METHODICAL APPROACH TO THE SUBSTANTIATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO CHARACTERISTICS OF QUALITY PROGRAM SYSTEMS PROTECTION OF THE INFORMATION

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-46
Author(s):  
Змеев ◽  
A. Zmeev ◽  
Рогозин ◽  
E. Rogozin ◽  
Алферов ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Automated System ◽  
Software Systems ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Security Systems ◽  
Unauthorized Access ◽  
Quality Program ◽  
Methodical Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Access And Quality

The analysis of the contradictions of regulatory documents in the field of protection of information from unauthorized access (unauthorized access) and quality of software systems (PS). We propose a method to study the requirements of quality characteristics of software security systems (PSZI) from unauthorized access, based on the use of the ultimate game-theoretic model of cooperation between the two sides: PSZI, exercise protection of information in an automated system (AS), and the offender

Construction and Study of a Game-Theoretic Model of Interaction Between Manufacturers of SLR Cameras, Taking into Account Forecasting Demand

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Vlasov
Keyword(s):  
Demand Forecasting ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Advanced Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Technology Market ◽  
Predicted Values ◽  
Made In

The article discloses the mechanisms for constructing and researching a theoretical and game model of interaction between manufacturers of SLR cameras taking into account demand forecasting. The need for the use of theoretical and game modeling of an advanced level, taking into account the predicted values of demand for mirror photographic equipment, as well as the dynamics of demand for a new photo product, is justified. In order to study the phenomenon of competitive interaction of manufacturers of SLR cameras, a comprehensive application of econometric analysis and theoretical game modeling was implemented. It is noted that this approach can be widely used in the practice of making decisions in the field of the photo industry. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the advanced game model of the choice by the manufacturer of camera equipment of the time of bringing new photo products to the market. In the process of analyzing the game model, maximax criteria, Laplace criterion, Wald criterion, Sevij criterion, Hurwitz criterion and Hodge Lehman criterion are used. Comprehensive analysis of the game model, supplemented by meaningful interpretations, contributes to improving the quality of decisions made in the photographic technology market, including when choosing marketing strategies for the promotion of photographers in the context of mainstreaming the risks of various nature and the limitations of the pandemic.

Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Samuel ◽  
Jeremy Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Structural Parameters ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Industry Competition ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract A long standing question is whether product market competition disciplines a firm’s incentive to engage in earnings management. This paper argues that this question cannot be investigated adequately without accounting for the quality of firms’ auditors, because auditors affect the probability of discovering earnings management. Since firms choose their auditor, a non-compliant firm can alter its own probability of being detected. Consequently, a firm’s decision to manage earnings is a function of its auditor’s quality, which is itself endogenously chosen by the firm. To study this issue we develop a game-theoretic model that captures the potential inter-relationship between industry competition, the firms’ choice of audit quality, and compliance with accounting regulations (or the degree of earnings manipulation). We show that the link between financial compliance and product market competition is affected by the endogenously chosen audit quality. We estimate this model’s structural parameters and find that greater competition reduces both compliance and the demand for high quality audits.

Understanding Design Decisions Under Competition Using Games With Information Acquisition and a Behavioral Experiment

2017 ◽  
Vol 139 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jitesh H. Panchal ◽  
Zhenghui Sha ◽  
Karthik N. Kannan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Analytical Models ◽  
Behavioral Experiment ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Design Decision ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Design Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic

The primary motivation in this paper is to understand decision-making in design under competition from both prescriptive and descriptive perspectives. Engineering design is often carried out under competition from other designers or firms, where each competitor invests effort with the hope of getting a contract, attracting customers, or winning a prize. One such scenario of design under competition is crowdsourcing where designers compete for monetary prizes. Within existing literature, such competitive scenarios have been studied using models from contest theory, which are based on assumptions of rationality and equilibrium. Although these models are general enough for different types of contests, they do not address the unique characteristics of design decision-making, e.g., strategies related to the design process, the sequential nature of design decisions, the evolution of strategies, and heterogeneity among designers. In this paper, we address these gaps by developing an analytical model for design under competition, and using it in conjunction with a behavioral experiment to gain insights about how individuals actually make decisions in such scenarios. The contributions of the paper are two-fold. First, a game-theoretic model is presented for sequential design decisions considering the decisions made by other players. Second, an approach for synergistic integration of analytical models with data from behavioral experiments is presented. The proposed approach provides insights such as shift in participants' strategies from exploration to exploitation as they acquire more information, and how they develop beliefs about the quality of their opponents' solutions.

