Participatory constitution-making: Introduction

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-178
Author(s):  
Sujit Choudhry ◽  
Mark Tushnet

Abstract At least since the late eighteenth century, constitutions have been understood as emanations of the will of “the People,” as the ultimate expression of an inherent popular sovereignty. In the form of theories of constituent power, accounts of constitutional foundations blended notional or conceptual “descriptions” of the People, which anchored the political legitimacy of constitutional orders in the idea of hypothetical consent, with empirical claims that the nation’s actual people were represented in constitution-making processes through elected delegates and thereby were the authors of and gave consent to its fundamental law. As part of the third wave of democratization, there was an important shift in what popular participation consisted of—from indirect participation by elected representatives to direct, popular participation in the constitution-making process. As a matter of constitutional process, this led to the growing practice, and expectation, that major constitutional changes should be ratified through referenda.

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZORAN OKLOPCIC

AbstractAgainst recent contributions to the debate about the constituent power of the people, the article proposes to reorient the debate by analytically distinguishing three dominant arenas of political struggle – democratic, social and national – in which the vocabulary of ‘the people’ and its constituent power is invoked. The invocation of the ‘will of the people’ and its constituent power in these arenas is associated with different assumptions, risks and implicit ideational trade-offs that must be laid bare. A contextual approach to constituent power counsels caution in dignifying pro-democratic constitutional transformations with the name of ‘the people’. It invites those who theorize constituent power with social struggles in mind to rebalance their attention to constituent power – and devote more attention to imaginaries and strategies that minimize moral hazards implicit in the vocabulary of peoplehood and to maximize the likelihood of the new order’s survival. Finally, a contextual approach rejects the role for constituent power in national struggles, arguing that constitutional theory is incapable of arbitrating between competing assertions of popular sovereignty. In the final part of the paper, I defend the contextual approach against the theoretical interventions currently on offer, and gesture towards its potential in crafting aprovincializedconstitutional theory.


1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 927-939 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Williams

From the standpoint of the national legislature, the constitution of Japan which became effective on May 3, 1947, contains the following significant reforms: (1) popular sovereignty replaces the sovereignty of the emperor; (2) the Diet is the chief branch of government; (3) an elected House of Councillors supersedes the House of Peers; (4) the cabinet is responsible to the Diet; (5) the “invisible government” of crown agencies is abolished.The preamble to the new constitution begins: “We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet…, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people.” As for the once sacred and inviolable emperor, he does “not have powers related to government,” but functions merely as “the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power,” performing, “with the advice and approval of the cabinet,” only such acts as promulgating laws, convoking the Diet and dissolving the House of Representatives, proclaiming general elections, attesting the appointment of officials, and awarding honors.


2021 ◽  
pp. 155-177
Author(s):  
Sarah Mortimer

From the 1560s, tensions between Protestant and Catholics escalated and this was accompanied by a wave of writing on political and religious ideas, especially in France and the Netherlands. There was a renewed interest in the nature and origins of authority within the political sphere, particularly the importance of the ‘people’ and the ways in which their will could be both represented and controlled. This chapter considers some of the key texts of resistance theory written in the 1560s and 1570s, including Francogallia and the Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos in France, and George Buchanan’s De Jure Regni apud Scotos in Scotland. Discussions of liberty and privileges in the Netherlands during the Dutch Revolt are also considered; here historically based arguments began to be supplemented by appeals to wider principles of morality and natural law. The election of Henry of Valois to the Polish throne provides one example of elective monarchy in practice. This chapter discusses the role of religion and of legal arguments in the development of resistance theories. It also highlights some of the practical and conceptual difficulties in appealing to popular sovereignty, especially in a period of deep confessional divisions, and shows how the authority of magistrates could be understood in different ways.


2020 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Ari Hirvonen ◽  
Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo

In this chapter Hirvonen and Lindroos-Hovinheimo argue that the revolutionary power of constituent power and popular sovereignty are relevant conditions of radical emancipatory and egalitarian politics. How the people become the people – and what makes the people in its becoming – are relevant questions in modern democracy. The article considers the power of the people as a theoretical idea and political possibility. It brings together the older tradition of political philosophy with contemporary theory by discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas together with those of Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Alain Badiou.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834
Author(s):  
Michael Gorup

