a Type B Package

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. K. Houghtaling
Keyword(s):  
Moisture Content ◽  
Closed Volume ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Gas Leakage ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site

Characterization data describing radioactive materials (RAM) in storage are likely those associated with the processes that produced the materials or with the mission for which they were produced. Along with impurity data, often absent or unknown as a result of post-processing storage environment is moisture content. Radiolysis of moisture may lead to a hydrogen flammability hazard within a closed volume such as a storage can or a transportation package. This paper offers a practical means of qualifying payloads of unknown moisture content for shipment within Type B packaging, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses part of a qualification program carried out at the Savannah River Site for onsite shipment of legacy RAM within the DDF-1 package. The DDF-1 is an onsite-only prototype of the currently certified 9975 package. Measurement of storage-can lid bulge can provide an upper bound for pressure within a storage can. Subsequent belljar testing can measure the rate of gas leakage from a storage can. These actions are shown sufficient to ensure that the performance of the 9975 containment vessels can accommodate 1) the deflagration energy from flammable gas mixtures within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave within Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

Aging Performance of Viton® GLT O-Rings in Radioactive Material Packages (U)

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Skidmore ◽  
K. M. Counts ◽  
E. B. Fox ◽  
E. N. Hoffman ◽  
K. A. Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Materials Used ◽  
Interim Storage ◽  
River Site ◽  
Term Storage

Radioactive material packages used for transportation of plutonium-bearing materials often contain multiple O-ring seals for containment. Packages such as the Model 9975 are also being used for interim storage of Pu-bearing materials at the Savannah River Site (SRS). One of the seal materials used in such packages is Viton® GLT fluoroelastomer. The aging behavior of containment vessel O-rings based on Viton® GLT at long-term containment term storage conditions is being characterized to assess its performance in such applications. This paper summarizes the program and test results to date.

scholarly journals Proposal for Qualification of Gas-Generating Radioactive Payloads for Transportation Within a Type B Package: The Recombiner/Getter Approach

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. K. Houghtaling ◽  
R. R. Livingston
Keyword(s):  
Closed Volume ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Hydrogen Accumulation ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site ◽  
Measurement Approach

This paper proposes an alternative approach to qualifying gas generating radioactive payloads for shipment within Type B packaging through application of hydrogen recombiner/getter technology. This work compliments an earlier paper by the first author describing a direct measurement approach to achieving the same qualification goal. Specifically, this paper discusses another part of the success at the Savannah River Site in authorizing onsite transfer of legacy Radioactive Materials within the DDF-1 package. The current safety basis requires a measurement of storage can pressure and placement of a recombiner/getter product inside the package containment vessel to prevent significant hydrogen accumulation within the closed volume surrounding the storage can. These two actions are sufficient to ensure 1) that deflagration pressure of a potential flammable gas mixture is within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave are within the Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

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