scholarly journals Methods of Estimating Reliability of Information Security Systems which Protect from Unauthorized Access in Automated Systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 1301-1332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oksana Bokova ◽  
Irina Drovnikova ◽  
Andrei Etepnev ◽  
Evgeniy Rogozin ◽  
Victor Khvostov
Keyword(s):  
Information Security ◽  
Structural Complexity ◽  
Systems Design ◽  
Software Systems ◽  
Automated Systems ◽  
Security Systems ◽  
Unauthorized Access ◽  
Reliability Indicators ◽  
Actual Design ◽  
Guidance Documents

Modern methods of protecting information  from unauthorized access in automated systems are based on the use of specialized information security systems from unauthorized access. Security systems are necessarily included in the form of additional software systems in the software as in a secure execution. Information security systems from unauthorized access can be developed not only in a process of automated systems design, but also complement the system-wide software of functioning systems. The use of the information security systems from unauthorized access can reduce a overall reliability of the automated systems, if they contain errors that are not detected during debugging. The reliability of the information security systems affects effectiveness of information security (confidentiality, integrity and availability). Guidelines of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC) of Russia are a methodological basis for the formation of the information security systems’ image both in the process of development and in the process of modernization of the automated systems. The guidance documents of FSTEC of Russia do not contain methodological approaches to assessing the reliability of these program systems. In this regard, the actual design of techniques of estimating reliability of the information security systems from unauthorized access in automated systems in a secure execution. The structural complexity of the information security systems from unauthorized access and large number of functions performed necessitates the use of three reliability indicators that characterize the system in solving problems of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. To develop the technique, the known methods of evaluating the reliability of complex systems are used, which do not allow their decomposition into serial and parallel connection. The developed methods were tested in assessing the reliability of the information security systems from unauthorized access with typical indicators of initial characteristics. The results of calculations and prospects of using the developed methods are presented in the paper.

ADAPTIVE INTEGRATED SECURITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM AS AN ELEMENT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE SITUATION CENTER

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-84
Author(s):  
MIKHAIL M. PUTYATO ◽  
◽  
ALEXANDER S. MAKARYAN ◽  
ALEXANDER N. CHERKASOV ◽  
IVAN G. GORIN ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Security System ◽  
Software Systems ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Security Systems ◽  
Integration Platform ◽  
Automatic Adaptation ◽  
Situation Center ◽  
And Control ◽  
Modern Technologies

The article deals with the analysis and modeling of an adaptive system for integrated security provision as an element of the infrastructure of the situation center. The constantly changing conditions of the information environment and the global information space dictate the possibility of automated or automatic "adaptation" of security systems to the requirements of modern software systems. The main tasks for organizing the integration of an integrated security system into the situation center system and determining the rules for interaction with functional blocks is the analysis and implementation of various formalized procedures for ensuring integrated security. An adaptive integrated security system is considered as an object that implements the ability to manage and quickly build a security model for a situation center, depending on the problem being solved, or preventing or eliminating an incident. The proposed approach is dictated not only by an increase in the functionality of modern technologies, but also by the requirements for the creation of adaptive integrated solutions that are scalable within the architecture to protect against various types of threats. The use of an integrated security system within the framework of the proposed approach will make it possible to promptly respond to incidents of both external and internal nature, which will allow timely neutralization of the consequences of their influence. An adaptive integrated security system as a common platform will provide timely monitoring, context and control capabilities in various situations. The development of such an integration platform will improve automation and improve the quality of information provided by information security products.