Lynch mobs regularly called on the language of popular sovereignty in their efforts to authorize lynchings, arguing that, as representatives of the people, they retained the right to wield public violence against persons they deemed beyond the protections of due process. Despite political theorists’ renewed interest in popular sovereignty, scholars have not accounted for this sordid history in their genealogies of modern democracy and popular constituent power. I remedy this omission, arguing that spectacle lynchings—ones that occurred in front of large crowds, sometimes numbering in the thousands—operated as public rituals of racialized people-making. In the wake of Reconstruction, when the boundaries of the polity were deeply contested, spectacle lynchings played a constitutive role in affirming and circulating the notion that the sovereign people were white, and that African Americans were their social subordinates.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colon-Rios

© The Author 2016. Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation between those who exercise a delegated authority (eg legislators) and those who possess an original constitution-making power (the people). In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau's name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau's particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Thomas Joseph Bailey Buchanan

<p>In this paper, I will argue that the round table model is the ideal constitution making process. This is primarily because it gives clarity to the respective powers of the institutions involved in the process, and may prevent a dominant group or individual from unilaterally imposing a constitution. In building my argument, I outline the theory of constituent power and its corollaries of unlimited constitution making power and popular participation. I endeavour to portray the shortcomings of the theory itself, and, the dangers of its practical manifestation. Following this, I introduce the round table model as a preferable alternative, both theoretically and practically. To buttress my argument, I examine the Bolivian, Venezuelan, Russian and South African constitution making episodes.</p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Arthur Ghins

According to a dominant narrative, the concept of popular sovereignty was joined to the notion of public opinion during the French Revolution to form the blueprint of a liberal constitutional state. This article shows how, after the Revolution, Benjamin Constant, who is now recognized as a founding figure of “liberalism,” used public opinion as a substitute for popular sovereignty to theorize political legitimacy and constitution making. I show why and when Constant discussed popular sovereignty, namely to dismiss it as an unhelpful and dangerous fiction in answer to factions invoking the concept to revolutionize the political order, or rulers such as Napoleon using it to claim absolute power. In parallel, I explain how Constant designed his alternative, opinion-based theory of legitimacy in the 1790s, before pragmatically adapting it over the course of his career as political regimes changed in France. Constant's substitution of public opinion for popular sovereignty, I contend, reveals distinct views on what makes a political regime legitimate and the meaning of constitutional changes. I conclude with a discussion of how Constant's views, thus interpreted, throw light on debates about sovereignty and public opinion in modern political thought.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 473-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Arato

This short article will seek to explore the causes, and possible solutions, of what seems to be the current freezing of the Turkish constitution-making process that has had some dramatic successes in the 1990s and early 2000s. I make the strong claim that democratic legitimacy or constituent authority should not be reduced either to any mode of power, even popular power, or to mere legality. It is these types of reduction that I find especially troubling in recent Turkish constitutional struggles, where the legal claims of two powers — the government-controlled legislative and the judicial branches — to structure the constitution are not backed by sufficient political legitimacy. In effect these two powers that claim their constituent authorization, rather implausibly in my view, from either the democratic electorate or from an original constituent power, because of their conflict threaten to freeze the constitution-making process that very much needs to be continued and concluded. I end the article by making a suggestion for one possible constitution-making procedure that would be both legitimate and legal.


1915 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Hasbach

Mr. W. J. Shepard, in a review of my work, Die moderne Demokratie, remarks that I have forgotten its spirit in the study of its forms. “It is not the vitalizing spirit,” he writes, “the impelling motive force, the broadly based popular sentiment of democracy that is of interest, but only the forms and mechanism ‥‥ of democratic-republican states.” Now I have in the fifth chapter of the second book presented the theory of political democracy, in the sixth that of social democracy, and in the seventh that of democratic socialism; and in the first of these three chapters I have discussed popular sovereignty and active citizenship, the supremacy of the majority in a democracy, the unlimited constituent power of the people (pouvoir constituant), in which European science has conceived the essence of this form of the state to reside in contradistinction to other forms. But Mr. Shepard has a different conception of its nature. He has raised an interesting question in this connection which I should like to discuss in the following pages.Brief though his statement on this point is, no one can doubt that he considers the supremacy of public opinion as the essence of democracy, since he writes: “No discussion of the nature, elements and effects of public opinion, no appreciation of the spirit of democracy is to be found in the covers of this volume.” As a matter of fact I have treated of this subject in the above-mentioned first division of the fifth chapter, which is devoted to the discussion of popular sovereignty, though certainly in the brief compass which appeared to me sufficient for the understanding of the nature of democracy.


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