scholarly journals Life Extension of the 9975 Package As a Storage Container: Thermal Analysis

Author(s):  
Bereket Kiflu ◽  
Steve J. Hensel

The 9975 shipping package is used to store plutonium bearing material with a heat release of up to 19 Watts at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). Individual 9975 packages have been used to store these materials for nearly 15 years. The 9975 package contains non-metallic components such as the elastomeric dual O-ring seals, used to ensure containment at the vessel closures, and a fiberboard over pack which provides impact and fire resistance to the containment vessels. These non-metallic components degrade during long term storage, particularly when higher heat generating contents are packaged. Degraded fiberboard properties result in higher peak internal 9975 package material temperatures during a fire accident event. The thermal performance of the 9975 shipping package was evaluated for a sequential accident consisting of a fire and drop which locally ruptures the outer drum. The package is exposed to an off-normal 58.3°C (137°F) ambient temperature prior to being fully engulfed in a fire for 1.5 hours at 815.6°C (1500°F). Subsequently the fiberboard smolders for 1.0 hour at 760°C (1400°F) at the location of drum rupture, followed by cool down to the ambient temperature. The thermal evaluation considered both the beginning-of-life (as-designed) condition and after 20 years of service as a plutonium material storage container. The results of the evaluation demonstrate that the 9975 shipping package maintains containment during initial and after 20 years of service. The maximum Primary Containment Vessel dual O-ring temperatures during the facility fire-drop-smoldering accident are 163.9°C (327°F) and 186.1°C (367°F) for beginning of life and after 20 years of service, respectively, which are within the allowable accident temperature limit of 204.4°C (400°F). Thus, the 9975 shipping package meets its intended function to provide containment.

Author(s):  
David Tamburello ◽  
Matthew Kesterson ◽  
Steven Hensel

Abstract The 9975 is a double containment shipping package used to transport plutonium bearing materials for the US Department of Energy. The 9975 is also used for long term storage of plutonium bearing materials at the Savannah River Site. The package utilizes a fiberboard overpack to protect against fire and impact events. The 9975 has been shown to maintain containment during a hypothetical facility accident fire even though the facility fire is hotter and longer than the regulatory transportation fire. Fiberboard aging and degradation has been investigated using both laboratory and field surveillance data. This information is used to evaluate an aged 9975 used for nuclear material storage. Variations in fiberboard thermal properties due to aging were shown to have modest effects on the maximum component temperatures, while the package geometry variations due to aging and degradation have a larger effect on the maximum component temperatures. Specifically, the air gap between the upper fiberboard assembly and the drum lid increases during storage due to the deterioration of the lower fiberboard assembly and slumping of the package containment vessel. A limiting air gap distance has been determined via thermal fire analysis, which may be used to estimate a storage life.


Author(s):  
Stephanie L. Hudlow

The outer can welder (OCW) in the FB-Line Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Gas Tungsten Arc Weld (GTAW) system used to create outer canisters compliant with the Department of Energy 3013 Standard, DOE-STD-3013-2000, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials. The key welding parameters controlled and monitored on the outer can welder Data Acquisition System (DAS) are weld amperage, weld voltage, and weld rotational speed. Inner 3013 canisters from the Bagless Transfer System that contain plutonium metal or plutonium oxide are placed inside an outer 3013 canister. The canister is back-filled with helium and welded using the outer can welder. The completed weld is screened to determine if it is satisfactory by reviewing the OCW DAS key welding parameters, performing a helium leak check, performing a visual examination by a qualified weld inspector, and performing digital radiography of the completed weld. Canisters with unsatisfactory welds are cut open and repackaged. Canisters with satisfactory welds are deemed compliant with the 3013 standard for long-term storage.


Author(s):  
S. J. Hensel

Plutonium bearing materials packaged for long term storage per the Department of Energy Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) are required to be examined periodically in a non-destructive manner (i.e. without compromising the storage containers) for pressure buildup. Radiography is the preferred technology for performing the examinations. The concept is to measure and record the container lid position. As a can pressurizes the lid will deflect outward and thus provide an indication of the internal pressure. A radiograph generated within 30 days of creation of each storage container serves as the baseline from which future surveillance examinations will be compared. A problem with measuring the lid position was discovered during testing of a digital radiography system. The solution was to provide a distinct feature upon the lower surface of the container lid from which the digital radiography system could easily track the lid position.


