System-Wide Response to Incidents: Case Study

Author(s):  
S. Zhang ◽  
S. Kariyawasam ◽  
R. Sutherby ◽  
J. Upadhyaya

This paper presents a systematic and comprehensive procedure for the system-wide response to incidents (SWRI). This SWRI process has been used for identifying emerging threats and incorporating the learnings from major incidents into a pipeline integrity management program (IMP). This process also complements the IMP for threat identification and system wide risk assessment, thus giving consideration to all known threats and their interactions. A recent major incident due to thermal expansion on a TransCanada pipeline system was used to demonstrate the process of SWRI and the use of SWRI to identify the contributing factors of thermal expansion. An example was used to illustrate the engineering assessment for thermal expansion driven by the construction of two new compressor stations on an existing pipeline. The process documented in this case study has the potential to augment the integrity management programs and systemic corrective actions for pipeline systems in the energy industry.

Author(s):  
M. Robb Isaac ◽  
Saleh Al-Sulaiman ◽  
Monty R. Martin ◽  
Sandeep Sharma

In early 2005, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) initiated a Total Pipeline Integrity Management System (TPIMS) implementation in order to carry out a major integrity assessment of its operating facilities, equipment, buried plant piping and pipeline network and to establish a continuing integrity management program. KOC Transit System is a complex infrastructure consisting of over three hundred pipelines, thousands of wellhead flow lines, and consumer and offshore lines for which there was a significant loss of data when the facilities were destroyed during a military invasion in 1990. An initial pipeline system assessment identified issues and actions regarding condition of the pipelines, corridors, requirements on in-line inspection (ILI), documentation, RISK assessment, status of international code compliance, and overall state of the system. Following recommendations from that initial assessment led to the development of a long term strategy; the execution of which required the implementation of a comprehensive integrity management program. This case study discusses the results obtained after five years of implementation of TPIMS at KOC. It will demonstrate some of the complex components involved in managing the integrity of the Transit System that have been made possible through the implementation of the system. The general concept and structure of TPIMS will be described, and how it deals with the complexity of the KOC pipeline system. The system made it possible to integrate and manage data from various sources, by conducting integrity assessment using ILI, Direct Assessment and hydrostatic testing, as well as structure a comprehensive RISK & Decision Support mechanism. This is one of the world’s first implementations of this magnitude which encompasses such a wide range of services and variables; all being managed in a single environment and utilized by a multitude of users in different areas at KOC. The biggest challenge in a project of this scope is data management. Examples will be shown of the integration structure to illustrate the benefits of using a single comprehensive and versatile platform to manage system requirements; ultimately providing system reliability and improving overall operational efficiency.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey Lachey ◽  
Keith Vanderlee ◽  
Robert Jewell ◽  
Tony Alfano

As risk assessment methodologies, tools, and processes continue to evolve in the industry, utilizing risk outputs to not only identify high risk locations, but to also understand the driver(s) behind the elevated risks for those locations is paramount. The ideal scenario for reducing pipeline risk is utilizing a risk-driven mitigation plan as this ensures the optimal use of company dollars, but also inherently means that a company has a firm understanding of their data and pipeline system. When the company understands their data and the implications for its inaccuracies, whether it be improper data alignment or incorrect application of data, they can effectively employ a campaign for preventative and mitigative measures (P&MM). However, if suspect data is used during a risk assessment, P&MM cannot accurately target risk drivers and high risk locations, making it challenging for the company to maximize their resources. For well over a year, an on-going partnership between AGL Resources Inc. (AGL) and Det Norske Veritas (U.S.A.), Inc. (DNV GL) has ensued to tailor a GIS-based risk management software solution for AGL. Through this collaboration among Integrity Management, Risk Management, IT, GIS, and Operations & Maintenance subject matter experts (SMEs) on both sides, one central hub of cross-functional pipeline knowledge was created. As a result, countless opportunities were exploited to identify supplementary data sources to employ new data manipulation techniques and processes, providing AGL with the foundation for such a risk-based Preventative & Mitigative Measure program. With the foundation laid and the proper risk elements present, AGL can now execute optimized risk-informed responses to identified high risk locations, pipeline segments, or pipeline systems. These optimized responses require an understanding of the types of P&MM available to reduce the threats and consequences, the costs involved for each P&MM implemented, and the utilization of a tool to allow various ‘what-if’ risk analyses to be conducted. Adopting and integrating this process as part of AGL’s risk management program allows them to capitalize on the maintenance dollars they spend while also reducing the potential hazards to the surrounding people, places and environment.


2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (02) ◽  
pp. 106-110
Author(s):  
Ge Wang ◽  
Michael Lee ◽  
Chris Serratella ◽  
Stanley Botten ◽  
Sam Ternowchek ◽  
...  

