Watercourse Crossing Program: 10 Years Performance

Author(s):  
Gerald Ferris ◽  
Sarah Newton ◽  
Minh Ho

Abstract Plains Midstream Canada (PMC) completes a watercourse crossing program as part of its overall integrity management program. The approximately 9,900 kilometers of operating and discontinued pipelines are evaluated within the watercourse crossing program. The pipelines are located throughout the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario. The terrain traversed ranges from relatively steep near the Rocky Mountains to extremely flat in northern Alberta and Southern Ontario. Since 2008, PMC’s systematic watercourse crossing program has evolved and now consists of approximately 5,000 individual watercourse crossings. The bankfull width of the watercourses ranges from less than 1 m for intermittent streams to more than 700 m at major rivers. The watercourse crossing program is subjected to a continuous improvement process, with a focus on key learnings from pipeline failures, free spans and exposure. This paper describes the results from the program over the last 10 years and highlights program improvements. In addition, data from a failure and three free spans on the pipelines now owned by PMC, but where the exposure, free span or failure occurred prior to PMC purchasing the pipelines were added to expand the available data for the key learnings.

Author(s):  
Alex J. Baumgard ◽  
Tara L. Coultish ◽  
Gerry W. Ferris

Over the last 15 years, BGC Engineering Inc. has developed and implemented a geohazards Integrity Management Program (IMP) with 12 major pipeline operators (consisting of gas and oil pipelines and of both gathering and transmission systems). Over this time, the program has been applied to the assessment of approximately 13,500 individual hydrotechnical and geotechnical geohazard sites spanning approximately 63,000 km of operating pipelines in Canada and the USA. Hydrotechnical (watercourse) and geotechnical (slope) hazards are the primary types of geohazards that have directly contributed to pipeline failures in Canada. As with all IMPs, the core objectives of a geohazard management system are to ensure a proactive approach that is repeatable and defensible. In order to meet these objectives, the program allows for varying levels of intensity of inspection and a recommended timescale for completion of actions to manage the identified geohazards in accordance with the degree of hazard that the site poses to the pipeline. In this way, the sites are managed in a proactive manner while remaining flexible to accommodate the most current conditions at each site. This paper will provide a background to the key components of the program related specifically to existing operating pipeline systems, present pertinent statistics on the occurrence of various types of geohazards based on the large dataset of inspections, and discuss some of the lessons learned in the form of program results and program challenges from implementing a geohazard integrity management system for a dozen operators with different ages of systems, complexity of pipeline networks, and in varied geographic settings.


Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program. Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned and completed. Finally, the integrity management program should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.


Author(s):  
Eduardo Bomfim Boszczowski ◽  
Carlos Renato Aragonez de Vasconcellos ◽  
Kleber Vini´cius da Cruz ◽  
Ozias Pereira Filho ◽  
Sarah Marcela C. Cartagena

The present paper describes the tasks developed along 550 kilometers of PETROBRAS TRANSPORTE South Region right-of-way where there are more than 1000 kilometers of onshore pipelines. This work was based on the company Integrity Management Program, with focus on risk reduction due to third party damage, promoting social accountability and environment preservation. On the Introduction there are presented pipeline failures stats in USA and Europe. It’s visible in the stats that third party damage is one of the most common pipeline failures responsibleness. In the next topics we list the mitigation methods based on the Integrity Management Program that involves risk analysis; inspection plans based on risk; plan check and program audits. On the Detailed Plan we present standards and normal requirement for pipeline integrity; the Company GIS — Geographic Information System — where you find the pipeline data with its position and depth from ground level; the action plan to correct anomalies found during inspections; and the awareness programs performed through the Communication System to answer the solicitations registered at TRANSPETRO Call Center. We also present the social and environment Responsibility Program that includes the Identification of the communities around our right-of-way, the social and environment classification and the projects development to guaranty the installation integrity that contribute to the communities quality life raise. The Communication Plan for the stakeholders is based on API 1162 – Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators. This plan is accomplished by a team of different professionals such as communication and social service professionals and others. They visit Public Officials (City Hall, Civil Defense, Fire Department, Road Police and Public Services Providers), Excavators, land owners and communities with the objective to guide and publicize safe and co-responsible manners to pipeline installations. It’s remarkable the creation of especial projects in the communities along the right-of-way, such as Communitarian vegetable fields, mobile movie theaters and educational effort in high schools. We also present the results from the Integrity Program to prevent third party damage, the improvement promoted and the recommendations to make it better. At the end we present the costs involved in all actions to prevent third party damage by Brazil South Region Pipeline Operator.


