Notice of Retraction: Government subsidy structures and private R&D: Cost sharing or performance reward? China evidence

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lian Yujun ◽  
Zhou Kaiguo
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Government Subsidy

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 2045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Song ◽  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Corporate Social

In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.

scholarly journals External Intervention or Internal Coordination? Incentives to Promote Sustainable Development through Green Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Tong ◽  
Yina Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Internal Funds ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

To encourage firms to engage in green production, two different types of investment funding, namely external funds from agencies outside the supply chain (e.g., government subsidy), and internal funds from supply chain partners (e.g., greening cost-sharing with the retailer), are investigated in this paper. Based on game theory, the decision-making behavior and profits of a competitive supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer, a regular manufacturer, and a retailer are analyzed under both funding schemes. The results show that while both government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract can achieve the goals of increasing a product’s degree of greenness and increasing the sales of green products, there are differences between these two methods in reaching these goals. Further, both via theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that although both the green manufacturer and the retailer can greatly benefit from government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract, they may have different preferences regarding these two methods, which are mainly related to the size of the government subsidy, the fraction of greening cost-sharing with the retailer, the Research and Development (R&D) cost coefficient, the greenness sensitivity coefficient, and price sensitivity coefficient. Finally, the supply chain members’ behaviors (including the production and pricing decisions and, the choice of funds investment) are largely affected by the government subsidy mechanism.

scholarly journals Effect of government subsidies on supply chain decision-making and coordination in the context of COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wuyong Qian ◽  
Sen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Welfare Level ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the background of the COVID-19 epidemic, the retailer determines the anti-epidemic effort level and bears the corresponding costs, and the manufacturer determines the cost-sharing rate under the coordination strategy. This paper analyses the pricing decision, anti-epidemic effort level and cost-sharing rate of supply chain under different government subsidy measures and coordination strategies. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the applicability of the conclusion and the model. From the perspective of Stackelberg game, we find that under the background of the epidemic, government subsidy measures, coordination strategies and increasing marginal income of anti-epidemic efforts are conducive to higher anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level. And the government can obtain the maximum anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level by subsidising manufacturers with cost sharing.

scholarly journals Cost-sharing strategy for recycling and service investment in a closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 2963-2990
Author(s):  
Renbang Shan ◽  
Li Luo ◽  
Ran Kou
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the cost-sharing strategies of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party recycler in a Stackelberg game considering government subsidy and retailer’s service effort. Next, we construct profit functions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party recycler considering government subsidy and service effort for four scenarios: no cost-sharing (N), service investment cost-sharing (I), recycling investment cost-sharing (II), and both service and recycling investment cost-sharing (III). Furthermore, we obtain the optimal results and discuss the impact of cost-sharing ratio, service cost coefficient, government subsidy and service sensitivity coefficient on profits and social net benefits. The results show that the service investment cost-sharing strategy cannot achieve profit coordination, and under certain conditions, the recycling investment cost-sharing strategy and the service and recycling investment cost-sharing strategy can achieve profit coordination. In addition, changes in different factors such as government subsidy, service cost coefficients, and service sensitivity coefficients will affect the effectiveness of cost-sharing strategies.

A coordination mechanism through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility and government subsidy in a two-echelon supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Liu ◽  
Wenwen Ren ◽  
Qian Xu ◽  
Zhiyang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Corporate Social

Purpose This paper aims to deal with the coordination problem of the supply chain through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy. Design/methodology/approach With respect to the coordination problem of the supply chain with CSR, this paper constructs a three-stage game model consisting of a dominant retailer, n suppliers and government. From the perspective of cost sharing and government subsidies, this paper discussed the decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. On this basis, this paper designed a coordination mechanism considering both cost sharing and government subsidies and explore the impact of cost sharing rate and government subsidy rate on CSR efforts, members’ profits and social welfare. Findings CSR can improve the profits of supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. Then the profits of supply chain nodal enterprises will be affected by the fulfillment level of CSR of their partners. Furthermore, excessive CSR will erode the supply chain profits and cause resource waste. High CSR costs often make retailers low CSR effort level, while a high CSR cost sharing rate can reduce the profits of suppliers and the supply chain. In addition, excessive government subsidies will lead to the decline of social welfare. Excessive government subsidies will cause the dependence of enterprises and affect their operating efficiency. Practical implications The proposed coordination mechanism can effectively do with the coordination problem of the supply chain. Originality/value The proposed coordination mechanism considering cost sharing and government subsidies simultaneously can effectively deal with conflict problems and guarantee the supply chain members and the supply chain to maximize their profits and social welfare.

The effect of cost sharing on the quality of dental care

1984 ◽  
Vol 48 (11) ◽  
pp. 597-605 ◽  
Author(s):  
HL Bailit ◽  
RH Brook ◽  
CJ Kamberg ◽  
GA Goldberg ◽  
V Spolsky ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dental Care ◽  
Cost Sharing

Cost sharing and the demand for ambulatory mental health services.

1984 ◽  
Vol 39 (10) ◽  
pp. 1195-1197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall P. Ellis ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Health Services ◽  
Health Services ◽  
Cost Sharing
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