scholarly journals Coordinating a fresh-product supply chain with demand information updating: Hema Fresh O2O platform

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawu Peng ◽  
Honglin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Theoretical Results

Motivated by Hema Fresh's new-retail case, we study the coordination of a two-echelon fresh-product supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer. Due to a long production lead time, the supplier has to make production decision in advance based on early demand information. The market demand can be updated during the supplier's production lead time. Hence, the retailer would make order decision according to the latest demand information. Incorporating risk-sharing mechanism of overproduction and overstock, we propose a novel bi-directional risk-sharing contract to coordinate such a supply chain with demand information updating. We construct a two-stage optimization model in which the supplier first decides production quantity, and then the retailer decides final order quantity not exceeding the supplier’s initial production. In both the centralized and decentralized systems, we analytically derive the unique equilibrium of production and order decisions in a Stackelberg supplier-led game. We prove that the proposed contract can realize supply chain perfect coordination and explore how the proposed contract affects the members'decisions. The theoretical results show that, by turning the risk-sharing proportions, the supply chain profit can be arbitrarily split between the members, which is a desired property for supply chain coordination. Compared with the single risk-sharing contract, the proposed contract results in a greater supply chain profit and achieves Pareto improvement for both members. Furthermore, we also explore how the risk preference and negotiating power affect the contract selection and the additional profit allocation of the supply chain. Numerical examples are presented to verify our theoretical results.

scholarly journals Dynamic Pricing and Supply Coordination with Reimbursement Contract under Random Yield and Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guo Li ◽  
Lun Ran ◽  
Xiaohang Yue ◽  
Zhaohua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Order Quantities ◽  
Centralized System

This paper investigates the dynamic pricing and supply chain coordination in a decentralized system that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, in which both the market demand and production yield are stochastic. We show that the centralized expected profit is jointly concave in the production quantity and order quantity when the price is ex-ante selected. We also derive the equilibrium strategies in the decentralized system and prove that the entire profit of supply chain is inevitably lower than that under centralized system. Based on this, we propose a reimbursement contract to coordinate the decentralized supply chain so as to achieve the maximized profit. It is worth mentioning that, under reimbursement contract, the equilibrium production and order quantities are irrelevant to the manufacturer's risk sharing coefficient but are only determined by the supplier’s risk sharing coefficient.

scholarly journals Assessing the coordinated revenue-sharing contract of China’s farmer-supermarket direct-purchase model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Peng Liang ◽  
Melat Sima ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Xiaoyu Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Promotional Efforts

China began connecting farmers directly with supermarkets 10 years ago, when they were at a disadvantage and forced to sell products at low prices, as unstable cooperation among supply chain participants led to inequitable distribution of revenue. Revenue-sharing contracts offer a risk-sharing approach to ensure supply chain coordination and optimize profit for all. Research on short life cycle products with revenue-sharing contracts assume stable prices or investigate the effects of revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain coordination. This study introduced a revenue-sharing contract model into a ‘farmer-supermarket direct-purchase’ supply chain, considering price fluctuation and retail promotional efforts, stochastic market demand, among other factors. Revenue-sharing contracts achieved long-term stability in supply chain coordination, all participants obtained more profits, and the size of revenue-sharing parameter depends on the position and bargaining power of all participants. A case study on Tianhong supermarket and Nanxia farmer cooperative verified these findings, eliciting practical implications for professionals and policymakers.

scholarly journals Chemical supply chain coordination based on technology level and lead-time considerations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atieh Fander ◽  
Saeed Yaghoubi ◽  
Javad Asl-Najafi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Deterioration Rate ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Finite Time Horizon ◽  
Technology Level

The production and transportation of chemicals is a risky process with high-cost operations for members of the supply chain, where some of the materials deteriorate over time and deal with value-reduction challenges. This paper studies a two-stage hazardous chemicals supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer in a finite time horizon with a constant deterioration rate for both sides. To prevent potential hazards and improve product quality, the manufacturer invests in risk reduction and quality improvement technologies that can also attract more market demand. Owing to the importance of time in the storage and production of chemical products, this study focuses on a novel lead-time based discount contract to coordinate the channel members. The contract seeks to maximize the total profit of the chain by determining the optimal lead-time and manufacturer's technology level. By doing so, the supplier provides high-quality products and the manufacturer's unit supplying cost reduces and can buy more chemicals from the supplier. On the other hand, the supplier will have more time to supply the product and its initial cost will be reduced. As a result, the profit of both sides increases simultaneously. Some numerical examples are applied to examine the applicability of the proposed models. Finally, several sensitivity analyses on the main parameters are conducted to extract some in-depth managerial implications.