2016 ◽  
Vol 138 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers

This paper reviews the basic elements of a facility integrity management program (FIMP) and describes the process used to assess risk conditions related to a facility. The policies, goals, and objectives of the program should be defined before implementing it. The location and details of the facility and all its equipment must be described, and the information should be recorded in a computerized database. Important triggers for change management and the minimum features of change management are reviewed. Ensuring the competency and training of personnel responsible for integrity management is essential. The integrity management team must identify hazards associated and ways of controlling them. Once hazards are identified, risk assessment is performed and options for reducing risk are considered. Results of the risk assessment are then used to plan and execute activities of the integrity management program (IMP). Needed repairs or replacements are identified, planned, and completed. Finally, the IMP should incorporate a continuous improvement process and information from investigations of incidents at the facility, at other company locations, and within the industry.


Author(s):  
Brittany Goldsmith ◽  
Elizabeth Foyt ◽  
Madhu Hariharan

As offshore field developments move into deeper water, one of the greatest challenges is in designing riser systems capable of overcoming the added risks of more severe environments, complicated well requirements and uncertainty of operating conditions. The failure of a primary riser component could lead to unacceptable consequences, including environmental damage, lost production and possible injury or loss of human life. Identification of the risks facing riser systems and management of these risks are essential to ensure that riser systems operate without failure. Operators have recognized the importance of installing instrumentation such as global positioning systems (GPS), vessel motion measurement packages, wind and wave sensors and Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler (ADCP) units to monitor vessel motions and environmental conditions. Additionally, high precision monitoring equipment has been developed for capturing riser response. Measured data from these instruments allow an operator to determine when the limits of acceptable response, predicted by analysis or determined by physical limitations of the riser components, have been exceeded. Regular processing of measured data through automated routines ensures that integrity can be quickly assessed. This is particularly important following extreme events, such as a hurricane or loop current. High and medium alert levels are set for each parameter, based on design analysis and operating data. Measured data is compared with these alert levels, and when an alert level is reached, further response evaluation or inspection of the components in question is recommended. This paper will describe the role of offshore monitoring in an integrity management program and discuss the development of alert levels based on potential failure modes of the riser systems. The paper will further demonstrate how this process is key for an effective integrity management program for deepwater riser systems.


Author(s):  
Yong-Yi Wang ◽  
Don West ◽  
Douglas Dewar ◽  
Alex McKenzie-Johnson ◽  
Millan Sen

