scholarly journals Proposal for Qualification of Gas-Generating Radioactive Payloads for Transportation Within a Type B Package

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. K. Houghtaling
Keyword(s):  
Moisture Content ◽  
Closed Volume ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Gas Leakage ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site

Characterization data describing radioactive materials (RAM) in storage are likely those associated with the processes that produced the materials or with the mission for which they were produced. Along with impurity data, often absent or unknown as a result of post-processing storage environment is moisture content. Radiolysis of moisture may lead to a hydrogen flammability hazard within a closed volume such as a storage can or a transportation package. This paper offers a practical means of qualifying payloads of unknown moisture content for shipment within Type B packaging, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses part of a qualification program carried out at the Savannah River Site for onsite shipment of legacy RAM within the DDF-1 package. The DDF-1 is an onsite-only prototype of the currently certified 9975 package. Measurement of storage-can lid bulge can provide an upper bound for pressure within a storage can. Subsequent belljar testing can measure the rate of gas leakage from a storage can. These actions are shown sufficient to ensure that the performance of the 9975 containment vessels can accommodate 1) the deflagration energy from flammable gas mixtures within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave within Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

scholarly journals Proposal for Qualification of Gas-Generating Radioactive Payloads for Transportation Within a Type B Package: The Recombiner/Getter Approach

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. K. Houghtaling ◽  
R. R. Livingston
Keyword(s):  
Closed Volume ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Hydrogen Accumulation ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site ◽  
Measurement Approach

This paper proposes an alternative approach to qualifying gas generating radioactive payloads for shipment within Type B packaging through application of hydrogen recombiner/getter technology. This work compliments an earlier paper by the first author describing a direct measurement approach to achieving the same qualification goal. Specifically, this paper discusses another part of the success at the Savannah River Site in authorizing onsite transfer of legacy Radioactive Materials within the DDF-1 package. The current safety basis requires a measurement of storage can pressure and placement of a recombiner/getter product inside the package containment vessel to prevent significant hydrogen accumulation within the closed volume surrounding the storage can. These two actions are sufficient to ensure 1) that deflagration pressure of a potential flammable gas mixture is within Normal Conditions of Transport, and 2) the consequences of a detonation shock wave are within the Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

scholarly journals Thermal Analysis of a 9975 Package in a Facility Fire Accident

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Multiple Sources ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
River Site

Surplus plutonium bearing materials in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex are stored in the 3013 containers that are designed to meet the requirements of the DOE standard DOE-STD-3013. The 3013 containers are in turn packaged inside 9975 packages that are designed to meet the NRC 10 CFR Part 71 regulatory requirements for transporting the Type B fissile materials across the DOE complex. The design requirements for the hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) involving a fire are given in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9975 packages are stored at the DOE Savannah River Site in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility for long term of up to 50 years. The design requirements for safe storage in KAMS facility containing multiple sources of combustible materials are far more challenging than the HAC requirements in 10 CFR 71.73. While the 10 CFR 71.73 postulates an HAC fire of 1475°F and 30 minutes duration, the facility fire calls for a fire of 1500°F and 86 minutes duration. This paper describes a methodology and the analysis results that meet the design limits of the 9975 components and demonstrate the robustness of the 9975 package.

Design and Analysis of Shipping Container for Big Rock Decommissioned Reactor Vessel

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce (Bart) Slimp ◽  
Mick Papp ◽  
Phuong H. Hoang
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Base Material ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Analysis Methodology ◽  
Maximum Wall Thickness ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions

A major milestone in 2003 on the Big Rock Point (BRP) decommissioning project involved shipping the Reactor Vessel (RV) in a steel cask for burial. The Reactor Vessel Transport System (RVTS) cask was a sealed integral container, which provided necessary radiological shielding and containment of radioactive waste for shipping and disposal. The RVTS, using the provisions of the ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NB, was designed as a Type B package in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. This included meeting Normal Condition of Transport (NCT) and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) loading per 10 CFR 71, Regulatory Guide 7.6, “Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels,” Regulatory Guide 7.8, “Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material” and Regulatory Guide 7.11, “Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches.” The RVTS was designed to withstand accelerations and shocks postulated during highway and rail transit using guidelines from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and ANSI N14.2. The design analysis methodology, fabrication process and transportation planning for the Big Rock RVTS Cask are presented in this paper.

scholarly journals Justification for Onsite Transfer of Type B Packages After Extended Storage

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Kurt Houghtaling ◽  
T. Eric Skidmore
Keyword(s):  
Storage Temperature ◽  
Surveillance Program ◽  
Type B ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Subsequent Performance ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Transportation Service ◽  
Bearing Materials ◽  
Cumulative Radiation Dose ◽  
Accident Conditions

This paper offers a practical means of qualifying previously loaded Type B packages for transportation onsite within the DOE complex after years of protected storage, while supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA). Specifically, the paper discusses relevant packaging components and introduces part of a surveillance program carried out at the Savannah River Site supporting long-term storage of 3013-processed plutonium-bearing materials within closed 9975 packages and its application to DOE’s Equivalent Safety. Under normal service, maintenance is carried out annually to re-qualify the 9975 packagings for leak-tight transportation service. While in storage, however, annual maintenance was judged not to provide a significant increase in safety but to increase storage operation costs and to violate ALARA principles. Hence, a surveillance program was developed to investigate and confirm predictions of storage-related behavior for 9975 packaging materials, including the performance of O-ring seals and Celotex® insulation. The combination of analytical evaluations with surveillance data is shown sufficient to ensure that the 9975 packages can accommodate 1) time at storage temperature and 2) cumulative radiation dose without compromising subsequent performance under regulatory Normal Conditions of Transport or site-specific credible accident conditions.

