Facility Integrity Management and Assessment of Associated Risk Conditions

2016 ◽  
Vol 138 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Change Management ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Continuous Improvement Process ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Training Of Personnel ◽  
And Training

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program (FIMP) and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals, and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described, and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program (IMP). Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned, and completed. Finally, the IMP should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.

Facility Integrity Management and Assessment of Associated Risk Conditions

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Change Management ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Continuous Improvement Process ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Training Of Personnel ◽  
And Training

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program. Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned and completed. Finally, the integrity management program should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.

Meeting the Geohazards Management Guidelines of Annex N

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Zaleski ◽  
Tom Greaves ◽  
Jan Bracic
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Program Planning ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Hazard Identification ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Management Guidelines ◽  
Record Keeping ◽  
Reduction Program ◽  
Integrity Management

The Canadian Standards Association’s Publication Z662-07, Annex N provides guidelines for pipeline integrity management programs. Government agencies that regulate pipelines in Alberta, British Columbia and other Canadian jurisdictions are increasingly using Annex N as the standard to which pipeline operators are held. This paper describes the experience of Pembina Pipeline Corporation (Pembina) in implementing a geohazards management program to fulfill components of Annex N. Central to Pembina’s program is a ground-based inspection program that feeds a geohazards database designed to store geotechnical and hydrotechnical site information and provide relative rankings of geohazard sites across the pipeline network. This geohazard management program fulfills several aspects of the Annex, particularly: record keeping; hazard identification and assessment; risk assessment and reduction; program planning; inspections and monitoring; and mitigation. Pembina’s experience in growing their geohazard inventory from 65 known sites to over 1300 systematically inspected and catalogued sites in a span of approximately two years is discussed. Also presented are methods by which consultants and Pembina personnel contribute to the geohazard inspection program and geohazard inventory, and how the ground inspection observations trigger follow-up inspections, monitoring and mitigation activities.

Advanced Integrity Management Framework for Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Len LeBlanc ◽  
Walter Kresic ◽  
Sean Keane ◽  
John Munro
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

This paper describes the integrity management framework utilized within the Enbridge Liquids Pipelines Integrity Management Program. The role of the framework is to provide the high-level structure used by the company to prepare and demonstrate integrity safety decisions relative to mainline pipelines, and facility piping segments where applicable. The scope is directed to corrosion, cracking, and deformation threats and all variants within those broad categories. The basis for the framework centers on the use of a safety case to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated. A ‘safety case’, for the purposes of this methodology is defined as a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient to show that the system is safe.[1] The decision model brings together the aspects of data integration and determination of maintenance timing; execution of prevention, monitoring, and mitigation; confirmation that the execution has met reliability targets; application of additional steps if targets are not met; and then the collation of the results into an engineering assessment of the program effectiveness (safety case). Once the program is complete, continuous improvement is built into the next program through the incorporation of research and development solutions, lessons learned, and improvements to processes. On the basis of a wide range of experiences, investigations and research, it was concluded that there are combinations of monitoring and mitigation methods required in an integrity program to effectively manage integrity threats. A safety case approach ultimately provides the structure for measuring the effectiveness of integrity monitoring and mitigation efforts, and the methodology to assess whether a pipeline is sufficiently safe with targets for continuous improvement. Hence, the need for the safety case is to provide transparent, quantitative integrity program performance results which are continually improved upon through ongoing revalidations and improvement to the methods utilized. This enables risk reduction, better stakeholder awareness, focused innovation, opportunities for industry information sharing along with other benefits.

Watercourse Crossing Program: 10 Years Performance

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Ferris ◽  
Sarah Newton ◽  
Minh Ho
Keyword(s):  
Rocky Mountains ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Intermittent Streams ◽  
Southern Ontario ◽  
Continuous Improvement Process ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Canadian Provinces ◽  
Pipeline Failures ◽  
Bankfull Width ◽  
Northern Alberta

Abstract Plains Midstream Canada (PMC) completes a watercourse crossing program as part of its overall integrity management program. The approximately 9,900 kilometers of operating and discontinued pipelines are evaluated within the watercourse crossing program. The pipelines are located throughout the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario. The terrain traversed ranges from relatively steep near the Rocky Mountains to extremely flat in northern Alberta and Southern Ontario. Since 2008, PMC’s systematic watercourse crossing program has evolved and now consists of approximately 5,000 individual watercourse crossings. The bankfull width of the watercourses ranges from less than 1 m for intermittent streams to more than 700 m at major rivers. The watercourse crossing program is subjected to a continuous improvement process, with a focus on key learnings from pipeline failures, free spans and exposure. This paper describes the results from the program over the last 10 years and highlights program improvements. In addition, data from a failure and three free spans on the pipelines now owned by PMC, but where the exposure, free span or failure occurred prior to PMC purchasing the pipelines were added to expand the available data for the key learnings.