scholarly journals Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyi Ji ◽  
Xiangxiang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Uncertainty ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
Better Than

Perishable and short-life products can be seen everywhere in life. Due to the particularity of these products, they are more complicated in supply chain management. This paper studies whether the two-part tariff and ZRS contract can achieve the purpose of reducing risks and coordinating supply chain. We assume that market demand and supplier yield are uncertain, and we use game theory and probability distribution for research. The research results show that when the information is asymmetric, the manufacturer always ignore the demand forecast information provided by the retailer under the wholesale price contract. When the demand is uncertain, regardless of whether the information is symmetric or asymmetric, the two-part tariff contract and the ZRS contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve maximum profit. When the retailer's degree of risk aversion is high, the ZRS contract is better than the two-part tariff, which can reduce the risk of retailers and achieve the purpose of coordinating the supply chain. When the supply is uncertain, the manufacturer can provide the supplier with a risk-sharing contract, including the return price and the sharing ratio that meet certain constraints. Such a contract can effectively reduce the supplier's risk and realize supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Research on Supply Chain Coordination and Profit Allocation Based on Altruistic Principal under Bilateral Asymmetric Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuiliang Gu ◽  
Hongmei Guo ◽  
Yingsheng Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Trading Volume ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Manufacturing Cost ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Risk Rate

To ensure supply chain coordination and equitable profit allocation when there is bilateral asymmetric information, a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with private manufacturing cost information and one retailer with private selling cost information is considered. A bilateral adverse selection model is established with a virtual altruistic principal as the coordination subject, for which the supply chain coordination conditions and an allocation rule for the supply chain surplus are then given. It was found that contract coordination depended on the costs and risk rates of both parties and market demand; that is, the lower the costs and the risk rate, the easier the supply chain coordination. Second, the trading volume distortion degree was positively correlated with production cost, sales cost, and price sensitivity and negatively correlated with the market environment parameter. Third, the allocation proportion for the supply chain surplus was determined. Finally, under a specific cost distribution assumption, a numerical example was given to simulate the contract execution and analyze the relationships between costs and profit.

Supply Chain Coordination for E-Commerce: Risk Penalty vs. Flat Rate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ju Myung Song ◽  
Yao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Shipping Industry ◽  
Flat Rate

Problem definition: We study the coordination of an E-commerce supply chain between online sellers and third party shippers to meet random demand surges, induced by, for instance, online shopping holidays. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by the challenge of meeting the unpredictable demand surges in E-commerce, we study shipping contracts and supply chain coordination between online sellers and third party shippers in a novel model taking into account the unique features of the shipping industry. Methodology: We compare two shipping contracts: the risk penalty (proposed by UPS) and the flat rate (used by FedEx), and analyze their impact on the seller, the shipper, and the supply chain. Results: Under information symmetry, the sophisticated risk penalty contract is no better than the simple flat rate contract for the shipper, against common belief. Although both the risk penalty and the flat rate can coordinate the supply chain, the risk penalty does so only if the shipper makes zero profit, but the flat rate can provide a positive profit for both. These results represent a new form of double marginalization and risk-sharing, in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on the classic supplier-retailer supply chain, where risk-sharing contracts (similar to the risk penalty) can bring benefits to all parties, but the single wholesale price contract (similar to the flat rate) can achieve supply chain coordination only when the supplier makes zero profit. We also find that only the online seller, but not the shipper, has the motivation to vertically integrate the seller-shipper supply chain. Under information asymmetry, however, the risk penalty brings more benefit to the shipper than the flat rate, but hurts the seller and the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results imply that information plays an important role in the shipper’s choices of shipping contracts. Under information symmetry, the risk penalty is unnecessarily complex because the simple flat rate is as good as the risk penalty for the shipper; moreover, it is better for the seller-shipper coordination. However, under information asymmetry, the shipper faces additional shipping risk that can be offset by the extra flexibility of the risk penalty. Our study also explains and supports the recent practice of online sellers (e.g., Amazon.com and JD.com), but not shippers, to vertically integrate the supply chain by consistently expanding their shipping capabilities.

scholarly journals Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xinhui Wang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Zihan Zhou ◽  
Yiling Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Market Outlook

This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

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