Case for Continuous Reassessment of Risk in Managing Pipeline Integrity

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Len ◽  
James Mihell ◽  
Keith Adams ◽  
Cameron Rout
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Risk Assessments ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Assessment Plans ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Effective Use ◽  
Integrity Assessments

The practice of employing risk assessment as a tool for developing assessment plans has been universally accepted by gas and liquid pipeline operators. Risk management is a process that is inherent in the effective implementation of a pipeline integrity management program (IMP). In an IMP risk is used to accomplish the following activities: • Identifying potential threats and consequences to a pipeline; • Prioritizing integrity assessments; • Assessing the benefits derived from mitigating actions; • Determining the effectiveness of mitigation measures for identified threats; • Assigning preventative and mitigative measures to be implemented; • Assessing integrity re-assessment intervals; and • Determining effective use of resources. This paper endeavors to discuss the benefits of conducting ongoing risk assessments in support of overall pipeline integrity management.

On the Use of Checklists in Auditing: A Commentary

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C25 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Efrim Boritz ◽  
Lev M. Timoshenko
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Risk Assessments ◽  
Cue Combination ◽  
Assessment Task ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Red Flag ◽  
Application Methods ◽  
Effective Use ◽  
Fraud Risk Assessments

SUMMARYExperimental studies concerning fraud (or “red flag”) checklists often are interpreted as providing evidence that checklists are dysfunctional because their use yields results inferior to unaided judgments (Hogan et al. 2008). However, some of the criticisms leveled against checklists are directed at generic checklists applied by individual auditors who combine the cues using their own judgment. Based on a review and synthesis of the literature on the use of checklists in auditing and other fields, we offer a framework for effective use of checklists that incorporates the nature of the audit task, checklist design, checklist application, and contextual factors. Our analysis of checklist research in auditing suggests that improvements to checklist design and to checklist application methods can make checklists more effective. In particular, with regard to fraud risk assessments, customizing checklists to fit both client circumstances and the characteristics of the fraud risk assessment task, along with auditor reliance on formal cue-combination models rather than on judgmental cue combinations, could make fraud checklists more effective than extant research implies.

Meeting the Geohazards Management Guidelines of Annex N

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Zaleski ◽  
Tom Greaves ◽  
Jan Bracic
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Program Planning ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Hazard Identification ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Management Guidelines ◽  
Record Keeping ◽  
Reduction Program ◽  
Integrity Management

The Canadian Standards Association’s Publication Z662-07, Annex N provides guidelines for pipeline integrity management programs. Government agencies that regulate pipelines in Alberta, British Columbia and other Canadian jurisdictions are increasingly using Annex N as the standard to which pipeline operators are held. This paper describes the experience of Pembina Pipeline Corporation (Pembina) in implementing a geohazards management program to fulfill components of Annex N. Central to Pembina’s program is a ground-based inspection program that feeds a geohazards database designed to store geotechnical and hydrotechnical site information and provide relative rankings of geohazard sites across the pipeline network. This geohazard management program fulfills several aspects of the Annex, particularly: record keeping; hazard identification and assessment; risk assessment and reduction; program planning; inspections and monitoring; and mitigation. Pembina’s experience in growing their geohazard inventory from 65 known sites to over 1300 systematically inspected and catalogued sites in a span of approximately two years is discussed. Also presented are methods by which consultants and Pembina personnel contribute to the geohazard inspection program and geohazard inventory, and how the ground inspection observations trigger follow-up inspections, monitoring and mitigation activities.

Proactive Approaches to Geohazard Management

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Ruik Beyhaut
Keyword(s):  
Technological Development ◽  
Seismic Intensity ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Slope Instability ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
Critical Element ◽  
Bending Strain ◽  
Actual Movement ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
External Forces

To control the threats from external forces, pipeline owners and operators require detailed information about their pipeline infrastructure and the environment surrounding that infrastructure. The contribution from geographic data is recognized as an increasingly important part of a complete integrity management program, particularly for the identification of geohazards. This is because geohazards are generally characterized by high spatial variability, are complex and difficult to quantify but may result in catastrophic failure of pipelines. In recent years we have seen widespread technological development surrounding the processes to capture information in order to deliver quantitative inputs for pipeline engineers, risk & geotechnical experts. International codes & best practices (e.g. AS 2885.1-2012) state that “Environmental impact assessment is not simply a vehicle to obtain regulatory approval, it is a critical element of the planning for design, construction and operation of the pipeline.” Furthermore, geohazards frequently develop during the service life of pipelines. Consequently, regulators recommend that assessments are conducted on an ongoing basis to identify all potential threats and implement mitigation measures. A process has been developed to create efficient and economical solutions for monitoring and assessing the significance of pipeline bending strain and whether actual movement has taken place. This process can make use of a variety of inputs including slope gradient, climate, groundwater conditions, slope instability, seismic intensity, and environmental impacts, and can provide important information in the determination of potential mitigations. This paper will review the benefits which can be gained from the implementation of integrated approaches to inform geohazard management.