5S—A Tool for Culture Change in Shipyards

2002 ◽  
Vol 18 (03) ◽  
pp. 143-151
Author(s):  
Camilla DiBarra
Keyword(s):  
Change Management ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Culture Change ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Education Change ◽  
Common Purpose ◽  
Successful Education ◽  
Ship Repair ◽  
The U.S

5S is a successful education/change management program that has been used in many industries to institute a culture of orderliness in the workplace. 5S programs are common in the automotive, aerospace and many other industries. The U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry has recently embraced 5S objectives despite the fact that shipyards view their operations as unique from other industries. A possible reason for this decision is the culture change leverage that a 5S program can provide. The elements of 5S that make it a powerful change program that is effective in a wide variety of industries are: simplicity of concept, commonsense approach, creation of a common purpose, employee driven changes, principle-based ideas, focused events, a structure for sustaining and structured continuous improvement. The author provides examples of specific 5S applications in ship repair as well as a discussion of the elements that make 5S an effective culture change tool.

Rapid Analysis Tool for High-Level Risk Assessment of Pipelines

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain R. Colquhoun ◽  
Evelyn Choong ◽  
Richard Kania ◽  
Ming Gao ◽  
Pat Wickenhauser
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Transmission Lines ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Rapid Analysis ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Analysis Tool ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

When the benefits of using risk-based decision making in pipeline integrity management programs have been identified, operators are immediately faced with the challenge of large amounts of risk analysis work. This work frequently has to be done with minimum resources and/or in logistic situations that require a graduated approach extending over several years. In answering this challenge, a starting point must be identified that focuses resources where the risks are greatest. Since these locations are generally unknown in the first instance, the need exists to have a tool available to perform a first or high-level assessment to identify areas requiring further or more detailed study to support the integrity management program. The need also exists to have a robust tool that can be used to direct the assessments of smaller lines that might not require the detailed attention generally given to larger diameter transmission lines. This paper describes the extension of a simple indexing methodology comprising both theoretical and historical components to produce such a tool. It describes the use of so-called “smart” defaults to account for missing data, and a rudimentary decision model that can be used to grade the risk results. Examples are given of applications of the methodology to a gathering system and to the high-level evaluation of a transmission system. The paper also compares the results obtained to other, more detailed methodologies.

scholarly journals Laboratory animal facility management

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 268
Author(s):  
N. G. KOSTOMITSOPOULOS (Ν.Γ. ΚΩΣΤΟΜΗΤΣΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ)
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Animal ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Facility Management ◽  
Successful Management ◽  
Laboratory Animal Facility ◽  
Electromechanical Equipment ◽  
Animal Care ◽  
Training Of Personnel ◽  
And Training

The successful management of a laboratory animal facility is based on the design and implementation of a management program, which in most cases covers the minimum legislative requirements and goes further, in order to achieve more in the field of animal welfare. A complete management program should consist of the following main points: a) Monitoring of animal housing, the macro- and microenvironment of the animals, b) veterinary medical care, c) monitoring of electromechanical equipment and the overall construction of the animal facility, and designing of emergency and disaster plans, d) monitoring of the overall program by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee responsible to oversee and evaluate the management program of the facility, e) education and training of personnel and f) the implementation of an occupational health and safety program.

Critical Review of Risk Criteria for Natural Gas Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Tomic ◽  
Shahani Kariyawasam
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Quantitative Risk Assessment ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Relative Population ◽  
Natural Gas Pipelines ◽  
Risk Assessment Models ◽  
Risk Criterion ◽  
Integrity Management