Real-time monitoring and detection of structural degradation helps in capturing the structural conditions of ships. The latest nondestructive testing (NDT) and sensor technologies will potentially be integrated into future generations of the structural integrity management program. This paper reports on a joint development project between Alaska Tanker Company, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), and MISTRAS. The pilot project examined the viability of acoustic emission technology as a screening tool for surveys and inspection planning. Specifically, testing took place on a 32-year-old double-hull Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) trade tanker. The test demonstrated the possibility of adapting this technology in the identification of critical spots on a tanker in order to target inspections. This targeting will focus surveys and inspections on suspected areas, thus increasing efficiency of detecting structural degradation. The test has the potential to introduce new inspection procedures as the project undertakes the first commercial testing of the latest acoustic emission technology during a tanker's voyage.


Author(s):  
Garry L. Sommer ◽  
Brad S. Smith

Enbridge Pipelines Inc. operates one of the longest and most complex pipeline systems in the world. A key aspect of the Enbridge Integrity Management Program (IMP) is the trending, analysis, and management of data collected from over 50 years of pipeline operations. This paper/presentation describes Enbridge’s challenges, learnings, processes, and innovations for meeting today’s increased data management/integration demands. While much has been written around the premise of data management/integration, and many software solutions are available in the commercial market, the greatest data management challenge for mature pipeline operators arises from the variability of data (variety of technologies, data capture methods, and data accuracy levels) collected over the operating history of the system. Ability to bring this variable data set together is substantially the most difficult aspect of a coordinated data management effort and is critical to the success of any such project. Failure to do this will result in lack of user confidence and inability to gain “buy-in” to new data management processes. In 2001 Enbridge began a series of initiatives to enhance data management and analysis. Central to this was the commitment to accurate geospatial alignment of integrity data. This paper/presentation describes Enbridge’s experience with development of custom software (Integrated Spatial Analysis System – ISAS) including critical learnings around a.) Data alignment efforts and b.) Significant efforts involved in development of an accurate pipe centreline. The paper/presentation will also describe co-incident data management programs that link to ISAS. This includes enhanced database functionality for excavation data and development of software to enable electronic transfer of data to this database. These tools were built to enable rapid transfer of field data and “real time” tool validation through automated unity plots of tool defect data vs. that measured in the field.


Author(s):  
Martin Zaleski ◽  
Tom Greaves ◽  
Jan Bracic

The Canadian Standards Association’s Publication Z662-07, Annex N provides guidelines for pipeline integrity management programs. Government agencies that regulate pipelines in Alberta, British Columbia and other Canadian jurisdictions are increasingly using Annex N as the standard to which pipeline operators are held. This paper describes the experience of Pembina Pipeline Corporation (Pembina) in implementing a geohazards management program to fulfill components of Annex N. Central to Pembina’s program is a ground-based inspection program that feeds a geohazards database designed to store geotechnical and hydrotechnical site information and provide relative rankings of geohazard sites across the pipeline network. This geohazard management program fulfills several aspects of the Annex, particularly: record keeping; hazard identification and assessment; risk assessment and reduction; program planning; inspections and monitoring; and mitigation. Pembina’s experience in growing their geohazard inventory from 65 known sites to over 1300 systematically inspected and catalogued sites in a span of approximately two years is discussed. Also presented are methods by which consultants and Pembina personnel contribute to the geohazard inspection program and geohazard inventory, and how the ground inspection observations trigger follow-up inspections, monitoring and mitigation activities.


Author(s):  
Robert V. Hadden ◽  
Kevin J. De Leenheer

As part of its Integrity Management Program, Trans Mountain Pipe Line hydrostatically tests sections of its pipeline system with water transported to test sites through the pipeline. After completion of the testing, the water continues through the pipeline to a water treatment facility where it is treated and discharged to the municipal sewer system. Hydrostatic testing of an operating pipeline, although simple in concept, is a major undertaking. This paper will outline the technical aspects of Trans Mountain’s hydrostatic testing program including: test water transportation, environmental constraints, coordination of test activities and water treatment.


Author(s):  
David Mangold ◽  
W. Kent Muhlbauer ◽  
Jim Ponder ◽  
Tony Alfano

Risk management of pipelines is a complex challenge due to the dynamic environment of the real world coupled with a wide range of system types installed over many decades. Various methods of risk assessment are currently being used in industry, many of which utilize relative scoring. These assessments are often not designed for the new integrity management program (IMP) requirements and are under direct challenge by regulators. SemGroup had historically used relative risk assessment methodologies to help support risk management decision-making. While the formality offered by these early methods provided benefits, it was recognized that, in order to more effectively manage risk and better meet the United States IMP objectives, a more effective risk assessment would be needed. A rapid and inexpensive migration into a better risk assessment platform was sought. The platform needed to be applicable not only to pipeline miles, but also to station facilities and all related components. The risk results had to be readily understandable and scalable, capturing risks from ‘trap to trap’ in addition to risks accompanying each segment. The solution appeared in the form a quantitative risk assessment that was ‘physics based’ rather than the classical statistics based QRA. This paper will outline the steps involved in this transition process and show how quantitative risk assessment may be efficiently implemented to better guide integrity decision-making, illustrated with a case study from SemGroup.


