Quantitative System Specific Likelihood Algorithms for System Wide Risk Assessment

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahani Kariyawasam ◽  
Hong Wang ◽  
Boon Ong ◽  
Mohammad Al-Amin ◽  
Ning Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Companion Paper ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Failure Rates ◽  
Causal Factors ◽  
Risk Framework ◽  
Explicit Consideration ◽  
Threat Categories ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Excessive Risk

The System Wide Risk Assessment (SWRA) is an essential first step in the pipeline integrity management program. It is required by both Canadian and US regulators and is expected to estimate risk due to all threats, interaction of threats, and consequences. The main objective of the SWRA is to identify high risk segments so that segments with excessive risk can be mitigated. The SWRA models developed in this study employs quantified likelihood models and consequence models. A companion paper explains the consequence models. This paper presents the framework and rationale used to produce quantifiable measures of likelihood for each threat. The quantification enables sensible comparisons between threat likelihood values and also enables realistic combining of likelihood values to produce total likelihood of failure due to all threats. It also facilitates identification of key parameters that contribute to each threat. It is important to have a consistent risk framework that systematically applies to all the threats and accommodates all the different aspects and mitigative actions in each threat management process. For effective continuous improvement it is essential that the models are transparent and updatable. A consistent framework that is systematic, rigorous, transparent and updatable is utilized with explicit consideration to threat interactions. The main advantages of the likelihood models developed in this study are: • It is based on all evidence that is available for each threat (failure histories, observations from assessments, i.e., digs, HTs, and ILIs, and mechanistic understanding) • It considers all nine threat categories and relevant subcategories where causal factors are different (such as SCC and Circumferential SCC within the crack threat category) • It clearly considers all three types of threat interactions (Interacting coincident defects, Interacting-activating threats, and Interacting common-mode conditions) among all threat categories. • It is based on subsystem specific historical failure rates for each threat, where subsystem is defined as a subset of pipelines that have different performance characteristics with respect to at least one threat. This basis enables the failure frequencies predicted to be more in line with reality and consequently improves accuracy of predictions and appropriate quantification. • The subsystem specific historical failure rates are then calibrated to correlate to different mechanistic characteristics so that within-pipeline-subsystem variation due to changes in parameters is represented. • Finally assessments or observations are used to appropriately update threat likelihood with latest knowledge from measured local observations. All of the improvements mentioned above have helped the SWRA 2013 to produce more representative results. The comprehensive set of validation exercises verify that the results are realistic.

Meeting the Geohazards Management Guidelines of Annex N

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Zaleski ◽  
Tom Greaves ◽  
Jan Bracic
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Program Planning ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Hazard Identification ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Management Guidelines ◽  
Record Keeping ◽  
Reduction Program ◽  
Integrity Management

The Canadian Standards Association’s Publication Z662-07, Annex N provides guidelines for pipeline integrity management programs. Government agencies that regulate pipelines in Alberta, British Columbia and other Canadian jurisdictions are increasingly using Annex N as the standard to which pipeline operators are held. This paper describes the experience of Pembina Pipeline Corporation (Pembina) in implementing a geohazards management program to fulfill components of Annex N. Central to Pembina’s program is a ground-based inspection program that feeds a geohazards database designed to store geotechnical and hydrotechnical site information and provide relative rankings of geohazard sites across the pipeline network. This geohazard management program fulfills several aspects of the Annex, particularly: record keeping; hazard identification and assessment; risk assessment and reduction; program planning; inspections and monitoring; and mitigation. Pembina’s experience in growing their geohazard inventory from 65 known sites to over 1300 systematically inspected and catalogued sites in a span of approximately two years is discussed. Also presented are methods by which consultants and Pembina personnel contribute to the geohazard inspection program and geohazard inventory, and how the ground inspection observations trigger follow-up inspections, monitoring and mitigation activities.

Deterministic QRA Model and Implementation Experience via an Integrity Management Software Tool

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Dawson ◽  
Iain Colquhoun ◽  
Inessa Yablonskikh ◽  
Russell Wenz ◽  
Tuan Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Geographical Information Systems ◽  
Risk Model ◽  
Software Tool ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Quantitative Risk Assessment ◽  
Geographical Information ◽  
Failure Rates ◽  
Assessment Practice ◽  
Integrity Management

Current risk assessment practice in pipeline integrity management tends to use semi-quantitative index-based or model-based methodologies. This approach has been found to be very flexible and provide useful results for identifying high-risk areas and for prioritizing physical integrity assessments. However, as pipeline operators progressively adopt an operating strategy of continual risk reduction with a view to minimizing total expenditures within safety, environmental, and reliability constraints, the need for quantitative assessments of risk levels is becoming evident. Whereas reliability-based quantitative risk assessments can be and are routinely carried out on a site-specific basis, they require significant amounts of quantitative data for the results to be meaningful. This need for detailed and reliable data tends to make these methods unwieldy for system-wide risk assessment applications. This paper describes methods for estimating risk quantitatively through the calibration of semi-quantitative estimates to failure rates for peer pipeline systems. By applying point value probabilities to the failure rates, deterministic quantitative risk assessment (QRA) provide greater rigor and objectivity than can usually be achieved through the implementation of semi-quantitative risk assessment results. The method permits a fully quantitative approach to suit the operator’s data availability and quality, and analysis needs. The paper also discusses experiences of implementing this type of risk model in Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) software and the use of and integration of data via existing pipeline geographical information systems (GIS).