Ground movements, such as landslides and subsidence/settlement, can pose serious threats to pipeline integrity. The consequence of these incidents can be severe. In the absence of systematic integrity management, preventing and predicting incidents related to ground movements can be difficult. A ground movement management program can reduce the potential of those incidents. Some basic concepts and terms relevant to the management of ground movement hazards are introduced first. A ground movement management program may involve a long segment of a pipeline that may have a threat of failure in unknown locations. Identifying such locations and understanding the potential magnitude of the ground movement is often the starting point of a management program. In other cases, management activities may start after an event is known to have occurred. A sample response process is shown to illustrate key considerations and decision points after the evidence of an event is discovered. Such a process can involve fitness-for-service (FFS) assessment when appropriate information is available. The framework and key elements of FFS assessment are explained, including safety factors on strain capacity. The use of FFS assessment is illustrated through the assessment of tensile failure mode. Assessment models are introduced, including key factors affecting the outcome of an assessment. The unique features of girth welds in vintage pipelines are highlighted because the management of such pipelines is a high priority in North America and perhaps in other parts of the worlds. Common practice and appropriate considerations in a pipeline replacement program in areas of potential ground movement are highlighted. It is advisable to replace pipes with pipes of similar strength and stiffness so the strains can be distributed as broadly as possible. The chemical composition of pipe steels and the mechanical properties of the pipes should be such that the possibility of HAZ softening and weld strength undermatching is minimized. In addition, the benefits and cost of using the workmanship flaw acceptance criteria of API 1104 or equivalent standards in making repair and cutout decisions of vintage pipelines should be evaluated against the possible use of FFS assessment procedures. FFS assessment provides a quantifiable performance target which is not available through the workmanship criteria. However, necessary inputs to perform FFS assessment may not be readily available. Ongoing work intended to address some of the gaps is briefly described.


2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (02) ◽  
pp. 106-110
Author(s):  
Ge Wang ◽  
Michael Lee ◽  
Chris Serratella ◽  
Stanley Botten ◽  
Sam Ternowchek ◽  
...  

Real-time monitoring and detection of structural degradation helps in capturing the structural conditions of ships. The latest nondestructive testing (NDT) and sensor technologies will potentially be integrated into future generations of the structural integrity management program. This paper reports on a joint development project between Alaska Tanker Company, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), and MISTRAS. The pilot project examined the viability of acoustic emission technology as a screening tool for surveys and inspection planning. Specifically, testing took place on a 32-year-old double-hull Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) trade tanker. The test demonstrated the possibility of adapting this technology in the identification of critical spots on a tanker in order to target inspections. This targeting will focus surveys and inspections on suspected areas, thus increasing efficiency of detecting structural degradation. The test has the potential to introduce new inspection procedures as the project undertakes the first commercial testing of the latest acoustic emission technology during a tanker's voyage.


Author(s):  
Sathya Geetha Ganesan ◽  
Diego Martínez García ◽  
Juneseok Lee ◽  
Jonathan Keck ◽  
Paul Yang

Author(s):  
Mario Caruso ◽  
Gerry Ferris ◽  
Hans Olav Heggen ◽  
Burke Delanty

Abstract Free span assessment in watercourse crossings for the on-shore pipeline industry has become a more and more important part of pipeline integrity practice. One reason is that it has become increasingly well known that the dominant cause of pipeline failures in watercourse crossings is fatigue failure due to vortex induced vibrations at pipeline free spans. Recognition of this is now being identified in industry recommended practices and owners are incorporating this type of assessment into their pipeline integrity management practice. On shore pipelines are not designed with an allowable free span as is the practice with off-shore pipelines, but are buried. Design codes specify minimum depths of cover when constructed and indicate that pipelines should be maintained so that no excessive loads occur. In the past the no excessive loads requirement has been interpreted that the pipeline must remained buried. As experience from the off-shore environment and increasingly from experience on-shore has shown that most exposed and/or free spans do not fail. Due to various river erosion mechanisms; scour, bank erosion or avulsion, previously buried pipelines do develop free spans. Some of the free spans fail and release products directly into the watercourse. Failures, particularly for liquid products, are very expensive due to the economic loss, repair costs and environment clean-up of the watercourse and its banks. Similarly, costs associated with pipeline replacement for free spanning pipelines or repair of pipelines that might develop free spans are relatively high. It is important to develop an understanding of the probability of the pipeline failing due to a free span, or put another way, determine which free span is a threat to integrity. This paper discusses some of the challenges with assessing free spans in watercourse crossings as part of integrity programs and highlights experiences in assessing this threat to integrity. The objective of this paper is to discuss some of the key uncertainties related to the management of the threat due to free spans. These uncertainties are due to the reliability of information about the free span, water velocity and condition of the pipelines.


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