Author(s):  
Hugo García ◽  
Carlos Nieves ◽  
Juan Diego Colonia

Oil pipelines systems for hydrocarbons transportation are linear projects that can reach great lengths. For this reason, theirs paths may cross different geological formations, soil types, navigable or torrential waters; and they may face geotechnical and hydrological instability problems such as creeping slopes, geological faults, landslides, scour and differential settling which causes different relative movements between the soil and the pipeline. The OCENSA (Oleoducto Central S.A) 30″ and 36″ diameter system was built in 1997 to transport crude oil from the eastern foothills of the Andes to the Caribbean Coast along some 830 km of the Eastern Andes mountains range and the spurs of the central Andes mountains range of Colombia: it was a major challenge to secure the integrity of the pipeline in the face of natural events.


Author(s):  
Miaad Safari ◽  
David Shaw

Abstract As integrity programs mature over the life of a pipeline, an increasing number of data points are collected from second, third, or further condition monitoring cycles. Types of data include Inline Inspection (ILI) or External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) inspection data, validation or remediation dig information, and records of various repairs that have been completed on the pipeline system. The diversity and massive quantity of this gathered data proposes a challenge to pipeline operators in managing and maintaining these data sets and records. The management of integrity data is a key element to a pipeline system Integrity Management Program (IMP) as per the CSA Z662[1]. One of the most critical integrity datasets is the repair information. Incorrect repair assignments on a pipeline can lead to duplicate unnecessary excavations in the best scenario and a pipeline failure in the worst scenario. Operators rely on various approaches to manage and assign repair data to ILIs such as historical records reviews, ILI-based repair assignments, or chainage-based repair assignments. However, these methods have significant gaps in efficiency and/or accuracy. Failure to adequately manage excavation and repair data can lead to increased costs due to repeated excavation of an anomaly, an increase in resources required to match historical information with new data, uncertainty in the effectiveness of previous repairs, and the possibility of incorrect assignment of repairs to unrepaired features. This paper describes the approach adopted by Enbridge Gas to track and maintain repairs, as a part of the Pipeline Risk and Integrity Management (PRIM) platform. This approach was designed to create a robust excavation and repair management framework, providing a robust system of data gathering and automation, while ensuring sufficient oversight by Integrity Engineers. Using this system, repairs are assigned to each feature in an excavation, not only to a certain chainage along the pipeline. Subsequently, when a new ILI results report is received, a process of “Repair Matching” is completed to assign preexisting repairs and assessments to the newly reported features at a feature level. This process is partially automated, whereby pre-determined box-to-box features matched between ILIs can auto-populate repairs for many of the repaired features. The proposed excavation management system would provide operators a superior approach to managing their repair history and projecting historical repairs and assessments onto new ILI reports, prior to assessing the ILI and issuing further digs on the pipeline. This optimized method has many advantages over the conventional repair management methods used in the industry. This method is best suited for operators that are embarking on their second or third condition monitoring cycle, with a moderate number of historical repairs.


Author(s):  
Neil Ripley ◽  
Elisa Scordo ◽  
Alex Baumgard

BGC Engineering Inc. (BGC) was retained by a large pipeline operator to develop a GIS-based system to assess and rank the environmental consequence of a pipeline rupture on watercourse crossings within their pipeline system. Several physical, biological and socio-economic factors contribute to the environmental consequence of a pipeline rupture on a watercourse. This study examined select spatial and vulnerability factors, and did not consider biologic or economic impacts. Three factors were selected as part of the initial study to prioritize the pipeline watercourse crossings according to: (1) size of the watercourse at the pipeline crossing, (2) proximity of each individual crossing to larger downstream watercourses, and (3) pipeline liquid flow rate volume. A spatial analysis was conducted to determine the first two factors, while input for the third factor was provided by the pipeline operator. Watercourse size was determined using Strahler’s stream order classification (Strahler 1952), while proximity to larger downstream watercourses was assessed using a Geographic Information System (GIS). This paper presents an overview of the data sources and methods used to develop an initial screening tool for identifying high consequence crossings within a pipeline system, and highlights the challenges encountered with acquiring and processing data to include in a consequence rating system. As with other pipeline risk assessments, the main challenges of this work include data availability, data integrity and resource limitations. This system is intended to fit within the pipeline operator’s current geohazard integrity management program and direct resources for a multi-year baseline field inspection program.


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