scholarly journals Effects of Moisture in the 9975 Shipping Package Fiberboard Assembly

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. L. Daugherty ◽  
K. A. Dunn ◽  
J. L. Murphy ◽  
E. R. Hackney
Keyword(s):  
Moisture Content ◽  
Storage System ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Savannah River Site ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Mold Growth ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Impact Performance ◽  
River Site ◽  
Impact Absorption

The fiberboard assembly used in 9975 shipping packages as an impact-absorption and insulation component has the capacity to absorb moisture, with an accompanying change to its properties. While package fabrication requirements generally maintain the fiberboard moisture content within manufacturing range, there is the potential during use or storage for atypical handling or storage practices which result in the absorption of additional moisture. In addition to performing a transportation function, the 9975 shipping packages are used as a facility storage system for special nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site. A small number of packages after extended storage have been found to contain elevated moisture levels. Typically, this condition is accompanied by an axial compaction of the bottom fiberboard layers, and the growth of mold. In addition to potential atypical practices, fiberboard can exchange moisture with the surrounding air, depending on the ambient humidity. Laboratory data have been generated to correlate the equilibrium moisture content of cane fiberboard with the humidity of the surrounding air. These data are compared to measurements taken within shipping packages. With a reasonable measurement of the fiberboard moisture content, an estimate of the fiberboard properties can be made. Over time, elevated moisture levels will negatively impact performance properties, and promote fiberboard mold growth and resultant degradation.

scholarly journals The Use of Digital Radiography in the Evaluation of Radioactive Materials Packaging Performance Testing

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecil G. May ◽  
Lawrence F. Gelder ◽  
Boyd D. Howard
Keyword(s):  
Digital Radiography ◽  
Performance Testing ◽  
Cumulative Effect ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Radiographic Images ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Testing And Evaluation

New designs of radioactive material shipping packages are required to be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material. This paper will discuss the use of digital radiography to evaluate the effects of the tests required by 10 CFR 71.71, Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT), and 10 CFR 71.73, Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC). One acceptable means of evaluating packaging performance is to subject packagings to the series of NCT and HAC tests. The evaluation includes a determination of the effect on the packaging by the conditions and tests. Historically, that determination has required that packagings be cut and sectioned to learn the actual effects on internal components, either after each test to document the effects of that test, or after all testing is complete which determines the cumulative effect on the package. Digital radiography permits the examination of internal packaging components without sectioning a package. This allows a single package to be subjected to the entire series of tests. After each test, the package is digitally radiographed and the effects of particular tests evaluated. Radiography reduces the number of packages required for testing and also reduces labor and materials required to section and evaluate numerous packages. This paper will include a description of the digital radiography equipment used in the testing and evaluation of the 9977 package at SRNL. The equipment is capable of making a single radiograph of a full-sized package in one exposure. Radiographs will be compared to sectioned packages that show actual conditions compared to radiographic images.

Onsite Transportation of Radioactive Materials at the Savannah River Site

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Watkins ◽  
Erich K. Opperman
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Savannah River Site ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Security Interest ◽  
River Site

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Transportation Safety Document (TSD) defines the onsite packaging and transportation safety program at SRS and demonstrates its compliance with Department of Energy (DOE) transportation safety requirements, to include DOE Order 460.1C, Packaging and Transportation Safety, DOE Order 461.2, Onsite Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National Security Interest, and 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management (Subpart B).

scholarly journals Drop Tests Results of Revised Closure Bolt Configuration of the Standard Waste Box, Standard Large Box-2, and Ten Drum Overpack Packagings

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecil G. May ◽  
Charles A. McKeel ◽  
Erich K. Opperman
Keyword(s):  
Internal Pressure ◽  
Type A ◽  
Savannah River Site ◽  
The Body ◽  
Performance Criteria ◽  
Savannah River ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Drop Tests ◽  
Original Number ◽  
River Site

The Transuranic (TRU) Disposition Project at Savannah River Site will require numerous transfers of radioactive materials within the site boundaries for sorting and repackaging. The three DOT Type A shipping packagings planned for this work have numerous bolts for securing the lids to the body of the packagings. In an effort to reduce operator time to open and close the packages during onsite transfers, thus reducing personnel exposure and costs, an evaluation was performed to analyze the effects of reducing the number of bolts required to secure the lid to the packaging body. The evaluation showed the reduction to one-third of the original number of bolts had no affect on the packagings’ capability to sustain vibratory loads, shipping loads, internal pressure loads, and the loads resulting from a 4-ft drop. However, the loads caused by the 4-ft drop are difficult to estimate and the study recommended each of the packages be dropped to show the actual effects on the package closure. Even with reduced bolting, the packagings were still required to meet the 49 CFR 178.350 performance criteria for Type A packaging. This paper will discuss the effects and results of the drop testing of the three packagings.

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