Backscratching in banks: political cycles in bank manager appointments

Author(s):  
Jonas Markgraf

Abstract Close ties between politicians and businesses affect firms’ performance and political outcomes, and while direct political control over firms has been curtailed by tightened regulation, political connections remain ubiquitous in many countries. Yet, it is unclear through which channels these linkages are maintained in strictly regulated environments. I speculate that one such channel of political control over firms is politicians’ ability to influence corporate appointment decisions. To test the claim, I employ survival models that analyze chairpersons’ turnovers in 90 Spanish savings banks between 1985 and 2010 and find strong evidence for electoral appointment cycles: bank chairpersons are more likely to lose office shortly after regional elections and when new governments enter office.

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandip Sukhtankar

Political control of firms is prevalent across the world. Evidence suggests that firms profit from political connections, and politicians derive benefit from control over firms. This paper investigates an alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit electorally from connected firms, examining sugar mills in India. I find evidence of embezzlement in politically controlled mills during election years, reflected in lower prices paid to farmers for cane. This result complements the literature on political cycles by demonstrating how campaign funds are raised rather than used. Politicians may recompense farmers upon getting elected, possibly explaining how they can get away with pilferage. (JEL D72, G34, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13)


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan González Bertomeu ◽  
Lucia Dalla Pellegrina ◽  
Nuno Garoupa

AbstractThis paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina for 1984–2007. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political cycles in the Court as well as possible coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions in some periods (such as President Carlos Menem’s term) but less so in others (including President Néstor Kirchner’s term, a period of swift turnover in the Court due to impeachment processes and resignations). Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 09011
Author(s):  
Harsasto Priyatno ◽  
Utomo Susilo

This research will investigate how bureaucratic reforms in the context of decentralization impact on state bureaucratic capacity in Indonesia. It argues that bureaucratic reforms in Indonesia has resultin a two-particular political outcomes. Firstly, to strengthen government political control over the bureaucracy by swinging back the decentralization approach toward a prefectoral system as a mean of changing the political arena in their favor, and, secondly, to gain popular support. In this way, bureaucracy reforms have indeed increased efficiency of the public sector, butat the same time decrease its autonomy. Democracy, decentralization, hybrid regime, partial bureaucracy reforms.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma García-Meca ◽  
Jose Antonio García García

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of political presence on profitability in Spanish savings banks. Together with political connections, the paper analyzes the effects of chairmen’s banking experience on the efficiency of the savings banks. Design/methodology/approach Information was collected from all the savings banks in the sample for the period 2002-2009. The database used combines time series with cross-section data to give a panel of data to be estimated with this methodology. Findings After differentiating between municipal and regional participation, the results show that regional participation causes lower efficiency in a savings bank. There is no evidence that the financial experience of the chairman is an aspect that improves savings banks’ profitability. Originality/value The analyses undertaken in this paper help to detect whether certain corporate governance practices affect stakeholders' interests and the economy as a whole, through their effects on economic and financial interests, like the efficiency of savings banks. The paper lends support to the recent legal reforms aimed at reducing political presence on the boards of savings banks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 100766
Author(s):  
Omid Faraji ◽  
Mohammad Kashanipour ◽  
Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Nader Vatanparast

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
José Luis Marcos ◽  
Azahara Marcos

Abstract. The aim of this study was to determine if contingency awareness between the conditioned (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US) is necessary for concurrent electrodermal and eyeblink conditioning to masked stimuli. An angry woman’s face (CS+) and a fearful face (CS−) were presented for 23 milliseconds (ms) and followed by a neutral face as a mask. A 98 dB noise burst (US) was administered 477 ms after CS+ offset to elicit both electrodermal and eyeblink responses. For the unmasking conditioning a 176 ms blank screen was inserted between the CS and the mask. Contingency awareness was assessed using trial-by-trial ratings of US-expectancy in a post-conditioning phase. The results showed acquisition of differential electrodermal and eyeblink conditioning in aware, but not in unaware participants. Acquisition of differential eyeblink conditioning required more trials than electrodermal conditioning. These results provided strong evidence of the causal role of contingency awareness on differential eyeblink and electrodermal conditioning.


1893 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Gustave Serrurier
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document