Author(s):  
Paul S. Blanton ◽  
T. Kurt Houghtaling

Radioactive material packagings designed for out-of-commerce shipments are not necessarily subject to the same regulatory requirements as packagings designed for in-commerce service. For example, DOE Order 460.1B permits application of the notion of Equivalent Safety to out-of-commerce shipping within DOE sites. Equivalent safety can be viewed as a reduction in 10 CFR 71 design conditions without a corresponding loss of public health and safety. This paper presents a packaging design identified as the Tritium Spent Melt Overpack (SMO) that successfully utilized equivalent safety at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Because the spent melt materials are highly radioactive, the container must be loaded and closed remotely. The SMO design is a based on twenty-foot long eighteen-inch diameter pipe, with one end closed by welded plate and the open end closed by a latching plug that incorporates bore seals. The SMO receives a single sixteen-inch diameter by 16-foot long crucible partly filled with the waste product from the tritium extraction process. The loaded overpack is moved from the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility inside a heavily shielded cask. Upon arrival at a waste silo designed to receive the overpack, it is removed from the shielding cask by remote means and placed in the long-term storage silo. This paper provides an overview of the SMO overpack design and its operation.


Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta

Surplus plutonium bearing materials in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex are stored in the 3013 containers that are designed to meet the requirements of the DOE standard DOE-STD-3013. The 3013 containers are in turn packaged inside 9975 packages that are designed to meet the NRC 10 CFR Part 71 regulatory requirements for transporting the Type B fissile materials across the DOE complex. The design requirements for the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) involving a fire are given in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9975 packages are stored at the DOE Savannah River Site in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility for long term of up to 50 years. The design requirements for safe storage in KAMS facility containing multiple sources of combustible materials are far more challenging than the HAC requirements in 10 CFR 71.73. While the 10 CFR 71.73 postulates an HAC fire of 1475°F and 30 minutes duration, the facility fire calls for a fire of 1500°F and 86 minutes duration. This paper describes a methodology and the analysis results that meet the design limits of the 9975 components and demonstrate the robustness of the 9975 package.


Author(s):  
Narendra K. (Nick) Gupta

Interim plutonium storage for up to 10 years in the K-reactor building is currently being planned at Savannah River Site (SRS). SAFKEG package could be used to store Pu metal and oxide (PuO2) in the K-reactor complex with other packagings like 9975. The SAFKEG is designed for carrying Type-B materials across the DOE complex and meets the 10CFR71 requirements. Thermal analyses were performed to ensure that the temperatures of the SAFKEG components will not exceed their temperature limits under the K-reactor storage conditions. Thermal analyses of the SAFKEG packaging with three content configurations using BNFL 3013 outer container (Rocky Flats, SRS bagless transfer cans, and BNFL inner containers) were performed for storage of PuO2 and plutonium metal.


Author(s):  
T. E. Skidmore ◽  
W. L. Daugherty ◽  
E. N. Hoffman

The Model 9975 shipping package specifies the materials of construction for its various components. With the loss of availability of material for two components (cane fiberboard overpack and Viton® GLT O-rings), alternate materials of construction were identified and approved for use for transport (softwood fiberboard and Viton® GLT-S O-rings). The shipping packages are part of a long-term storage configuration at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Therefore, additional testing is in progress to verify satisfactory long-term performance of the alternate materials under storage conditions. The test results to date can be compared to results on the original materials of construction to draw preliminary conclusions on the performance of the replacement materials.


Author(s):  
James K. Chan ◽  
John W. Ramsey

This paper describes the current pressure protection program at Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy chemical processing and nuclear material handling facility in Aiken, South Carolina. It gives a brief description of the design requirements based on ASME, API, CGA, and ASHRAE Codes. Equipment and systems requiring pressure protection at SRS are primarily pressure vessels, steam stations, process chemical systems, refrigerant and cryogenic systems and other air or gas systems. It is understood that any pressure protection program is built on five fundamental areas of responsibility: procurement, verification, registration, inspection, and repair. This paper focuses on the existing process of facility pressure protection evaluation for code compliance followed by identification of failure scenarios and system design requirements, valve selection and sizing, and verification record generation. Improvements to this process are recognized and discussed. They include the development of a computer program to perform pressure protection evaluation and generate verification records. The software would process all applicable pressure protection calculations using improved methodologies. All relevant data required would be accessible within the program. Pressure safety relief device attributes and system parameters would be displayed. The computer program would enhance design consistency, improve quality and plant safety, and make the pressure protection verification process more efficient and cost effective.


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