Findings From 16 Years of Auditing Pipeline Integrity Management Systems

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver J. Hodgson ◽  
Dennis W. J. Keen ◽  
Malcolm Toft
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Good Control ◽  
Operating Conditions ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Holistic View ◽  
Integrity Management

A Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) is a comprehensive, systematic, and integrated set of arrangements implemented by an operator to assess, mitigate, and manage pipeline risk. Over the past 16 years, Penspen have performed over 30 PIMS audits of pipeline operators internationally. This paper presents the collated findings from these audits, and examines the common areas in which operators have fallen short of best practice. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations based on the findings, which can be adopted by operators to improve their PIMS arrangements and practices. Penspen’s standardized 17 -element PIMS Model takes a holistic view of pipeline integrity. The audits, which are based on the Model, assess the adequacy and effectiveness of operators’ management systems and arrangements in keeping risks to people, the environment, and to the business to acceptable levels, given the anticipated pipeline operating conditions and taking into account the pipeline’s history and current status. Starting at the ‘top level’ of a PIMS, the audits consider the adequacy of operators’ pipeline policies, objectives, and performance metrics, and how these are subject to monitoring, review, and audit. The audits look at the organization responsible for managing the integrity of pipelines, and examine how all those with a role to play in the wider PIMS work together to this end. The numerous activities that take place during a pipeline’s lifecycle are investigated, to assess how the risk assessment results are used to determine the control and mitigation measures to be implemented during the pipeline’s design, construction, handover, commissioning, operation, inspection and maintenance, and how the operator ensures the effectiveness of these measures. The audits also study those ‘supporting’ processes and systems which play an important part in pipeline integrity management, including procurement, emergency response and recovery, incident investigation, change control, document and data management, and legal and code compliance. The collated results from the 30+ audits reveal that while operators typically have good control systems in place for the project stages of the pipeline lifecycle, controls for the operational stages have been found to be less robust. In terms of management and organization, operators can fail to recognize how many different individuals and teams have a role to play in the management of pipeline integrity. Furthermore, while operators often have good corporate systems in place for change control, emergency response, and risk assessment, such systems may not take into account pipeline-specific risks or requirements. Operators can tend to focus on pipeline safety and/or environmental-related risks, when through holistic assessment it can be shown that risks associated with production interruptions will tend to drive actions in practice.

Corrosion Monitoring as an Integral Component of an Effective Corrosion Management Program

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen N. Bich ◽  
Eric Kubian
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
Corrosion Monitoring ◽  
Monitoring Device ◽  
Comprehensive Understanding ◽  
Monitoring Plan ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Corrosion Mechanisms

An effective pipeline integrity management program requires four components: a comprehensive understanding of corrosion mechanisms taking place in the pipeline, an effective corrosion mitigation plan responsive to the expected mechanisms, a monitoring plan to provide feedback to the corrosion mitigation plan and a selective inspection plan to validate the corrosion mechanisms and mitigation effectiveness and to confirm the pressure-containment capability of the pipeline. This paper describes several case studies where the use of a suitable corrosion monitoring device has led to an early warning of the lack of performance of the mitigation measures which, if left unchecked, could result in more severe corrosion and eventually, failure.

Facility Integrity Management and Assessment of Associated Risk Conditions

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Change Management ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Continuous Improvement Process ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Training Of Personnel ◽  
And Training

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program. Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned and completed. Finally, the integrity management program should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.

A Study of Crack Interaction Criteria

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Scott
Keyword(s):  
Process Improvement ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Management System ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Crack Interaction ◽  
Failure Pressure ◽  
Close Proximity ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Integrity Assessments

Cracks in close proximity may interact and lead to leaks or ruptures at pressures well below the predicted failure pressures of the individual cracks. Several industry organizations and standards, including CEPA, ASME, API, and British Standards provide guidance on the treatment of potentially interacting cracks. This guidance tends to be very conservative. This paper is a study of crack interaction, including a discussion of industry guidance, a critical review of failure pressure models, and a review of results of laboratory hydro-testing of pipe sections containing either in-service flaws or simulated flaws. In some cases the industry guidance and current failure pressure models provide inconsistent predictions, and this leads to uncertainty in the assessments used in routine crack management programs. The results of the hydro-testing are discussed in the context of both types of predictions. Understanding and predicting these interactions is important in maintaining an effective and efficient crack management program. The paper is aimed at engineers involved in integrity assessments and integrity management system process improvement.