Facility Integrity Management and Assessment of Associated Risk Conditions

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Change Management ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Continuous Improvement Process ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Training Of Personnel ◽  
And Training

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program. Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned and completed. Finally, the integrity management program should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.

Rapid Analysis Tool for High-Level Risk Assessment of Pipelines

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain R. Colquhoun ◽  
Evelyn Choong ◽  
Richard Kania ◽  
Ming Gao ◽  
Pat Wickenhauser
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Transmission Lines ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Rapid Analysis ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Analysis Tool ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

When the benefits of using risk-based decision making in pipeline integrity management programs have been identified, operators are immediately faced with the challenge of large amounts of risk analysis work. This work frequently has to be done with minimum resources and/or in logistic situations that require a graduated approach extending over several years. In answering this challenge, a starting point must be identified that focuses resources where the risks are greatest. Since these locations are generally unknown in the first instance, the need exists to have a tool available to perform a first or high-level assessment to identify areas requiring further or more detailed study to support the integrity management program. The need also exists to have a robust tool that can be used to direct the assessments of smaller lines that might not require the detailed attention generally given to larger diameter transmission lines. This paper describes the extension of a simple indexing methodology comprising both theoretical and historical components to produce such a tool. It describes the use of so-called “smart” defaults to account for missing data, and a rudimentary decision model that can be used to grade the risk results. Examples are given of applications of the methodology to a gathering system and to the high-level evaluation of a transmission system. The paper also compares the results obtained to other, more detailed methodologies.

Critical Review of Risk Criteria for Natural Gas Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Tomic ◽  
Shahani Kariyawasam
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Quantitative Risk Assessment ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Relative Population ◽  
Natural Gas Pipelines ◽  
Risk Assessment Models ◽  
Risk Criterion ◽  
Integrity Management

Risk Assessment is an integral part of an Integrity Management Program (IMP), and it is generally the first step in most IMPs. Risk is of the product of two variables, the likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure, where failure is defined as a loss of containment event. Hence, it is necessary to calculate both variables in order to accurately model risk. To assess risk, criterion need to be established and the actual risk needs to be compared to the criterion in order to determine the acceptability of risk. Currently, most industry risk assessment models are qualitative risk models, where consequence is generally characterized by class, relative population measures, or some other relative measure. While this may be adequate for some relative risk ranking purposes, it is generally not accurate in representing the true consequences and the arbitrary nature leads to overly conservative or overly un-conservative results. Conversely, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) models take into account the effect of the thermal radiation due to ignited pipeline rupture and evaluate the consequence on the surrounding human population. Such a consequence model is dependent on the pipeline properties (i.e. diameter and MOP) and the structure properties (i.e. precise locations and types of structures). The overall risk is then represented by two specific, well defined measures: Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk (SR). The goal of this paper is to perform a critical review of IR and SR acceptability criteria that are widely available and widely used, and outline the criteria (and the approach) adapted by TransCanada Pipelines. Worldwide, there are several different standards that define the criteria for evaluating IR and SR, particularly some countries with higher population densities around pipelines (e.g. UK and Netherlands). These IR and SR criteria have been compared in a hypothetical case study, to determine the most appropriate method in terms of the assumptions for calculating risks, the criteria, and how the actual risks compares to the criteria. The outcome of this study was the adoption of a defendable process for calculating SR, along with the associated criterion.

System-Wide Response to Incidents: Case Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zhang ◽  
S. Kariyawasam ◽  
R. Sutherby ◽  
J. Upadhyaya
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Thermal Expansion ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Energy Industry ◽  
Major Incident ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Major Incidents ◽  
Integrity Management

This paper presents a systematic and comprehensive procedure for the system-wide response to incidents (SWRI). This SWRI process has been used for identifying emerging threats and incorporating the learnings from major incidents into a pipeline integrity management program (IMP). This process also complements the IMP for threat identification and system wide risk assessment, thus giving consideration to all known threats and their interactions. A recent major incident due to thermal expansion on a TransCanada pipeline system was used to demonstrate the process of SWRI and the use of SWRI to identify the contributing factors of thermal expansion. An example was used to illustrate the engineering assessment for thermal expansion driven by the construction of two new compressor stations on an existing pipeline. The process documented in this case study has the potential to augment the integrity management programs and systemic corrective actions for pipeline systems in the energy industry.

