Understanding Design Decisions Under Competition Using Games With Information Acquisition and a Behavioral Experiment

2017 ◽  
Vol 139 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jitesh H. Panchal ◽  
Zhenghui Sha ◽  
Karthik N. Kannan

The primary motivation in this paper is to understand decision-making in design under competition from both prescriptive and descriptive perspectives. Engineering design is often carried out under competition from other designers or firms, where each competitor invests effort with the hope of getting a contract, attracting customers, or winning a prize. One such scenario of design under competition is crowdsourcing where designers compete for monetary prizes. Within existing literature, such competitive scenarios have been studied using models from contest theory, which are based on assumptions of rationality and equilibrium. Although these models are general enough for different types of contests, they do not address the unique characteristics of design decision-making, e.g., strategies related to the design process, the sequential nature of design decisions, the evolution of strategies, and heterogeneity among designers. In this paper, we address these gaps by developing an analytical model for design under competition, and using it in conjunction with a behavioral experiment to gain insights about how individuals actually make decisions in such scenarios. The contributions of the paper are two-fold. First, a game-theoretic model is presented for sequential design decisions considering the decisions made by other players. Second, an approach for synergistic integration of analytical models with data from behavioral experiments is presented. The proposed approach provides insights such as shift in participants' strategies from exploration to exploitation as they acquire more information, and how they develop beliefs about the quality of their opponents' solutions.

Author(s):  
Murtuza N. Shergadwala ◽  
Jitesh H. Panchal

Abstract Designers make information acquisition decisions, such as where to search and when to stop the search. Such decisions are typically made sequentially, such that at every search step designers gain information by learning about the design space. However, when designers begin acquiring information, their decisions are primarily based on their prior knowledge. Prior knowledge influences the initial set of assumptions that designers use to learn about the design space. These assumptions are collectively termed as inductive biases. Identifying such biases can help us better understand how designers use their prior knowledge to solve problems in the light of uncertainty. Thus, in this study, we identify inductive biases in humans in sequential information acquisition tasks. To do so, we analyze experimental data from a set of behavioral experiments conducted in the past [1–5]. All of these experiments were designed to study various factors that influence sequential information acquisition behaviors. Across these studies, we identify similar decision making behaviors in the participants in their very first decision to “choose x”. We find that their choices of “x” are not uniformly distributed in the design space. Since such experiments are abstractions of real design scenarios, it implies that further contextualization of such experiments would only increase the influence of these biases. Thus, we highlight the need to study the influence of such biases to better understand designer behaviors. We conclude that in the context of Bayesian modeling of designers’ behaviors, utilizing the identified inductive biases would enable us to better model designer’s priors for design search contexts as compared to using non-informative priors.


2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-42
Author(s):  
Mallika Bose ◽  
Eliza Pennypacker ◽  
Thomas Yahner

A group of faculty at Penn State's Department of Landscape Architecture observed that the traditional master/apprentice model of studio instruction fosters greater student dependence on faculty for decision-making guidance than the faculty considers desirable. They contend that this traditional model promotes a studio dynamic that encourages students to look to the professor for design ideas and wait for faculty approval before making design decisions. The faculty considered this decision-making dependency to be in conflict with the need for students to develop the critical-thinking skills required to address the complex and ill-structured problems that are common in architecture and landscape architecture. In response to their concern this faculty team developed a studio teaching method they termed “independent design decision-making.” They speculated that by transferring the responsibility for design decisions from professor to the student, students could improve their critical thinking and gain confidence in design decision-making. The faculty conceived a set of strategies to implement in a 3rd year team-taught site planning and design studio that presents a range of complex design issues and scales. In collaboration with Penn State's Schreyer Institute for Teaching Excellence, the faculty researchers developed a 2-year comparative study to test this new teaching method in the same design studio with two consecutive student groups-evaluating the strategies implemented in the first year, refining methods, then applying and re-evaluating the results in the next year's class. These new strategies included ways students receive information to inspire their designs (“input strategies”) and ways to receive critique on their design ideas (“feedback strategies”). Two evaluation instruments were chosen to assess this method of studio teaching: 1) the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT), and 2) Student Assessment of Learning Gains (SALG). This paper presents this teaching/learning method and reports on the results of the comparative study.


Author(s):  
Dmitriy Vlasov

The article discloses the mechanisms for constructing and researching a theoretical and game model of interaction between manufacturers of SLR cameras taking into account demand forecasting. The need for the use of theoretical and game modeling of an advanced level, taking into account the predicted values of demand for mirror photographic equipment, as well as the dynamics of demand for a new photo product, is justified. In order to study the phenomenon of competitive interaction of manufacturers of SLR cameras, a comprehensive application of econometric analysis and theoretical game modeling was implemented. It is noted that this approach can be widely used in the practice of making decisions in the field of the photo industry. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the advanced game model of the choice by the manufacturer of camera equipment of the time of bringing new photo products to the market. In the process of analyzing the game model, maximax criteria, Laplace criterion, Wald criterion, Sevij criterion, Hurwitz criterion and Hodge Lehman criterion are used. Comprehensive analysis of the game model, supplemented by meaningful interpretations, contributes to improving the quality of decisions made in the photographic technology market, including when choosing marketing strategies for the promotion of photographers in the context of mainstreaming the risks of various nature and the limitations of the pandemic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Samuel ◽  
Jeremy Schwartz

