scholarly journals Research on Supply Chain Coordination and Profit Allocation Based on Altruistic Principal under Bilateral Asymmetric Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuiliang Gu ◽  
Hongmei Guo ◽  
Yingsheng Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Trading Volume ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Manufacturing Cost ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Risk Rate

To ensure supply chain coordination and equitable profit allocation when there is bilateral asymmetric information, a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with private manufacturing cost information and one retailer with private selling cost information is considered. A bilateral adverse selection model is established with a virtual altruistic principal as the coordination subject, for which the supply chain coordination conditions and an allocation rule for the supply chain surplus are then given. It was found that contract coordination depended on the costs and risk rates of both parties and market demand; that is, the lower the costs and the risk rate, the easier the supply chain coordination. Second, the trading volume distortion degree was positively correlated with production cost, sales cost, and price sensitivity and negatively correlated with the market environment parameter. Third, the allocation proportion for the supply chain surplus was determined. Finally, under a specific cost distribution assumption, a numerical example was given to simulate the contract execution and analyze the relationships between costs and profit.

scholarly journals Coordinating a fresh-product supply chain with demand information updating: Hema Fresh O2O platform

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawu Peng ◽  
Honglin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Theoretical Results

Motivated by Hema Fresh's new-retail case, we study the coordination of a two-echelon fresh-product supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer. Due to a long production lead time, the supplier has to make production decision in advance based on early demand information. The market demand can be updated during the supplier's production lead time. Hence, the retailer would make order decision according to the latest demand information. Incorporating risk-sharing mechanism of overproduction and overstock, we propose a novel bi-directional risk-sharing contract to coordinate such a supply chain with demand information updating. We construct a two-stage optimization model in which the supplier first decides production quantity, and then the retailer decides final order quantity not exceeding the supplier’s initial production. In both the centralized and decentralized systems, we analytically derive the unique equilibrium of production and order decisions in a Stackelberg supplier-led game. We prove that the proposed contract can realize supply chain perfect coordination and explore how the proposed contract affects the members'decisions. The theoretical results show that, by turning the risk-sharing proportions, the supply chain profit can be arbitrarily split between the members, which is a desired property for supply chain coordination. Compared with the single risk-sharing contract, the proposed contract results in a greater supply chain profit and achieves Pareto improvement for both members. Furthermore, we also explore how the risk preference and negotiating power affect the contract selection and the additional profit allocation of the supply chain. Numerical examples are presented to verify our theoretical results.

scholarly journals Information Asymmetry in Supply Chain Coordination: State of the Art

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-43
Author(s):  
Mohammadali Vosooghidizaji ◽  
◽  
Atour Taghipour ◽  
Béatrice Canel-Depitre
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Coordination State ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Comprehensive Literature Review

Supply chains consist of several actors from supplier, manufacturer, distributer, wholesaler and retailers connected to each other by financial, material and informational flows. Optimal performance of supply chains requires set of actions that coordinate the members’ decisions [1], [2]. In many cases, members are trying to optimize their own objectives which can lead to asymmetric information by keeping some strategic information private. Although, this information asymmetry is a challenge affecting the coordination of supply chain, but it is achievable if proper set of coordinating mechanism executed. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review of supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and tries to analyze the trend in the context and address the evolution and gaps in existing literature.

scholarly journals Emergency Coordination Model of Fresh Agricultural Products’ Three-Level Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Yang ◽  
Haorui Liu ◽  
Xuedou Yu ◽  
Fenghua Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Emergency Events

In consideration of influence of loss, freshness, and secret retailer cost of products, how to handle emergency events during three-level supply chain is researched when market need is presumed to be a nonlinear function with retail price in fresh agricultural product market. Centralized and decentralized supply chain coordination models are studied based on asymmetric information. Optimal strategy of supply chain in dealing with retail price perturbation is caused by emergency events. The research reveals robustness for optimal production planning, wholesale price for distributors, wholesale price for retailers, and retail price of three-level supply chain about fresh agricultural products. The above four factors can keep constant within a certain perturbation of expectation costs for retailers because of emergency events; the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. This paper also can be used for reference to the other related studies in how to coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric and punctual researches information response to disruptions.

scholarly journals The Incentive Model in Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Default Risk

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hong Cheng ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Jinjiang Yan ◽  
Xianyu Wang ◽  
Mingyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral

Trade credit is widely used for its advantages. However, trade credit also brings default risk to the manufacturer due to the uncertain demand. And moral hazard may aggravate the default risk. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of moral hazard in trade credit and explore incentive contract under uncertain demand and asymmetric information. We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral retailer ordering a single product from a risk-neutral manufacturer. Market demand is stochastic and is influenced by retailer’s sales effort which is his private information. Incentive theory is used to develop the principal-agent model and get the incentive contract from the manufacturer’s perspective. Results show that the retailer will reduce his effort level to get more profit and the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced, in the case of asymmetric information. Facing this result, the manufacturer will reduce the order quantity in incentive contract to lessen his losses. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate all these theoretical results and to draw managerial insights.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Trade Credit and Quantity Discount with Sales Effort Effects

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihong Wang ◽  
Shaofeng Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Analytical Model ◽  
Hybrid Model ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Model Combining ◽  
Effort Effect

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of trade credit and quantity discount in supply chain coordination when the sales effort effect on market demand is considered. In this paper, we consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single retailer ordering a single product from a single manufacturer. Market demand is stochastic and is influenced by retailer sales effort. We formulate an analytical model based on a single trade credit and find that the single trade credit cannot achieve the perfect coordination of the supply chain. Then, we develop a hybrid quantitative analytical model for supply chain coordination by coherently integrating incentives of trade credit and quantity discount with sales effort effects. The results demonstrate that, providing that the discount rate satisfies certain conditions, the proposed hybrid model combining trade credit and quantity discount will be able to effectively coordinate the supply chain by motivating retailers to exert their sales effort and increase product order quantity. Furthermore, the hybrid quantitative analytical model can provide great flexibility in coordinating the supply chain to achieve an optimal situation through the adjustment of relevant parameters to resolve conflict of interests from different supply chain members. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the hybrid model.

scholarly journals Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (9) ◽  
pp. 1842-1865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Xiao-hua Wu ◽  
Bing Ye ◽  
Yong-wang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Purpose The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road. Design/methodology/approach A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Findings The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain. Practical implications Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis. Originality/value This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

scholarly journals Three-Level Supply Chain Coordination under Disruptions Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract with Price Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yuer Chen ◽  
Yulu Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Normal Environment ◽  
Contract Form ◽  
Additive Form ◽  
Dependent Demand

Considering the market demand is stochastic and dependent on price, this paper shows that the revenue-sharing contract could coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer under normal environment. However, the original revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain under disruptions in circumstances of certain incidents leading to significant changes in market demand and causing additional deviation costs. To solve the problem, this essay introduces two improved forms of revenue-sharing contract: a mixed contract form based on a quantity discount policy and a pure form, which are characterized by antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form or in the multiplicative form with price dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.

scholarly journals Supply chain coordination strategy for NEVs based on supplier alliance under dual-credit policy

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. e0257505
Author(s):  
Miaomiao Ma ◽  
Weidong Meng ◽  
Yuyu Li ◽  
Bo Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Credit ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Credit Policy ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Technology Improvement ◽  
D Investment

In this paper, we assume that the supply chain for new energy vehicles (NEVs) consists of a manufacturer and N parts suppliers, considering that the R&D investment of both manufacturer and suppliers will affect the market demand of NEVs and NEVs credit, we construct decentralized and centralized decision-making models under the dual-credit policy to study the R&D investment strategy of supply chain enterprises. Furthermore, considering that suppliers can form alliances, we establish bargaining game models under the conditions of the non-alliance and alliance of suppliers, and discuss the coordination strategy for the NEVs supply chain. It is found that, under the dual-credit policy, the higher the credit coefficient of technology improvement, the higher the transaction price of credits, and the higher the R&D investment of supply chain. Dual-credit policy can effectively encourage NEVs supply chain to increase R&D investment, improve NEV technology level, and improve the profit of supply chain. Under the dual-credit policy, the increment profit distribution strategy based on a bargaining game model can coordinate the NEVs supply chain. When suppliers separately negotiate with the manufacturer, bringing the negotiation sequence forward, the supplier can get more profits. However, as the manufacturer has the right to determine the negotiation sequence, the supplier can only get the profit of the last round of negotiation, and the manufacturer can get excess profit. Forming a suppliers alliance can solve this problem effectively, and increase the profit of all suppliers when the alliance`s negotiating power is improved to a certain threshold.

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