The Dejudicialization of International Politics?

For many, the growing judicialization of international relations is the next step in the process toward the complete legalization of international politics. We draw on the literature in comparative judicial politics to examine the limits of the phenomenon. The domestic literature on judicialization portrays the process as something of a one-way ratchet. In an increasingly juridified world, judges have been asked to take on greater roles in global governance, and they seem to be doing so with aplomb. This in turn incentivizes individuals and interest groups to frame their policy claims in legal terms, providing ever-more fuel for judicial governance. Yet many courts and other legal institutions, both domestic and international, have had their jurisdiction constrained, with some areas of law removed from judicial purview. Might the dynamics of constraint and backlash lead to the dejuridification of an area that has been judicialized? We conceptualize the possibility of what we call dejudicialization, situate it in the context of the literature on backlash, and delimit its potential scope and implications. While dejudicialization is empirically rare, we argue that its very possibility suggests that judicialization should not be considered a teleological process.

Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina for 1984–2007. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political cycles in the Court as well as possible coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions in some periods (such as President Carlos Menem’s term) but less so in others (including President Néstor Kirchner’s term, a period of swift turnover in the Court due to impeachment processes and resignations). Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.

Response to Maria Popova's review of Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development

I thank Maria Popova for her generous, thoughtful, and constructive review of my book and am delighted to hear that despite my exclusively American focus, she finds much of import in my work for scholars of comparative judicial politics. In fact, her breakdown of the potentially generalizable theoretical insights to be drawn from my book was as edifying as it was gratifying. Needless to say, had I been aware of the ways in which some of the empirical phenomena I seek to explain in the American case have since been effectively replicated in, or speak to the circumstances of, other polities, I would have made a deliberate attempt to highlight that fact.

Comparative Judicial Politics

This article studies comparative judicial politics, and presents a systematic definition of judicial independence. It presents theoretical explanations — positive and normative — for judicial independence, and examines judicial systems in a classificatory way. The article concludes with a list of the authors' ideas for empirical research.