Abstract A long standing question is whether product market competition disciplines a firm’s incentive to engage in earnings management. This paper argues that this question cannot be investigated adequately without accounting for the quality of firms’ auditors, because auditors affect the probability of discovering earnings management. Since firms choose their auditor, a non-compliant firm can alter its own probability of being detected. Consequently, a firm’s decision to manage earnings is a function of its auditor’s quality, which is itself endogenously chosen by the firm. To study this issue we develop a game-theoretic model that captures the potential inter-relationship between industry competition, the firms’ choice of audit quality, and compliance with accounting regulations (or the degree of earnings manipulation). We show that the link between financial compliance and product market competition is affected by the endogenously chosen audit quality. We estimate this model’s structural parameters and find that greater competition reduces both compliance and the demand for high quality audits.


Author(s):  
Mostafa Sabbaghi ◽  
Sara Behdad

Design for ease-of-repair is an efficient solution to effectively use resources by extending the lifespan of products. However, designing a repairable product may not be necessarily an economically viable solution for manufacturers. Repairable products enable independent repair businesses to compete with original manufacturers on offering repair services. On the other hand, although designing a less repairable product may dissuade competition, it increases the cost of repair for manufacturers at the same time, in addition to decreasing consumers’ satisfaction. In this paper, a game-theoretic model is developed to represent the competition between a manufacturer acting as a leader, and a coalition of independent repair service providers acting as a follower. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived, representing the optimal prices for repair services offered by the two service-providers based on the level of repairability. In addition, based on the information extracted from a repair-related survey, we provide insights about consumers’ attitudes towards repairability of products to help manufacturers make better design decisions.


Author(s):  
Yiran Zhang ◽  
Peng Hang ◽  
Chao Huang ◽  
Chen Lv

Interacting with surrounding road users is a key feature of vehicles and is critical for intelligence testing of autonomous vehicles. The Existing interaction modalities in autonomous vehicle simulation and testing are not sufficiently smart and can hardly reflect human-like behaviors in real world driving scenarios. To further improve the technology, in this work we present a novel hierarchical game-theoretical framework to represent naturalistic multi-modal interactions among road users in simulation and testing, which is then validated by the Turing test. Given that human drivers have no access to the complete information of the surrounding road users, the Bayesian game theory is utilized to model the decision-making process. Then, a probing behavior is generated by the proposed game theoretic model, and is further applied to control the vehicle via Markov chain. To validate the feasibility and effectiveness, the proposed method is tested through a series of experiments and compared with existing approaches. In addition, Turing tests are conducted to quantify the human-likeness of the proposed algorithm. The experiment results show that the proposed Bayesian game theoretic framework can effectively generate representative scenes of human-like decision-making during autonomous vehicle interactions, demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness. Corresponding author(s) Email:   [email protected]  


Author(s):  
C. C. Hayes ◽  
F. Akhavi

When designing products, designers compare complex alternatives and select one or more for further development. The quality of these selection decisions directly impacts the quality, cost and safety of the final product. Decision theoretic approaches for making systematic comparisons might help in this process, yet designers do not tend to use them. The goals of this work are to begin understanding why, and to identify future questions that may lead to solutions. This paper summarizes the results of two studies, 1) an ethnographic study of working designers in which their actual practices and needs were observed during decision making, and 2) a laboratory study in which designers were asked to use mathematical models to compare and select design alternatives. Based on these studies, we conclude that the mathematical models, as formulated, are not well suited to designers’ needs. We propose a research agenda that may lead to new approaches combining decision theoretic and user-centered methods to create tools that the average designer will be willing to use.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-46
Author(s):  
Змеев ◽  
A. Zmeev ◽  
Рогозин ◽  
E. Rogozin ◽  
Алферов ◽  
...  

The analysis of the contradictions of regulatory documents in the field of protection of information from unauthorized access (unauthorized access) and quality of software systems (PS). We propose a method to study the requirements of quality characteristics of software security systems (PSZI) from unauthorized access, based on the use of the ultimate game-theoretic model of cooperation between the two sides: PSZI, exercise protection of information in an automated system (AS), and the offender


Author(s):  
Дмитрий Власов ◽  
Dmitriy Vlasov

In recent years application of game-theoretic modeling for decisionmaking in various fields of economic activity became very popular. However not enough researches are conducted for the purpose of determination of adequacy and efficiency of such use, questions of orientation of various game models on the solution of specific objectives of the theory of decision-making are not fully described. The relevance of a subject of article is caused by increase of interests in game theory and game modeling as to the tool of the solution of various problems of decision-making in the conditions of risk and uncertainty. The allocated contexts of application of game theory in practice of decisionmaking formed the basis of the electronic educational resource «Game theory» which became an integral part of vocational training of bachelors in Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. The presented results can be used for improvement of quality of the made decisions.


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