Rapid Analysis Tool for High-Level Risk Assessment of Pipelines

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain R. Colquhoun ◽  
Evelyn Choong ◽  
Richard Kania ◽  
Ming Gao ◽  
Pat Wickenhauser
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Transmission Lines ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Rapid Analysis ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Analysis Tool ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

When the benefits of using risk-based decision making in pipeline integrity management programs have been identified, operators are immediately faced with the challenge of large amounts of risk analysis work. This work frequently has to be done with minimum resources and/or in logistic situations that require a graduated approach extending over several years. In answering this challenge, a starting point must be identified that focuses resources where the risks are greatest. Since these locations are generally unknown in the first instance, the need exists to have a tool available to perform a first or high-level assessment to identify areas requiring further or more detailed study to support the integrity management program. The need also exists to have a robust tool that can be used to direct the assessments of smaller lines that might not require the detailed attention generally given to larger diameter transmission lines. This paper describes the extension of a simple indexing methodology comprising both theoretical and historical components to produce such a tool. It describes the use of so-called “smart” defaults to account for missing data, and a rudimentary decision model that can be used to grade the risk results. Examples are given of applications of the methodology to a gathering system and to the high-level evaluation of a transmission system. The paper also compares the results obtained to other, more detailed methodologies.

Early Experience With Integrity Management Inspections for US Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Robert Brown
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Require Time ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments

In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. At the core of this new rule is a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the examination of management and analytical processes-aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard OPS compliance inspections. OPS realized a fundamentally different approach to oversight was needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the comprehensive changes to the OPS inspection program that were developed to perform integrity management inspections. OPS completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in early 2004, and is making progress in reviewing the programs of smaller liquid operators. During this initial year OPS gained substantial knowledge about the state of hazardous liquid pipeline operator integrity management programs. At a high level, OPS learned that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and are making the appropriate plans and progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas. However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes takes time. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time. OPS recognizes this situation and has developed an inspection and enforcement approach that not only assures compliance with the rule requirements, but also fosters continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the initial inspections, and OPS expectations for future integrity management program development. Finally, the intial year of integrity management inspections provided some valuable insights about how to perform these new type of inspections and improve external communication. This paper also addresses what OPS learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.

Critical Review of Risk Criteria for Natural Gas Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Tomic ◽  
Shahani Kariyawasam
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Quantitative Risk Assessment ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Relative Population ◽  
Natural Gas Pipelines ◽  
Risk Assessment Models ◽  
Risk Criterion ◽  
Integrity Management

Risk Assessment is an integral part of an Integrity Management Program (IMP), and it is generally the first step in most IMPs. Risk is of the product of two variables, the likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure, where failure is defined as a loss of containment event. Hence, it is necessary to calculate both variables in order to accurately model risk. To assess risk, criterion need to be established and the actual risk needs to be compared to the criterion in order to determine the acceptability of risk. Currently, most industry risk assessment models are qualitative risk models, where consequence is generally characterized by class, relative population measures, or some other relative measure. While this may be adequate for some relative risk ranking purposes, it is generally not accurate in representing the true consequences and the arbitrary nature leads to overly conservative or overly un-conservative results. Conversely, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) models take into account the effect of the thermal radiation due to ignited pipeline rupture and evaluate the consequence on the surrounding human population. Such a consequence model is dependent on the pipeline properties (i.e. diameter and MOP) and the structure properties (i.e. precise locations and types of structures). The overall risk is then represented by two specific, well defined measures: Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk (SR). The goal of this paper is to perform a critical review of IR and SR acceptability criteria that are widely available and widely used, and outline the criteria (and the approach) adapted by TransCanada Pipelines. Worldwide, there are several different standards that define the criteria for evaluating IR and SR, particularly some countries with higher population densities around pipelines (e.g. UK and Netherlands). These IR and SR criteria have been compared in a hypothetical case study, to determine the most appropriate method in terms of the assumptions for calculating risks, the criteria, and how the actual risks compares to the criteria. The outcome of this study was the adoption of a defendable process for calculating SR, along with the associated criterion.

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