scholarly journals Proposal for Qualification of Gas-Generating Radioactive Payloads for Transportation Within a Type B Package: The Recombiner/Getter Approach

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. K. Houghtaling ◽  
R. R. Livingston
Keyword(s):  
Closed Volume ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Hydrogen Accumulation ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site ◽  
Measurement Approach

This paper proposes an alternative approach to qualifying gas generating radioactive payloads for shipment within Type B packaging through application of hydrogen recombiner/getter technology. This work compliments an earlier paper by the first author describing a direct measurement approach to achieving the same qualification goal. Specifically, this paper discusses another part of the success at the Savannah River Site in authorizing onsite transfer of legacy Radioactive Materials within the DDF-1 package. The current safety basis requires a measurement of storage can pressure and placement of a recombiner/getter product inside the package containment vessel to prevent significant hydrogen accumulation within the closed volume surrounding the storage can. These two actions are sufficient to ensure 1) that deflagration pressure of a potential flammable gas mixture is within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave are within the Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

scholarly journals Proposal for Qualification of Gas-Generating Radioactive Payloads for Transportation Within a Type B Package

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. K. Houghtaling
Keyword(s):  
Moisture Content ◽  
Closed Volume ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Gas Leakage ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site

Characterization data describing radioactive materials (RAM) in storage are likely those associated with the processes that produced the materials or with the mission for which they were produced. Along with impurity data, often absent or unknown as a result of post-processing storage environment is moisture content. Radiolysis of moisture may lead to a hydrogen flammability hazard within a closed volume such as a storage can or a transportation package. This paper offers a practical means of qualifying payloads of unknown moisture content for shipment within Type B packaging, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses part of a qualification program carried out at the Savannah River Site for onsite shipment of legacy RAM within the DDF-1 package. The DDF-1 is an onsite-only prototype of the currently certified 9975 package. Measurement of storage-can lid bulge can provide an upper bound for pressure within a storage can. Subsequent belljar testing can measure the rate of gas leakage from a storage can. These actions are shown sufficient to ensure that the performance of the 9975 containment vessels can accommodate 1) the deflagration energy from flammable gas mixtures within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave within Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

scholarly journals Thermal Analysis of a 9975 Package in a Facility Fire Accident

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Multiple Sources ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site

Surplus plutonium bearing materials in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex are stored in the 3013 containers that are designed to meet the requirements of the DOE standard DOE-STD-3013. The 3013 containers are in turn packaged inside 9975 packages that are designed to meet the NRC 10 CFR Part 71 regulatory requirements for transporting the Type B fissile materials across the DOE complex. The design requirements for the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) involving a fire are given in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9975 packages are stored at the DOE Savannah River Site in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility for long term of up to 50 years. The design requirements for safe storage in KAMS facility containing multiple sources of combustible materials are far more challenging than the HAC requirements in 10 CFR 71.73. While the 10 CFR 71.73 postulates an HAC fire of 1475°F and 30 minutes duration, the facility fire calls for a fire of 1500°F and 86 minutes duration. This paper describes a methodology and the analysis results that meet the design limits of the 9975 components and demonstrate the robustness of the 9975 package.

Design and Analysis of Shipping Container for Big Rock Decommissioned Reactor Vessel

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce (Bart) Slimp ◽  
Mick Papp ◽  
Phuong H. Hoang
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Base Material ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Analysis Methodology ◽  
Maximum Wall Thickness ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions

A major milestone in 2003 on the Big Rock Point (BRP) decommissioning project involved shipping the Reactor Vessel (RV) in a steel cask for burial. The Reactor Vessel Transport System (RVTS) cask was a sealed integral container, which provided necessary radiological shielding and containment of radioactive waste for shipping and disposal. The RVTS, using the provisions of the ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NB, was designed as a Type B package in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. This included meeting Normal Condition of Transport (NCT) and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) loading per 10 CFR 71, Regulatory Guide 7.6, “Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels,” Regulatory Guide 7.8, “Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material” and Regulatory Guide 7.11, “Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches.” The RVTS was designed to withstand accelerations and shocks postulated during highway and rail transit using guidelines from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and ANSI N14.2. The design analysis methodology, fabrication process and transportation planning for the Big Rock RVTS Cask are presented in this paper.

scholarly journals Justification for Onsite Transfer of Type B Packages After Extended Storage

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Kurt Houghtaling ◽  
T. Eric Skidmore
Keyword(s):  
Storage Temperature ◽  
Surveillance Program ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Subsequent Performance ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Transportation Service ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Cumulative Radiation Dose ◽  
Accident Conditions

This paper offers a practical means of qualifying previously loaded Type B packages for transportation onsite within the DOE complex after years of protected storage, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses relevant packaging components and introduces part of a surveillance program carried out at the Savannah River Site supporting long-term storage of 3013-processed plutonium-bearing materials within closed 9975 packages and its application to DOE’s Equivalent Safety. Under normal service, maintenance is carried out annually to re-qualify the 9975 packagings for leak-tight transportation service. While in storage, however, annual maintenance was judged not to provide a significant increase in safety but to increase storage operation costs and to violate ALARA principles. Hence, a surveillance program was developed to investigate and confirm predictions of storage-related behavior for 9975 packaging materials, including the performance of O-ring seals and Celotex® insulation. The combination of analytical evaluations with surveillance data is shown sufficient to ensure that the 9975 packages can accommodate 1) time at storage temperature and 2) cumulative radiation dose without compromising subsequent performance under regulatory Normal Conditions of Transport or site-specific credible accident conditions.

scholarly journals Hydrogen Concentrations During Storage of 3013 Oxide Samples

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. M. Askew ◽  
J. E. Laurinat ◽  
S. J. Hensel
Keyword(s):  
National Laboratory ◽  
Hydrogen Gas ◽  
Surveillance Program ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Shipping Containers ◽  
Savannah River National Laboratory ◽  
Hydrogen Accumulation ◽  
Lower Flammability Limit ◽  
River Site

As part of a surveillance program intended to ensure the safe storage of plutonium bearing nuclear materials in the Savannah River Site (SRS) K-Area Materials Storage, samples of these materials are shipped to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for analysis. These samples are in the form of solids or powders which will have absorbed moisture. Potentially flammable hydrogen gas is generated due to radiolysis of the moisture. The samples are shipped for processing after chemical analysis. To preclude the possibility of a hydrogen deflagration or detonation inside the shipping containers, the shipping times are limited to ensure that hydrogen concentration in the vapor space of every layer of confinement is below the lower flammability limit of 4 volume percent (vol%) [1]. This study presents an analysis of the rate of hydrogen accumulation due to radiolysis and calculation of allowable shipping times for typical K-Area materials.

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