scholarly journals AN EXPLANATORY CHALLENGE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Boult
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Number Of Authors

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard's way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don't think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms of an “explanatory challenge”. The explanatory challenge is a simple, yet powerful and illuminating challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is illuminating in the sense that it shows us why Epistemological Disjunctivism must take on certain internalistically problematic commitments. A secondary aim of this paper is to examine whether the recently much-discussed distinction between justifications and excuses in epistemology can support an adequate response. I will argue that it cannot.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Epistemic Modesty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.

scholarly journals ON ENVATTMENT - DISJUNCTIVISM, SKEPTICAL SCENARIOS AND RATIONALITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (134) ◽  
pp. 525-544
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Clinical Cases

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination.

scholarly journals REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.J. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Bridge Principle ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

AbstractIt is now common to distinguishMetaphysicalfromEpistemologicalDisjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I labelReflective Epistemological Disjunctivismor (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.

Epistemological Disjunctivism, by Duncan Pritchard.

Mind ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (489) ◽  
pp. 235-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Littlejohn
Keyword(s):  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Direct Application ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Skeptical Paradox

This chapter demonstrates that epistemological disjunctivism represents a viable theoretical option when it comes to our understanding of perceptual knowledge. It also shows that this proposal has direct application to the underdeterminationRK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the new evil demon intuition and the insularity of reasons thesis that underlies it, and hence is in a position to deny one of the claims that makes up this paradox. Moreover, epistemological disjunctivism can also lay claim to being an undercutting anti-skeptical proposal. Finally, the chapter discusses how epistemological disjunctivism is able to trade on the general epistemological distinction that has been drawn between favoring and discriminating epistemic support.

World in Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Logue
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
External World ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
External World Skepticism

I will begin this paper by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is “extended”, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject’s environment (a view also known as Naïve Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism (a view that is elaborated and defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard). I will conclude by comparing the resulting view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism, and arguing that the version I have offered provides the most satisfying response to external world skepticism.

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