Optimizing Preventative and Mitigative Measure Selection

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Lachey ◽  
Keith Vanderlee ◽  
Robert Jewell ◽  
Tony Alfano
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Subject Matter Experts ◽  
Data Alignment ◽  
Risk Management Program ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
A Company

As risk assessment methodologies, tools, and processes continue to evolve in the industry, utilizing risk outputs to not only identify high risk locations, but to also understand the driver(s) behind the elevated risks for those locations is paramount. The ideal scenario for reducing pipeline risk is utilizing a risk-driven mitigation plan as this ensures the optimal use of company dollars, but also inherently means that a company has a firm understanding of their data and pipeline system. When the company understands their data and the implications for its inaccuracies, whether it be improper data alignment or incorrect application of data, they can effectively employ a campaign for preventative and mitigative measures (P&MM). However, if suspect data is used during a risk assessment, P&MM cannot accurately target risk drivers and high risk locations, making it challenging for the company to maximize their resources. For well over a year, an on-going partnership between AGL Resources Inc. (AGL) and Det Norske Veritas (U.S.A.), Inc. (DNV GL) has ensued to tailor a GIS-based risk management software solution for AGL. Through this collaboration among Integrity Management, Risk Management, IT, GIS, and Operations & Maintenance subject matter experts (SMEs) on both sides, one central hub of cross-functional pipeline knowledge was created. As a result, countless opportunities were exploited to identify supplementary data sources to employ new data manipulation techniques and processes, providing AGL with the foundation for such a risk-based Preventative & Mitigative Measure program. With the foundation laid and the proper risk elements present, AGL can now execute optimized risk-informed responses to identified high risk locations, pipeline segments, or pipeline systems. These optimized responses require an understanding of the types of P&MM available to reduce the threats and consequences, the costs involved for each P&MM implemented, and the utilization of a tool to allow various ‘what-if’ risk analyses to be conducted. Adopting and integrating this process as part of AGL’s risk management program allows them to capitalize on the maintenance dollars they spend while also reducing the potential hazards to the surrounding people, places and environment.

Case for Continuous Reassessment of Risk in Managing Pipeline Integrity

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Len ◽  
James Mihell ◽  
Keith Adams ◽  
Cameron Rout
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Risk Assessments ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Assessment Plans ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Effective Use ◽  
Integrity Assessments

The practice of employing risk assessment as a tool for developing assessment plans has been universally accepted by gas and liquid pipeline operators. Risk management is a process that is inherent in the effective implementation of a pipeline integrity management program (IMP). In an IMP risk is used to accomplish the following activities: • Identifying potential threats and consequences to a pipeline; • Prioritizing integrity assessments; • Assessing the benefits derived from mitigating actions; • Determining the effectiveness of mitigation measures for identified threats; • Assigning preventative and mitigative measures to be implemented; • Assessing integrity re-assessment intervals; and • Determining effective use of resources. This paper endeavors to discuss the benefits of conducting ongoing risk assessments in support of overall pipeline integrity management.

Facility Integrity Management and Assessment of Associated Risk Conditions

2016 ◽  
Vol 138 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Change Management ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Continuous Improvement Process ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Training Of Personnel ◽  
And Training

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program (FIMP) and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals, and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described, and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program (IMP). Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned, and completed. Finally, the IMP should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.

The Role of Offshore Monitoring in an Effective Deepwater Riser Integrity Management Program

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brittany Goldsmith ◽  
Elizabeth Foyt ◽  
Madhu Hariharan
Keyword(s):  
Failure Modes ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Measured Data ◽  
Operating Conditions ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Positioning Systems ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Deepwater Riser

As offshore field developments move into deeper water, one of the greatest challenges is in designing riser systems capable of overcoming the added risks of more severe environments, complicated well requirements and uncertainty of operating conditions. The failure of a primary riser component could lead to unacceptable consequences, including environmental damage, lost production and possible injury or loss of human life. Identification of the risks facing riser systems and management of these risks are essential to ensure that riser systems operate without failure. Operators have recognized the importance of installing instrumentation such as global positioning systems (GPS), vessel motion measurement packages, wind and wave sensors and Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler (ADCP) units to monitor vessel motions and environmental conditions. Additionally, high precision monitoring equipment has been developed for capturing riser response. Measured data from these instruments allow an operator to determine when the limits of acceptable response, predicted by analysis or determined by physical limitations of the riser components, have been exceeded. Regular processing of measured data through automated routines ensures that integrity can be quickly assessed. This is particularly important following extreme events, such as a hurricane or loop current. High and medium alert levels are set for each parameter, based on design analysis and operating data. Measured data is compared with these alert levels, and when an alert level is reached, further response evaluation or inspection of the components in question is recommended. This paper will describe the role of offshore monitoring in an integrity management program and discuss the development of alert levels based on potential failure modes of the riser systems. The paper will further demonstrate how this process is key for an effective integrity management program for deepwater riser systems.

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