Risk Assessment is an integral part of an Integrity Management Program (IMP), and it is generally the first step in most IMPs. Risk is of the product of two variables, the likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure, where failure is defined as a loss of containment event. Hence, it is necessary to calculate both variables in order to accurately model risk. To assess risk, criterion need to be established and the actual risk needs to be compared to the criterion in order to determine the acceptability of risk. Currently, most industry risk assessment models are qualitative risk models, where consequence is generally characterized by class, relative population measures, or some other relative measure. While this may be adequate for some relative risk ranking purposes, it is generally not accurate in representing the true consequences and the arbitrary nature leads to overly conservative or overly un-conservative results. Conversely, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) models take into account the effect of the thermal radiation due to ignited pipeline rupture and evaluate the consequence on the surrounding human population. Such a consequence model is dependent on the pipeline properties (i.e. diameter and MOP) and the structure properties (i.e. precise locations and types of structures). The overall risk is then represented by two specific, well defined measures: Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk (SR). The goal of this paper is to perform a critical review of IR and SR acceptability criteria that are widely available and widely used, and outline the criteria (and the approach) adapted by TransCanada Pipelines. Worldwide, there are several different standards that define the criteria for evaluating IR and SR, particularly some countries with higher population densities around pipelines (e.g. UK and Netherlands). These IR and SR criteria have been compared in a hypothetical case study, to determine the most appropriate method in terms of the assumptions for calculating risks, the criteria, and how the actual risks compares to the criteria. The outcome of this study was the adoption of a defendable process for calculating SR, along with the associated criterion.

System-Wide Response to Incidents: Case Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zhang ◽  
S. Kariyawasam ◽  
R. Sutherby ◽  
J. Upadhyaya
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Thermal Expansion ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Energy Industry ◽  
Major Incident ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Major Incidents ◽  
Integrity Management

This paper presents a systematic and comprehensive procedure for the system-wide response to incidents (SWRI). This SWRI process has been used for identifying emerging threats and incorporating the learnings from major incidents into a pipeline integrity management program (IMP). This process also complements the IMP for threat identification and system wide risk assessment, thus giving consideration to all known threats and their interactions. A recent major incident due to thermal expansion on a TransCanada pipeline system was used to demonstrate the process of SWRI and the use of SWRI to identify the contributing factors of thermal expansion. An example was used to illustrate the engineering assessment for thermal expansion driven by the construction of two new compressor stations on an existing pipeline. The process documented in this case study has the potential to augment the integrity management programs and systemic corrective actions for pipeline systems in the energy industry.

Quantitative System Specific Likelihood Algorithms for System Wide Risk Assessment

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahani Kariyawasam ◽  
Hong Wang ◽  
Boon Ong ◽  
Mohammad Al-Amin ◽  
Ning Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Companion Paper ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Failure Rates ◽  
Causal Factors ◽  
Risk Framework ◽  
Explicit Consideration ◽  
Threat Categories ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Excessive Risk

The System Wide Risk Assessment (SWRA) is an essential first step in the pipeline integrity management program. It is required by both Canadian and US regulators and is expected to estimate risk due to all threats, interaction of threats, and consequences. The main objective of the SWRA is to identify high risk segments so that segments with excessive risk can be mitigated. The SWRA models developed in this study employs quantified likelihood models and consequence models. A companion paper explains the consequence models. This paper presents the framework and rationale used to produce quantifiable measures of likelihood for each threat. The quantification enables sensible comparisons between threat likelihood values and also enables realistic combining of likelihood values to produce total likelihood of failure due to all threats. It also facilitates identification of key parameters that contribute to each threat. It is important to have a consistent risk framework that systematically applies to all the threats and accommodates all the different aspects and mitigative actions in each threat management process. For effective continuous improvement it is essential that the models are transparent and updatable. A consistent framework that is systematic, rigorous, transparent and updatable is utilized with explicit consideration to threat interactions. The main advantages of the likelihood models developed in this study are: • It is based on all evidence that is available for each threat (failure histories, observations from assessments, i.e., digs, HTs, and ILIs, and mechanistic understanding) • It considers all nine threat categories and relevant subcategories where causal factors are different (such as SCC and Circumferential SCC within the crack threat category) • It clearly considers all three types of threat interactions (Interacting coincident defects, Interacting-activating threats, and Interacting common-mode conditions) among all threat categories. • It is based on subsystem specific historical failure rates for each threat, where subsystem is defined as a subset of pipelines that have different performance characteristics with respect to at least one threat. This basis enables the failure frequencies predicted to be more in line with reality and consequently improves accuracy of predictions and appropriate quantification. • The subsystem specific historical failure rates are then calibrated to correlate to different mechanistic characteristics so that within-pipeline-subsystem variation due to changes in parameters is represented. • Finally assessments or observations are used to appropriately update threat likelihood with latest knowledge from measured local observations. All of the improvements mentioned above have helped the SWRA 2013 to produce more representative results. The comprehensive set of validation exercises verify that the results are realistic.

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