A Game Theoretic Solution for the Optimal Selection of Services

2014 ◽  
pp. 1481-1497
Author(s):  
Salah Merad ◽  
Rogério de Lemos ◽  
Tom Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Software Systems ◽  
Cost Constraints ◽  
Integration Of Services ◽  
Service Oriented ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
System Requirements ◽  
Run Time ◽  
Theoretic Solution ◽  
The Cost

This chapter considers the problem of optimally selecting services during run-time with respect to their non-functional attributes and costs. Commercial pressures for reducing the cost of managing complex software systems are changing the way in which systems are designed and built. The reason behind this shift is the need for dealing with changes efficiently and effectively, which may include removing the human operator from the process of decision-making. In service-oriented computing, in particular, the run-time selection and integration of services may soon become a reality since services are readily available. Assuming that each component service has a specific functional and non-functional profile, the challenge now is to define a decision maker that is able to select services that satisfy the system requirements and optimise the quality of services under cost constraints. The approach presented in this chapter describes a game theoretic solution by formulating the problem as a bargaining game.

scholarly journals Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Sıdıka Tunç
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Output Uncertainty ◽  
Support Tools ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Award Scheme ◽  
Over Time

Problem definition: We study the contest duration and the award scheme of an innovation contest where an organizer elicits solutions to an innovation-related problem from a group of agents. Academic/practical relevance: Our interviews with practitioners at crowdsourcing platforms have revealed that the duration of a contest is an important operational decision. Yet, the theoretical literature has long overlooked this decision. Also, the literature fails to adequately explain why giving multiple unequal awards is so common in crowdsourcing platforms. We aim to fill these gaps between the theory and practice. We generate insights that seem consistent with both practice and empirical evidence. Methodology: We use a game-theoretic model where the organizer decides on the contest duration and the award scheme while each agent decides on her participation and determines her effort over the contest duration by considering potential changes in her productivity over time. The quality of an agent’s solution improves with her effort, but it is also subject to an output uncertainty. Results: We show that the optimal contest duration increases as the relative impact of the agent uncertainty on her output increases, and it decreases if the agent productivity increases over time. We characterize an optimal award scheme and show that giving multiple (almost always) unequal awards is optimal when the organizer’s urgency in obtaining solutions is below a certain threshold. We also show that this threshold is larger when the agent productivity increases over time. Finally, consistent with empirical findings, we show that there is a positive correlation between the optimal contest duration and the optimal total award. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that the optimal contest duration increases with the novelty or sophistication of solutions that the organizer seeks, and it decreases when the organizer can offer support tools that can increase the agent productivity over time. These insights and their drivers seem consistent with practice. Our findings also suggest that giving multiple unequal awards is advisable for an organizer who has low urgency in obtaining solutions. Finally, giving multiple awards goes hand in hand with offering support tools that increase the agent productivity over time. These results help explain why many contests on crowdsourcing platforms give multiple unequal awards.

Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiming He ◽  
Biliang Luo ◽  
Baoling Zou
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
Contractual Arrangement ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Contractual Choice ◽  
Positive Effect

Abstract This paper introduces a game framework for farmland rent contract choice which incorporates the characteristic uncertainty about the quality of agricultural factors and heterogeneous agricultural attributes matching with rural land leasing contract and the dynamic contracting behavioral equilibrium. The game theoretic model shows that the farmland rent sharecropping is a Pareto optimum contract, that the different farmland use contractual arrangement will match with specific agricultural factors combination between farmland and labor, that sequential rational tenants will make the game transfer from Nash Equilibrium to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Our field survey data of China between 2014 and 2015 is consistent with our theoretic hypothesis. The empirical results indicate that the tenant's age has significant negative effect on share contract, that social security, soil fertility and the number of plots have significant positive effect.

A Game Theoretic Solution for the Optimal Selection of Services

2012 ◽  
pp. 172-188
Author(s):  
Salah Merad ◽  
Rogério de Lemos ◽  
Tom Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Software Systems ◽  
Cost Constraints ◽  
Integration Of Services ◽  
Service Oriented ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
System Requirements ◽  
Run Time ◽  
Theoretic Solution ◽  
The Cost

This chapter considers the problem of optimally selecting services during run-time with respect to their non-functional attributes and costs. Commercial pressures for reducing the cost of managing complex software systems are changing the way in which systems are designed and built. The reason behind this shift is the need for dealing with changes efficiently and effectively, which may include removing the human operator from the process of decision-making. In service-oriented computing, in particular, the run-time selection and integration of services may soon become a reality since services are readily available. Assuming that each component service has a specific functional and non-functional profile, the challenge now is to define a decision maker that is able to select services that satisfy the system requirements and optimise the quality of services under cost constraints. The approach presented in this chapter describes a game theoretic solution by formulating the problem as a bargaining game.

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